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Introducton
Among many economists and politcians the noton that bilateral trade increases welfare is widely
accepted. In the past few decades, big steps towards a further liberalizaton of internatonal trade
were taken. Although successive rounds of multlateral trade negotatons have helped achieve
deep reductons in import dutes, other obstacles remain. These barriers to trade can have various
forms and in most cases occur in the form of additonal direct or indirect costs. The exact sum of
these costs is usually uncertain. One aspect of this uncertainty is the unpredictability of future
export revenues due to volatlity in the exchange rate of the invoicing currency and the domestc
currency. Lowering the level of uncertainty about exchange rates could therefore be promotng
trade and thereby, as the ultmate goal, increase welfare in the world.
In Europe, major steps have been taken to eliminate this kind of uncertainty by introducing a
common currency with the formaton of the Eurozone. Afer the last round of accessions in
January 2014, the Eurozone forms a currency union of 18 member countries with a total
populaton of 333 millions and accounts for around 13 percent of the world's GDP. Before and in
the early years afer the introducton of the Euro, expectatons of large economic gains from a
currency union this large were widespread. On February 2nd 2004 in a keynote address at the
conference “Euro Adopton in the Accession Countries – Opportunites and Challenges”, Horst
Köhler, at that tme Managing Director of the Internatonal Monetary Fund (IMF), stated:
“Eventually joining the common currency area will provide a further signifcant boost to economic
development through increased trade and fnancial fows by lowering transacton costs and
eliminatng market risks.“
This implies that the introducton of the Euro has sizable and positve efect on the member
country's patern of internatonal trade. The answer to the queston whether or not this is true is
of considerable interest as the Euro consttutes a unique natural experiment of several major
economies introducing a common currency and therefore is carefully watched by countries
considering to join the Eurozone or to form new currency unions in other parts of the world. The
fnancial crisis of 2008 and the following debt crisis in Europe have clearly shown that potental
gains from a common currency come at a certain cost: Giving up an independent monetary policy
limits the optons for countries to deal with such crisis. As positve efects in trade are used as one
of the main arguments to justfy the disadvantages of a common currency, it is necessary to
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investgate the relatonship between exchange rate volatlity and trade and assess the robustness
of trade efects from currency unions. As argued by Rose (2000), the impact of a currency union
goes beyond the efect of eliminatng nominal exchange rate uncertainty as it is also limits the
resources needed in handling currency exchange. In the literature this is ofen described as a non-
linear impact on trade (Figure 1) and referred to as the “Rose Efect” or “Euro Efect” (e.g. Baldwin
(2006)).
Figure 1: Exchange Rate Volatlity and Trade
This thesis contributes to the existng literature by analyzing the impact of uncertainty in the form
of exchange rate volatlity on the intensive and extensive margin of trade using informaton at the
frm- and country-level. I use advanced panel data estmaton techniques and examine
methodological problems in previous studies. Among the potental biases for empirical results that
I try to account for are endogeneity issues, sample selecton, multlateral resistance, frm
heterogeneity and bilateral tme-invariant heterogeneity. Furthermore, I distnguish between
efects from exchange rate volatlity and common currencies in order to properly assess the “Euro
Efect”.
The thesis is structured as follows: The frst chapter presents country-level evidence for the impact
of exchange rate volatlity on bilateral trade for European countries and their biggest trading
partners. In order to properly consider short-term efects and special sectoral characteristcs, the
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endogeneity in the currency decision estmatng trade fows between the CFA Franc Zone and the
Eurozone before and afer the introducton of the Euro. The underlying idea is to examine whether
positve trade efects occur when the eliminaton of nominal exchange rate volatlity is not
explicitly wanted and is not associated with other trade facilitatng atempts. The third chapter
shifs the focus to the impact of exchange rate volatlity and currency unions on export behavior at
the frm-level using survey data of frms located in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The main aim
here is to validate and quantfy the efect of exchange rate policy on a frms' probability to become
an exporter, the frms' export intensity and the determinants of natural hedging, while accountng
for diferences between single industries and sectors. In chapter four the impact of uncertainty on
the mode of export is investgated, using frm-level informaton from the same survey as in the
previous chapter, in order to identfy how uncertainty in various felds afects a frms' choice
between direct exportng or exports via an intermediary. The ffh chapter looks at a very distnct
aspect of uncertainty in the context of internatonal trade. It focuses on the uncertainty that comes
with trading major conventonal weapons (MCW) and tries to answer the questons whether being
close in a politcal sense renders two countries more likely to engage in the exchange of deadly
weapons. Having similar politcal views might help to reduce the uncertainty of potental
consequences that is associated with the delivery of major arms by clearing doubts about their
future use.
One of the main fndings of this thesis is that uncertainty induced by volatlity in the exchange rate
has a signifcant negatve impact on trade fows in Europe and that thus decreasing volatlity
increases trade. The introducton of a common currency is found to have an additonal positve
impact. Both results are based on data at the frm- and at the country-level. Nevertheless, the
efect of the currency union is quanttvely small, profoundly smaller than found in most previous
studies. There is also evidence for strong sectoral diferences, indicatng that responsiveness to
fuctuatons in the exchange rate depends on industry-related features such as the investment
horizon and access to fnancial markets. Furthermore, by using a natural experiment involving the
CFA Franc Zone it was shown that misspecifed models and endogeneity in the currency decision
can be a serious problem in the empirical estmaton and that, when being able to control for the
bias, results may turn out to be insignifcant. Exchange rate volatlity and thus uncertainty about
future revenues not only afects a frms' decision whether or not and how much to export, but
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among many other factors, also the choice for the mode of export. Firms in the service sector in
Eastern Europe are more likely to involve an intermediary in their exportng actvites and on a
larger scale when volatlity in the exchange rate of the domestc currency to the Euro increases.
The fndings do not render currency unions a wrong endeavor. Nevertheless, they emphasize that
the decision to join a currency union should not be based mainly on the expectaton of large gains
in terms of higher trade fows to other members of the currency union as the increase in bilateral
trade fows so far has been rather small. A reducton in volatlity in the exchange rate to the main
invoicing currencies can also be achieved by using other tools of monetary policy. Although being
designed only to facilitate the transiton to the Euro, the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II
(ERM II), that allows exchange rates to vary within a certain band to the Euro, could qualify as a
beter soluton for some countries. In fact, trade efects for frms of the ERM II are found to be only
slightly smaller than those of the Euro, but by design, the ERM II grants greater fexibility in tmes
of crisis. If a reducton in uncertainty over future movements of the exchange rate is not possible,
countries should ensure that frms have access to foreign markets via intermediaries. These
implicatons are partcularly important for countries in Eastern Europe, to whom the speech of
Horst Köhler was mostly directed to. Several countries located in the region have already decided
to join the Eurozone with Latvia in 2014 being the latest example and many more are expected to
follow. As revoking partcipaton in the Eurozone is extremely problematc, atempts to introduce
the Euro need a solid ground of expertse with a thorough assessment of potental positve and
negatve efects and have to be based on realistc expectatons. 
With respect to the politcal determinants of arms transfers, I fnd that countries are more likely to
trade when they have a similar politcal orientaton. One possible explanaton is that the level of
uncertainty about the future use of the weapons is lower: countries have more trust that arms
afer their export are not used against the interests of the supplier when the recipient has similar
politcal beliefs. I can also show that governments are more likely to transfer arms in order to help
other countries when both share a certain politcal orientaton. This has not changed
fundamentally with the end of the Cold War. Also military pacts between countries and conficts in
the recipients remain to be relevant factors for the probability that two countries trade arms, as
well as mandatory UN embargoes. It is important that any atempt to control the distributon of
major arms, in a domestc approach or at the supranatonal level, acknowledges and refects the
politcal dimension as an important factor.
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I - Exchange Rate Volatlity and the Euro Efect
based on joint work with Inmaculada Martnez-Zarzoso
The end of the Breton Woods system in the early 1970's and the adopton of a foatng exchange
rate regime in 1973 raised the queston of how the resultng increase in exchange rate volatlity
causes exchange rate risk and afects internatonal trade and welfare. The EMU and the
introducton of the Euro, associated with the aboliton of several European currencies, has led to a
huge debate among economists about the efects on trade. Very recently, the global fnancial crisis
as a catalyst of the debt crises and the massive central bank interventons especially in Europe and
the USA have increased exchange rate volatlity and brought the topic back on the agenda.
In the light of the recent events, especially the case of Europe and the Euro is worth a second
glance. The queston whether joining a currency union and thereby eliminatng exchange rate
volatlity with various other countries is boostng trade signifcantly is a very relevant queston for
many Central and Eastern European countries. The fact that countries like Poland postpone their
accession to the Euro is a strong indicator for the uncertainty whether or not the negatve
consequences of a currency union outweigh positve efects, especially on trade.
Early theoretcal studies including Clark (1973) and Hooper & Kohlhagen (1978) fnd negatve
efects for exchange rate volatlity on trade, but are based on strong assumptons. When these
assumptons are relaxed, results depend on whether the frms are actve in several countries
(Makin 1978), adjustments of the infaton rate to exchange rate movements (Cushman 1983;
Cushman 1986), flexibility of the frms in adjustng inputs (Canzoneri & Clark 1984) or changing
target markets (Broll & Eckwert 1999), risk aversion of the frm (De Grauwe 1988; Viaene & de
Vries 1992) or the types of shocks frms are exposed to (Barkoulas et al. 2002).
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The empirical literature does not present unambiguous evidence on the relatonship between
exchange rate volatlity and trade. Some studies fnd signifcant negatve (e.g. Chit et al. 2010) or
positve efects (e.g. Klein & Shambaugh 2006), but in the majority of cases, no clear efect is
obtained (e.g. Hondroyiannis et al. 2008; Boug & Fagereng 2010; Eicher & Henn 2011).1
Evidence on currency unions and unilateral dollarizaton is much clearer. While early studies fnd
large efects and trade to triple (Rose 2000; Frankel & Rose 2002), most recent studies report
positve efects on trade of around 5 to 30 percent (e.g. Flam & Nordström 2007; Baldwin & Di
Nino 2006; Eicher & Henn 2011). Other authors do not describe signifcant efects (e.g. Berger &
Nitsch 2008; Santos Silva & Tenreyro 2010). The usual argument why efects for currency unions
are more signifcant is that a currency union goes beyond the mere eliminaton of exchange rate
variability and lowers transacton costs to a much bigger extent.2 Although almost all empirical
studies are based on the gravity equaton on trade, they difer signifcantly in methodology, panel
of countries, tme frame, volatlity measure and degree of disaggregaton of the trade data.
The aim of this paper is to provide further empirical evidence on the relatonship between
exchange rate volatlity, currency unions in case of the Eurozone and trade by presentng several
noveltes with respect to previous research. Higher frequency trade and exchange rate data is used
to take into account the short term efects of volatlity in the bilateral exchange rate. Disaggregated
trade data is used to deal with diferences among industries.
In contrast to many other studies, several econometric problems including the existence of zero
trade values are taken into account. Investgatng the impact of exchange rate volatlity and the
Euro at the same tme allows us to disentangle the efect of a common currency beyond the
eliminaton of any variaton in the exchange rate with other members. Furthermore, due to a large
dataset including very recent data, the developments of the past years with the fnancial crisis and
the EU enlargement to the east are covered, yielding additonal fndings and policy implicatons.
Studies investgatng the currency union efect by employing early Eurozone data can be assumed
to be biased due to the boom in imports in the periphery countries from other Eurozone members
that, as we know today, was a consumpton and housing bubble and led to what is usually referred
to as the European “debt crisis”. Therefore, trade efects for the early years, especially for fnal
goods, could have been overestmated.
1 See literature surveys of Côté (1994), McKenzie (1999), Ozturk (2006), Bahmani-Oskooee & Hegerty (2007) and
Auboin & Ruta (2011).
2 Baldwin (2006) provides a good overview on the early literature.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Secton I.I describes the empirical strategy and issues
in the estmaton. Secton I.II presents the results and fnally, secton I.III concludes with a summary
of the main fndings and policy implicatons. 
I.I - Methodology
The empirical analysis is based on the standard gravity model of trade that was frst developed by
Tinbergen (1962). It is based on Newton's law of universal gravitaton, according to which planets
are mutually atracted in proporton to their physical mass and proximity. Transferred to the world
of trade, physical mass is replaced with economic mass which is usually measured in GDP. Thus,
trade between two countries is modeled as a functon of their “economic mass” and the distance
between them and has the following form:
X ij=G Ai B jφij , (I.1)
where Xij denotes the monetary value of exports from i to j, Ai comprises all exporter and Bj all
importer specifc factors that make up the total producton capacity and demand. G is a variable
that does not depend on i or j such as the level of trade liberalizaton. Finally, φ ij represents the
ease of exporter i to access market j what is the inverse of bilateral trade costs.
I.I.I - Estmaton Issues
The gravity equaton of trade has seen numerous contributons and further developments in the
past years. In partcular the work of Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) has been very infuental.
They show that for a well specifed gravity equaton trade costs must be seen in relatve terms to
the rest of the world in order to model a country's overall “resistance” to trade. This can be done
by introducing “multlateral trade resistance” (MTR) in the gravity equaton. The basic idea is that
ceteris paribus two countries trade less with each other when they are surrounded by big
economies than if they are surrounded by water, mountains or deserts and that the standard
gravity equaton does not account for that.
We are dealing with MTR by introducing country-year dummies that control for tme-varying
exporter and importer efects. Another serious issue, especially when dealing with sectoral trade
fows or trade between small countries, is the existence of zero trade fows. While previous models
were not capable of explaining the existence of zeros in trade fows and treated them as missing
data, the monopolistc-competton model of heterogeneous frms developed by Melitz (2003)
explains their existence with diferences in productvity between frms. Helpman et al.
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(2008) specifed a model that allows to control for zero trade fows using a two-stage procedure. In
the frst stage the extent of frms’ entry into an export market (extensive margin), which is an
unobserved variable in the standard gravity equaton, is estmated using a probit model given by:
ρij=Pr (T ij=1)=Θ( y0+ν i+σ j+κVCij+ζ FCij) , (I.2)
where the probability of exports from i to j depends on the importer and exporter dummies νi and
σj, bilateral variable exportng costs VCij and fxed costs of entry FCij.
In the second stage the determinants of trade fows (in monetary value) are estmated with an
augmented version of the gravity equaton where the results of the frst stage in form of the
inverse Mill's rato (IMR) are used to control for the sample selecton bias due to omited zero
trade fows. Following this approach, the estmated equaton is given by:
X ij=β0+Ιi+Ι j+κVCij+ ln (e
δ(zij+ηij )−1)+βηηij+eij , (I.3)
where trade fows between i and j is the dependent variable and I i and Ij denote the exporter and
importer individual efects. The term in brackets is the share of frms that export to j, z is the fted
variable for the latent variable that was estmated in the frst stage and ηij is the inverse Mill's rato.
A requirement of the approach is the use of a valid exclusion restricton: a variable that enters the
frst stage but not the second and that has no signifcant impact on the trade value, but on the
probability to export is a good candidate. Most authors choose a dummy variables that identfes
whether or not two countries share the same religion as the excluded variable. In the European
context, we do not consider this a good choice, as all countries share a christan heritage and only
some of their trading partners difer from that3. Also the main religion of a specifc country does
usually not vary over tme. In this specifc case of the EU members, we propose a diferent
approach with the crossproduct of a tme varying measure of corrupton for exporter and importer.
The channel through which it afects trade is by rising insecurity and associated extra fxed costs
for the exportng frm stemming from a higher probability of authorites or criminals trying to
extort bribes in their homeland or export destnaton (Crozet et al. 2009). For frms in countries
with very low levels of corrupton, this can be seen as a serious obstacle to start exportng as those
countries are usually not used to this practces. But also positve efects for trade are conceivable:
corrupt ofcials might allow frms to export or import even if their products do not meet technical,
ethical, quality or safety standards. In over-regulated countries this could lower fxed trade costs
3 Namely China, India and Turkey.
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signifcantly (Rose-Ackerman 1999). Either way, by infuencing fxed-costs rather than variable
costs, corrupton can be thought of as an additonal barrier to trade, which should not have a
signifcant impact on the value of trade once frms learn how to operate in a corrupt environment.
The corrupton data is taken from the Internatonal Country Risk Guide (ICRG) published by the PRS
Group and is a component of the Politcal Risk Dataset. It has a scale from 0 (extremely high level
of corrupton) to 6 and assesses corrupton within the politcal system4. 
An additonal possible source of estmaton bias is the endogeneity of the decision to join a
currency union. Frankel (2008) argues that endogeneity was not responsible for the extremely high
estmates of early studies investgatng currency union efects on trade. He presents estmates of
similar magnitude to those found by a large number of early studies for the CFA Franc Zone, whose
members have not decided to peg their currency to the Euro, but did so afer France joined the
Eurozone. The peg was not accompanied by other steps of integraton that may have boosted
trade and stands for an interestng natural experiment as the currency decision can be seen as
exogenous5.
In our case we assume endogeneity of the currency decision not to be a serious issue as past
integraton steps for Eurozone members are controlled for with a dummy for membership in the
European Union (EU). Besides the common currency, Eurozone members have the same degree of
trade facilitatng integraton as members of the EU. We assume that the decision to join the
Eurozone is a politcal decision that is mostly driven by other factors diferent from those
infuencing the value of trade. 
I.I.II - Data
We have build a dataset with monthly bilateral trade for 35 countries over the period from January
1996 to December 2010. The countries included are either EU-27 countries or their major trading
partners (Table A.1).6 We use nominal monthly bilateral trade data disaggregated according to the
BEC classifcaton7 from Eurostat. Unfortunately, Eurostat does not contain data on bilateral trade
4 In our dataset the crossproduct for both countries ranges from 2 to 36.
5 The impact of the Euro on trade between the CFA Franc Zone and the Eurozone is further investgated in chapter II
of this thesis.
6 Data for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia
and Slovenia is missing for the years from 1996 to 1998.
7 A thorough descripton of the BEC classifcaton is available from the United Natons Department of Economic and
Social Afairs (2007).
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between two non-EU members, therefore data on trade fows between countries that have never
been members of the EU is missing. The share of total trade covered by our sample is for EU
countries well above 80 percent (Table I.I.1).
Table I.I.1: Share of Total Trade in the Sample
We assign the BEC sectors to three categories of goods, namely capital goods, intermediates and
fnal goods, as recommended by the United Natons Department of Economic and Social Afairs
(2007). The share for each BEC category in total trade for the whole sample is illustrated in Figure
A.1 and the evoluton over tme of total trade for our three categories in Figure A.2. Nominal GDP
data is taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database at an annual level. To
construct the bilateral exchange rates8 and the volatlity measure, we use daily nominal middle
exchange rates reported by Datastream from the WM Company/Reuters.9
Diferent measures of exchange rate volatlity have been proposed in the related literature. Most
approaches have in common to measure the variance, but difer in the implementaton. Examples
are the standard deviaton of a rate of change or the moving standard deviaton. Other measures,
like ARCH and GARCH models, have gained popularity among researchers in recent years. The
later model the variance of the disturbance term for each period as a functon of the errors in the
8 The bilateral exchange rate measure is the average exchange rate of the past six months.
9 This rate is the midpoint between the bid rate and the ofered rate.
Eurozone Other EU-Members Non-EU Members
Country Share in % Country Share in % Country Share in %
Austria 87.07 Bulgaria 78.41 Switzerland 69.75
Belgium 91.62 Czech Republic 93.51 China 15.80
Cyprus 61.66 Denmark 83.75 India 19.60
Germany 80.58 Estonia 91.73 Japan 13.36
Spain 82.00 United Kingdom 82.91 Norway 72.39
Finland 85.16 Hungary 88.48 Russia 32.52
France 84.09 Lithuania 88.77 Turkey 49.57
Greece 71.01 Latvia 90.86 USA 19.04
Ireland 90.62 Poland 88.74
Italy 80.78 Romania 85.09






Notes: Share is the average share of total trade value covered by our sample over all 
16 BEC categories and 15 years for a single country.
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previous periods. All measures have drawbacks, like for instance the high persistence of real
exchange rate shocks when moving average representatons are applied or low correlaton in
volatlity when ARCH/GARCH models are the measure of choice (Baum et al. 2004). The
introducton of new and more sophistcated measures has however not altered the results
signifcantly in the empirical literature on the impact of exchange rate volatlity on trade (Córic &
Pugh 2010). 
Another important queston is whether volatlity of the nominal or the real exchange rate or both
are included in the model. An advantage of the real exchange rate is that it refects the true
relatve price of the good. However, it also captures variaton in the price levels, what is not
desirable. Several studies apply both exchange rates and compare the results. The diferences they
fnd are usually very small.10
Based on the recent literature, we have selected the standard deviaton of the frst diference of
the logarithms of the nominal exchange rate, which has been used in various studies before (e.g.
Clark et al. (2004)):
Volatility ijt=Std. dev. [ln (eijt , d)−ln (eijt−1)] d=1...130 , (I.4)
where e denotes the daily bilateral exchange rate between countries i and j at business day d.
This measure has the advantage of being equal to zero when the exchange rate is on a consistent
trend, which apparently could be forecasted and consequently would not be a source of
uncertainty.
To avoid bias from changes in price levels via spurious correlaton, we use nominal exchange rates.
The measure is constructed as a short-term volatlity measure with bilateral exchange rates from
the past six months. Departng from most previous studies, we construct the exchange rate
volatlity measure with daily exchange rates which allow more precise measures than “end of the
month” values as exchange rates sometmes tend to sufer more extreme movements at the end of
each month. High persistence of exchange rate shocks is less of a problem as we only measure
short-term volatlity of the past six months with high frequency data. In contrast to studies
investgatng long- or mid-run volatlity, we investgate the efect of short-term exchange rate
volatlity on trade by using a 6 month volatlity measure. We assume that 6 months consist of 130
business days and thus construct the volatlity measure accordingly.
10 A very profound comparison of the efects real and nominal exchange rate volatlity on exports was conducted by
Coter & Bredin (2011) fnding that magnitude and directon are not changing, while tming efects can be diferent.
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I.II - Efect of Exchange Rate Volatlity on Trade
Estmatons are conducted for three diferent categories of products: capital goods, intermediates
and consumpton goods. The idea is that these three groups difer signifcantly in terms of
contractng paterns and that our variables of interest might afect trade fows in a diferent
directon or to a diferent extent.
I.II.I - Model Specifcaton
First, we use fxed- (FE) and random-efects (RE) regressions with year-varying country fxed efects
on the log of the value of bilateral exports. Therefore, we are estmatng the following equaton:
ln X ijkt=β0+β1 ln (Y it∗Y jt)+β2 ln Distanceij+β3EU ijt+β4 Euroijt+
β
5
Borderij+β6 Languageij+β7 Landlocked ij+β8 Islandij+β9Colonyij+
β10Volatility ijt+β11 ln ExRateijt+β12Corruptionijt+κk+λm+αiy+ν jy+εijkt
,   (I.5)
where the explained variable Xijkt denotes nominal exports in sector k from the reporter country i
to the partner country j at tme t (month m in year y). The independent variable κk controls for
industry diferences with dummy variables for each BEC category and λm controls for monthly
seasonal efects with dummy variables for each month m of the year y. The introducton of α iy and
νjy proxies for multlateral resistance. The simultaneous inclusion of the measure of nominal
exchange rate volatlity and the dummy variable for mutual Euro membership allows us to capture
convex efects as described by Baldwin (2006). Other variables are described in Table A.3 in the
Appendix.
In order to control for zero trade fows, we follow the two stage approach from Helpman et al.
(2008). The frst step estmaton is a probit regression on the probability to export:
Pr ( X ijkt=1)=Θ (β0+β1 ln Y it∗Y jt+β2 ln Distanceij+β3EU ijt+β4Euroijt+
β
5
Borderij+β6 Languageij+β7 Landlocked ij+β8 Islandij+β9Colonyij+
β
10
Volatilityijt+β11 ln ExRateijt+β12Corruptionijt+κk+λm+αi+ν j )
. (I.6)
The second step is then estmated as a FE and RE regression including the linear predicton of
exports down-weighted by its standard error (ZHAT) and the inverse Mill's rato (IMR). To fulfll the
exclusion restricton, the variable Corruptonijt is not included:
ln X ijkt=β0+β1 ln (Y it∗Y jt)+β2 ln Distanceij+β3EU ijt+β4Euroijt+
β
5
Borderij+β6 Languageij+β7 Landlocked ij+β8 Island ij+β9Colonyij+
β10Volatility ijt+β11 ln ExRateijt+β12 ZHAT +β13 IMR+κk+λm+αiy+ν jy+εijkt
. (I.7)
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I.II.II - Results
The extended gravity model is estmated for a sample of 35 countries over 15 years. Tables I.II.1 to
I.II.3 present the estmates for capital goods, intermediates and fnal goods separately. The results
show very robust negatve efects for the volatlity measure for the current period and for all lags.
While for fnal goods (Table I.II.3) the efect is higher for the current value of the volatlity variable
than for the rest, for capital goods (Table I.II.1) lags of the volatlity variable present higher
coefcients than the current value. Finally, for intermediates (Table I.II.2) the current value and the
frst lag show higher elastcites than the second and third lags. Mutual EU membership has a
signifcant positve efect on the probability to trade and the trade value. The coefcient of the EU
dummy in the probit model is positve and statstcally signifcant and ranges from 0.26 for capital
goods over 0.34 for intermediates to 0.44 for fnal goods (column (3) in Tables I.II.1 to I.II.3). Thus,
mutual EU membership increases the extensive margin of trade signifcantly, especially for
industries producing fnal goods.
The estmated coefcient for EU membership in the FE model in column (4), which should give an
idea of the efect of EU membership on the intensive margin, equals 0.09 for intermediate goods,
about 0.11 for capital goods and 0.2 for fnal goods. Hence, the highest EU efect is found for fnal
goods.
The results for the “Euro Efect” are more ambiguous than for the efect of the EU, but stll
signifcant at conventonal levels. The probability to trade is negatvely afected with estmated
coefcients around -0.25 for fnal goods and intermediates and -0.33 for capital goods. Trade value
is afected negatvely for capital goods with estmates around -0.10 and positvely with estmates
around 0.08 and 0.07 for intermediates and fnal goods, respectvely. In percentage points, the
impact of the Euro on trade values lies according to our estmatons at around 9 percent for
intermediates and 7 percent for fnal goods. When not controlling for exchange rate volatlity, the
impact of the Euro on exports rises only slightly. For capital goods trade is around 11 percent lower
and around 8 percent in the two stage approach.
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Table I.II.1: Regression Results - Capital Goods
FE RE Probit FE RE
0.447*** 0.474*** 0.462*** 0.243*** 0.467***






0.115*** 0.112*** 0.260*** 0.122*** 0.118***
(0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0103) (0.0161) (0.0161)
-0.114*** -0.104*** -0.331*** -0.0708*** -0.0815***


























-2.805*** -2.758*** -1.688*** -1.518*** -2.231***
(0.514) (0.515) (0.368) (0.545) (0.542)
-3.482*** -3.432*** -1.475*** -2.200*** -2.885***
(0.612) (0.614) (0.363) (0.638) (0.636)
-3.527*** -3.425*** -1.430*** -2.244*** -2.901***
(0.509) (0.510) (0.358) (0.540) (0.537)
-1.451*** -1.402*** -1.555*** -0.164 -0.735
(0.531) (0.533) (0.364) (0.559) (0.556)
-0.301*** -0.296*** -0.00373 -0.299*** -0.295***
(0.0710) (0.0712) (0.0501) (0.0709) (0.0712)
0.0500 0.0578 -0.0924 0.0500 0.0571
(0.0634) (0.0636) (0.0840) (0.0634) (0.0636)
0.271*** 0.240*** -0.0426 0.271*** 0.241***
(0.0734) (0.0732) (0.0816) (0.0734) (0.0732)
0.0826 0.0751 0.0656 0.0804 0.0733







IMR - - -
2.047*** 5.926***
(0.631) (0.509)
283,895 283,895 345,268 283,895 283,895
0.194 0.697 - 0.194 0.698
RMSE 1.171 1.176 - 1.171 1.175








































Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; s ignifcance levels: * 10% ** 5% ***1%; 
Reported R2 is within R2 for FE estmatons and overall R2 for RE estmatons.
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Table I.II.2: Regression Results - Intermediates
FE RE Probit FE RE
0.682*** 0.510*** 0.390*** 0.660*** 0.516***






0.0896*** 0.0873*** 0.341*** 0.0912*** 0.0890***
(0.00902) (0.00901) (0.00449) (0.00900) (0.00900)
0.0942*** 0.0894*** -0.257*** 0.0785*** 0.0705***


























-2.435*** -2.416*** -1.144*** -2.927*** -3.003***
(0.285) (0.285) (0.174) (0.299) (0.298)
-2.560*** -2.522*** -0.868*** -3.033*** -3.090***
(0.339) (0.339) (0.171) (0.351) (0.350)
-1.865*** -1.833*** -0.792*** -2.334*** -2.397***
(0.282) (0.282) (0.169) (0.296) (0.296)
-0.617** -0.594** -2.426*** -1.086*** -1.153***
(0.298) (0.298) (0.170) (0.312) (0.312)
-0.0911** -0.0904** 0.0503** -0.0911** -0.0904**
(0.0394) (0.0394) (0.0230) (0.0394) (0.0394)
0.0820** 0.0820** -0.0324 0.0824** 0.0824**
(0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0385) (0.0348) (0.0349)
-0.0136 -0.0145 -0.0392 -0.0134 -0.0142
(0.0409) (0.0409) (0.0374) (0.0409) (0.0409)
0.0191 0.0195 0.00306 0.0186 0.0188







IMR - - -
2.545*** 2.833***
(0.182) (0.178)
1,045,992 1,045,992 1,381,072 1,045,992 1,045,992
0.113 0.623 - 0.113 0.623
RMSE 1.243 1.244 - 1.243 1.244








































Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; signifcance levels: * 10% ** 5% ***1%; 
Reported R2 is within R2 for FE estmatons and overall R2 for RE estmatons.
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Table I.II.3: Regression Results - Final Goods
FE R E Probit FE RE
0.416*** 0.449*** 0.451*** 0.234*** 0.450***






0.202*** 0.201*** 0.439*** 0.202*** 0.200***
(0.00790) (0.00789) (0.00609) (0.00787) (0.00787)
0.0648*** 0.0681*** -0.241*** 0.0741*** 0.0718***


























-2.426*** -2.404*** -0.987*** -2.214*** -2.365***
(0.234) (0.234) (0.200) (0.248) (0.247)
-2.186*** -2.167*** -1.487*** -1.932*** -2.088***
(0.282) (0.282) (0.199) (0.295) (0.294)
-1.438*** -1.429*** -0.510*** -1.186*** -1.347***
(0.235) (0.235) (0.197) (0.250) (0.249)
-0.968*** -0.957*** -2.208*** -0.724*** -0.879***
(0.247) (0.247) (0.199) (0.261) (0.260)
-0.276*** -0.276*** -0.268*** -0.274*** -0.275***
(0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0297) (0.0347) (0.0347)
-0.0592* -0.0591* -0.0931* -0.0600* -0.0599*
(0.0311) (0.0312) (0.0499) (0.0311) (0.0312)
0.0667* 0.0655* -0.116** 0.0659* 0.0647*
(0.0360) (0.0360) (0.0484) (0.0360) (0.0360)
-0.0589** -0.0589** 0.410*** -0.0602** -0.0593**







IMR - - -
5.923*** 6.156***
(0.417) (0.382)
879,509 879,509 1,035,804 879,509 879,509
0.167 0.683 - 0.167 0.683
RMSE 1.006 1.007 - 1.006 1.007








































Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; signifcance levels: * 10% ** 5% ***1%; 
Reported R2 is within R2 for FE estmatons and overall R2 for RE estmatons.
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When estmatng the model excluding exchange rate movements, the estmated coefcients
remain almost unchanged, whereas exchange rate volatlity coefcients move slightly. Not
controlling for exchange rate volatlity leads to slightly higher estmates for the EU and Euro
dummy (Tables A.4-A.6).
All coefcients of the other variables included in the gravity equaton yield the expected signs.
Estmates are always signifcant and positve for the GDP crossproduct and negatve and signifcant
for the distance between capitals. Controls for contguity always yield signifcant positve estmates
and the coefcient of the variable island is negatve and signifcant. While the control variable for
common ofcial language shows mixed results, former colonial tes have a negatve impact on the
probability to export, but a positve on the value exported. The excluded variable in the second
stage that, which is expected to have an impact only on the probability to trade, but not on the
value, does a considerably good job. Our bilateral corrupton measure has an insignifcant impact
on trade value and a signifcant impact on the probability. Only for capital goods, the impact on the
value is signifcant, but very low.
When testng our results for robustness, we fnd that neither reducing the tme period (Table A.8,
columns (1) to (3)), nor excluding big non-European countries (Table A.8, columns (4) to (6)) from
the sample signifcantly changes results for the EU or Euro dummies. Nevertheless, the volatlity
variables turn out to be less signifcant and their general impact less clear-cut. This is due to the
fact that exchange rates in the full sample are more volatlity before 1999 for countries that later
joined the Euro and in general between EU-countries and countries with more or less free foatng
exchange rates like USA, Russia or India.
I.III - Conclusion and Policy Implicatons
In contrast to many previous studies, we do not fnd unambiguous results for exchange rate
volatlity. Instead, we fnd evidence for a signifcant negatve impact, admitedly small in size. We
fnd that sectors react diferently with regard to the tme frame and size of the impact. While
mutual EU membership promotes trade via the extensive and intensive margin for most goods,
Euro membership does so only via the intensive margin and not for capital goods. This could
provide some evidence for a pronounced specializaton process taking place in the Eurozone at the
industry level afer the introducton of the Euro, which results in countries exportng goods from
less industries, but higher overall value. According to our results, the efect is slightly stronger for
intermediates than for fnal goods. However, further research is needed to confrm this statement.
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The results for the extensive margin are very much in contrast to fndings obtained by other
authors (e.g. Bergin & Lin 2010; Baldwin & Di Nino 2006), who usually fnd positve Euro efects on
the extensive margin. This is probably due to the lower level of disaggregaton and higher
frequency of our trade data. Negatve efects on a monthly level do not necessarily mean that
positve efects on a yearly and product level are not possible. It would mean that while the Euro
forced a strong specializaton process with pronounced seasonality on the industry level, the
number of diferent products traded between members of the Eurozone on a yearly basis has
increased. The introducton of controls for frm heterogeneity and sample selecton bias does not
change the results. Nonetheless, extensive and intensive margin are afected very diferently by
our variables of interest. When dropping most observatons with higher volatlity from the sample,
the impact of exchange volatlity on trade is less clear while the impact of mutual EU and Euro
membership remains robust.
Policy implicatons stemming from our results are manifold. Policymakers should keep in mind, that
currency unions come at great costs with regard to the fexibility of the domestc monetary policy
and positve trade efects may be very limited and do not exist for all types of goods. The
eliminaton of exchange rate volatlity can also be achieved by a fxed peg. Although we fnd trade
efects to be small, it stll may be the best choice to avoid negatve impacts as experienced
currently in Eurozone and grants greater fexibility. The queston whether stabilizing the exchange
rate is a desirable objectve for policymakers is unclear and it is also unclear to which extent the
real exchange rate is a variable that policymakers should be able to infuence or actually can
infuence, besides establishing a currency union, a fxed peg or Dollarizaton (Eichengreen 2007;
Rodrik 2008).
In the light of the current economic and politcal crisis in Europe, our results provide evidence that
a common currency may reduce investments and thus trade in capital goods within the currency
union. Together with current account imbalances or real exchange rate misalignments, this may
lead to a loss in compettveness that can not be compensated by a devaluaton of the domestc
currency by a single member.
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II - The CFA Franc and the Euro
The controversial debate about the “Euro Efect” following the paper of Rose (2000) helped
determine several methodological problems that occurred in investgatons about trade efects
stemming from currency unions based on the gravity equaton of trade. More recent studies have
found robust and much lower efects, but could not wash away concerns about one possible bias:
Many authors argue that in case of the Euro and most other currency arrangements it is hard to
isolate the efect of fxed exchange rates on trade due to the endogeneity of the currency decision
(e.g. Baldwin, 2006; Frankel, 2008). This is due to the fact that countries are considered to be more
likely to cooperate with countries that are close and they already have strong tes with.
Furthermore, monetary cooperaton is usually accompanied by other trade-promotng integraton
atempts. 
In this context, the case of the CFA Franc Zone in Western Africa, as suggested by Frankel (2008),
deserves a second look. As a byproduct of the introducton of the Euro in 1999, both CFA Franc
were pegged to the Euro afer only being pegged to the French Franc before. This provides an
interestng natural experiment, as members of the CFA Franc Zone had no intenton to peg their
currency to currencies of the Eurozone (EZ) besides the French Franc and it did not happen within
a process of deeper integraton between both currency unions. The decision to form a fxed peg of
the CFA Franc and the Euro can therefore be seen as exogenous. This allows to isolate the currency
efect on trade from other trade promotng atempts and to quantfy the efect without
endogeneity bias in the currency decision.
In this paper, I use the gravity equaton of trade to estmate the import and export efects of the
introducton of the Euro on trade fows within the CFA Franc Zone and between Eurozone and the
CFA Franc Zone with trade data for 128 countries and the years 1995-2009. Diferent to the
approach by Frankel (2008), I use panel data estmaton methods and, in order to account for
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multlateral resistance, include tme varying country-dummies and cover also countries outside the
Eurozone and the CFA Franc Zone. Furthermore, I try to ensure that the variables measure a strictly
exogenous efect. The main aim of this study is to quantfy the trade efect for fows between
countries with a pegged exchange rate that is strictly exogenous and give an impression of the size
of the endogeneity bias.
The results suggest that while there are positve efects for trade between the CFA Franc Zone and
the Eurozone and within the CFA Franc Zone, these are limited to single sectors and the former are
most likely the results of trade liberalizaton. The endogeneity bias appears to have a strong efect
when estmatng the model with OLS, as it was done in previous studies.
II.I - Background
The CFA Franc Zone was created in 1945 in the form of two currency unions with a pegged
exchange rate to the French Franc. One is the West African Economic and Monetary Union
(WAEMU)11 and the other the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC)12. As
both currency unions have the same fxed exchange rate to the French Franc and later the Euro13,
the exchange rate between both CFA Franc Zones is one.
All member states of the CFA Franc Zone are Sub-Saharan African countries and all but Guinea-
Bissau and Equatorial Guinea were French colonies before gaining independence. A unique feature
of the CFA Franc Zone is the involvement of France as the anchor currency country in the monetary
policy of the central banks of the WAEMU and CEMAC. France guarantees the convertbility in their
own currency and partcipates in the executve boards of the central banks with veto power and
thus the ability to block any decisions. Today, the CFA Franc Zone goes beyond the features of a
regular currency union. With the devaluaton in 1994, rules of macroeconomic surveillance very
similar to those established in the EMU were introduced and gradually implemented. The three
main convergence criteria are an infaton rate below 3 percent, a debt-to-GDP rato below 70
percent and a balanced budget (Hallet 2008).
The fxed peg of the CFA Franc to the French Franc/Euro serves as an an important anchor for
monetary policy for the CFA members. As a disadvantage, it implies the lack of monetary and
exchange rate policies as an opton to support a smooth adjustment to regional or country-specifc
11 In 2012 consistng of Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.
12 In 2012 consistng of Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.
13 Since the last devaluaton of the CFA Franc in 1994, the fxed exchange rates are FF 1 = CFA 100 and Euro 1 = CFA
655.957.
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shocks. According to Hallet (2008), it has contributed signifcantly to eforts in the region to
achieve considerably higher macroeconomic stability than in most other parts of Sub-Saharan
Africa. The convertbility to French Franc/Euro facilitates external transactons and provides the
CFA Franc Zone with credibility and stability. This is broadly seen as enhancing the conditons for
trade in general, not only for trade within the currency union. 
At the same tme, the CFA Franc Zone faces several severe problems: While monetary integraton is
well established, economic integraton is stll rather incomplete. Together with a weak economic
environment and a heavy dependence on commodity exports with volatle prices it increases the
likelihood of asymmetric shocks and of pro-cyclical fscal behaviour. This is the main reason why
overall compliance with the aforementoned convergence criteria has been insufcient in most of
the member countries in the past. 
II.II - Literature
Analysing trade efects within the framework of the CFA Franc Zone with two currency unions is
rather complex. Both CFA Franc currency unions themselves have a fxed peg with the France and
later the Eurozone as a whole. Therefore, the exchange rate between both CFA Francs is pegged
indirectly. An extensive literature investgates the trade efects stemming from currency unions and
fxed pegs. Both policies are very related as forming a currency union and a fxed peg of two
currencies both imply the eliminaton of any volatlity in the nominal bilateral exchange rate. The
main diference is that a currency union is a more binding commitment and harder to withdraw
from what makes currency handling easier as changes in the exchange rate policy are less likely.
Therefore, the trade efect of a currency union is usually expected to go beyond the trade efect of
a pegged currency.14
First, it is important to assess the relatve importance and relevance of exchange rates as a barrier
to trade in Sub-Saharan Africa. De Sousa & Lochard (2005) investgate how exchange rates in
comparison to other variables explain the “border efect puzzle”. They use a gravity model
approach and fnd between 17 and 28 percent of the total border efect for the CFA Franc Zone to
be caused by currency related efects such as currency handling and exchange rate uncertainty and
conclude that exchange rates indeed are a signifcant barrier to trade.
14 Given the one to one convertbility between both CFA Francs and the fact that France is the anchor currency with
signifcant infuence on the central bank policy for both currencies, one might also consider the two monetary
unions of the CFA Franc Zone as one large currency union. In this study, I do not distnguish between both currency
unions and treat the CFA Franc Zone as single currency union.
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The empirical literature investgatng trade efects of exchange rate volatlity in general does not
have an unambiguous result. Most studies yield insignifcant or weak but signifcant negatve
estmates.15 In contrast to that, studies investgatng trade efects of currency unions usually fnd
robust positve efects. While early studies have found extremely high results of up to 200 percent
(Rose 2000), estmates have decreased to a positve efect between 5 and 30 percent in more
recent studies, but remain robust. Most of the later studies have in common that they focus on
trade efects of the Eurozone rather than currency unions in general.16
While numerous studies have examined trade efects of exchange rate volatlity and currency
unions for industrialized countries, studies for developing and especially Sub-Saharan African
countries are scarce. In one of the very few exceptons, Fielding & Shields (2005) investgate the
impact of the CFA Franc on macroeconomic integraton in form of trade intensity and business
cycle synchronisaton for the years from 1981-2000. They fnd evidence for positve efects for
intra- and inter CFA Franc Zone trade that are declining over tme. Results for the 1980s are of a
similar magnitude as found by Rose (2000) for a global sample. The lower magnitude for more
recent years, especially for the fxed exchange rate efect of inter-CFA Franc Zone trade, could be
explained with a greater correlaton between exchange rate stability and other forms of
macroeconomic policy stability. Reforms in this feld in countries with fexible exchange rates let
potental gains of exchange rate stability diminish.
Masson (2008) tries to evaluate whether currency unions in Sub-Saharan Africa are justfed by
positve trade efects. He argues that due to asymmetries across countries and the low levels of
trade among the members a selectve expansion of existng fxed exchange rate agreements like
the CFA Franc Zone or adopton of a foreign currency like the Euro in form of a dollarizaton would
be preferable in terms of higher welfare than the formaton of new currency unions in this area. He
sees other trade facilitatng atempts such as improving infrastructure, politcal stability and
efcient merchandise handling as more promising in increasing trade than the formaton of a
currency union.
Tsangarides et al. (2006) investgate trade efects of currency unions employing an augmented
version of the gravity model of trade for the case of Africa with data for 217 countries and the tme
of 1948-2002. They fnd bilateral trade to double when both country are members of the same
15 See survey papers on the relatonship between exchange rate volatlity and trade from Côté (1994), McKenzie
(1999), Ozturk (2006), Bahmani-Oskooee & Hegerty (2007) and Auboin & Ruta (2011).
16 A good overview of the literature is delivered by Baldwin (2006).
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currency union and that the size of the efect is very similar for the African countries and the whole
sample. They also fnd that the trade efect is not associated with trade diversion from non-
currency-union members and is stronger the longer the mutual currency union membership
persists.
In the context of the “Euro Efect” literature, Frankel (2008) investgates the impact of the fxed
exchange rate efect between Eurozone and the CFA Franc Zone with a gravity model of trade. His
main goal is take advantage of the natural experiment given by the introducton of the Euro and to
investgate the “Euro Efect” without endogeneity in the currency decision. He uses trade data for
the years 1948-2006 and fnds bilateral trade between members of the Eurozone and the CFA
Franc Zone to be 76 percent higher afer the introducton of the Euro. Mutual membership in the
CFA Franc Zone he fnds to decrease bilateral trade by 52 percent. Unfortunately, the observed
positve efects for trade between the Eurozone and the CFA Franc Zone can not be seen as
completely exogenous, as in this study France is treated as a normal Eurozone member. The
currency decision of France certainly is a politcal decision and therefore endogenous.
Other authors investgate the queston whether the CFA Franc Zone fulfls the criteria of an
optmum currency area (OCA). Zhao & Kim (2009) compare features of the CFA Franc Zone with
the Eurozone using a structural vector autoregression method to model natonal outputs as
determined by global, regional, and country-specifc shocks. They fnd that domestc output of
members of the CFA Franc Zone are heavily infuenced by country-specifc shocks, while regional
shocks are more important in the Eurozone. They see this as evidence that the CFA Franc Zone
countries are structurally diferent from each other and therefore are more likely to be afected by
asymmetric shocks and thus that the CFA Franc Zone is in fact not fulflling the criteria of an
optmum currency area. Kurihara (2011) examines the suitability of the currency union among CFA
Franc Zone members according to the OCA criteria focussing on business cycles and trade and
endogeneity between variables. He fnds that the currency union and eliminaton of nominal
exchange rate variability results in large gains in actve trade fows and convergence of business
cycles.
In a descriptve study, Hallet (2008) describes a declining share of trade for the CFA Franc Zone
with the Eurozone in the past decades. He atributes this to the longer-term adjustment from
colonial economic tes and the increasing importance of emerging economies in Asia in more
recent years.
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Thus, in additon to politcal instability, infrastructure and merchandise handling, currency related
problems appear to be an important constraint to trade in Sub-Saharan Africa. While there are
doubts that the CFA Franc Zone is an appropriate tool, empirical results show large positve efects
on trade with the Eurozone and no signs of trade diversion, but evidence for the evoluton of trade
efects over tme is mixed. This is despite the decreasing relatve importance of the Eurozone in
trade for the CFA Franc Zone found in the descriptve study by Hallet (2008). Results on trade
efects within the CFA Franc Zone are in general mixed, indicatng that the CFA Franc Zone is not
contributng much to regional trade integraton. All studies investgatng trade efects have in
common that they look at trade efects at the aggregate level and do not distnguish between
diferent types of products.
II.III - Empirics
The dataset of this study covers 128 countries (Table B.1) for the years 1995-2009. Data on bilateral
trade fows is from United Natons Comtrade. Data for variables capturing geographical and
cultural closeness are from CEPII17 and bilateral data on regional trade agreements (RTA) and
currency unions (CU) is from de Sousa (2012). Informaton on CFA Franc Zone membership was
taken from the Banque Centrale des États d'Afrique Centrale (BEAC) and the Banque Centrale des
États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO) and for Eurozone membership from Eurostat. All variables in
the model are described in Table B.2.
In this study I estmate an augmented version of the gravity model of trade which represents trade
between two economies as a functon of their respectve economic masses, the distance between
them and a variety of other factors with ordinary least squares (OLS), fxed- (FE) and random-
efects (RE). The later two take advantage of the panel structure and control for unobserved
heterogeneity. One of the main aims of this study is to measure trade efects of currency unions or
direct pegs where the currency decision is exogenous. Therefore, we frst estmate all models also
with dummy variables for trade between CFA Franc Zone and Eurozone that do not treat France as
a member of the later. The reason is that, unlike for all other Eurozone members, for France to
assist in the peg of both CFA Francs to their currency and thus the Euro was a politcal decision and
can not be seen as exogenous.
17 See Mayer & Zignago (2011) for a more detailed descripton.
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In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity, we introduce several control variables including
country-tme fxed-efects. Allowing for a tme variaton in country fxed-efects is more consistent
with the theoretcal concept of “multlateral resistance” proposed by Anderson & van Wincoop
(2003), as multlateral resistance indices are likely to vary over tme. As a robustness check the
model is also estmated with no tme variaton in the country dummies. 
The model is defned as follows:
ln Exportsijt=β0+β1 lnGDPijt+β2 ln Distanceij+β3CFAEZ ijt+
β4EZCFAijt+β5 intraCFAijt+β6Borderij+β7 Languageij+β8 Landlockedij+
+β9Colonyij+β10 RTAijt+β11CU ijt+αit+ν jt+εijt
, (II.1)
where Exportsijkt denotes the average of bilateral exports from country i to j at tme t, GDP ijt is the
crossproduct of both countries average nominal GDP and Distanceij is the distance between both
countries' capitals. We include dummy variables to identfy trade fows from the CFA Franc Zone to
the Eurozone (CFAEZijt), the Eurozone to CFA Franc Zone (EZCFAijt) and between CFA Franc Zone
members (IntraCFAijt) . Borderij is a dummy variable that equals one if both countries share a
border, Languageij equals one if a language is spoken by at least nine percent of the populaton in
both countries, Landlockedij equals zero if none, one if one of the two, and two if both countries
are landlocked. Colonyij is a dummy variable that equals one if both countries have had any
colonial tes, RTAijt equals one if both countries have signed a regional trade agreement and CUijt18
equals one if both countries are members of the same currency union.
The model is estmated again for diferent sectors in order to identfy which sectors drive the
results. Therefore, trade data following the Standard Internatonal Trade Classifcaton (SITC) Rev. 2
at the 2-digit level from United Natons Comtrade is assigned to three diferent groups of products:
agricultural goods, mining and manufactures and estmated the aggregate level. The assignaton to
the three diferent good categories is done according to the conversion table by Rauch (1999).
18 The currency union dummy variable takes the value zero when both countries are a member of the CFA Franc Zone
as this is already captured by the dummy variable for mutual CFA Franc Zone membership.
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II.III.I - Results
Results for the estmatons with country and year fxed-efects including country and year dummies
are shown in Table II.III.1. Estmaton results with country dummies varying over tme are
presented in Table II.III.2. In all columns with odd numbers, dummy variables identfying trade
fows between Eurozone and CFA Franc Zone treat France as a Eurozone member, in columns with
even numbers France is not treated as Eurozone member. 
Estmated efects for CFA/EZ trade links difer to a larger extent between the diference estmaton
techniques and the directon of the fow. When estmatng efects for trade from CFA Franc Zone
members to Eurozone members with OLS, we fnd negatve efects of between 9 and 23 percent
lower trade fows. These efects are less signifcant or insignifcant when treatng France not as a
Eurozone member in order to minimize the endogeneity bias. Exports from Eurozone members to
CFA Franc Zone members are between 8 and 17 percent higher. For FE and RE estmatons the
introducton of the Euro only yields insignifcant results. Trade fows in the opposite directon show
signifcant positve efects when allowing country-dummies to vary over tme. Trade increases by
47 percent according to the FE estmatons and 25 percent for RE estmatons. The later is weakly
signifcant when treatng France as Eurozone member and insignifcant otherwise. Trade within the
CFA Franc Zone yields mostly signifcant positve estmates. Only for the FE model and only with
tme-varying country-dummies results are insignifcant. While estmates for the RTA dummy are
positve and signifcant in all cases, results of currency unions are mostly negatve or they are
insignifcant in the case of the FE estmatons with tme-varying country-dummies.
Variables measuring distance and dummies for common border, common language,
landlockedness and colonial relatons are dropped from all FE regressions due to perfect
collinearity as these variables do not vary over tme. In OLS and RE regressions, sharing a border, a
common language or to have common colonial past all have a signifcant positve impact on trade
fows. The GDP crossproduct has a signifcant positve impact on trade and distance between
capitals a signifcant negatve in all regressions. 
The OLS estmates have the disadvantage of unobserved heterogeneity and the panel data
structure of the data is not refected in the estmaton and therefore panel data estmaton
techniques are considered more appropriate. The preference for FE or RE estmatons depends on
the consistency of the RE estmates, which are more efcient. According to the Hausman test, all
RE estmates are inconsistent. In this study, multlateral resistance is accounted for by including
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country-dummies in the model. As this resistance to trade can be expected to vary over tme, it is
important that this is refected in the estmaton. Therefore, the preferred model is a FE estmaton
with tme-varying country-dummies shown in Table II.III.2 in columns (3) and (4).
Table II.III.1: Trade Volume Estmated with Country and Year Fixed-Efects and Country- and 
Year-Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS FE FE RE RE 
0.807*** 0.805*** 0.928*** 0.928*** 0.914*** 0.914***




(0.00739) (0.00739) (0.0198) (0.0198)
-0.146** -0.260*** 0.222 0.222 0.0992 0.0912
(0.0717) (0.0774) (0.171) (0.171) (0.146) (0.148)
0.183*** 0.129*** 0.0911 0.0889 0.0846 0.0814
(0.0347) (0.0366) (0.0664) (0.0662) (0.0606) (0.0614)
1.385*** 1.366*** 0.254** 0.254** 0.398*** 0.398***
















(0.0269) (0.0268) (0.101) (0.101)
0.588*** 0.586*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.203*** 0.203***
(0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0202) (0.0202)
-0.377*** -0.382*** -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.171*** -0.171***
(0.0444) (0.0444) (0.0255) (0.0255) (0.0346) (0.0346)
Constant
20.17*** 20.17*** 9.060*** 9.060*** 19.82*** 19.82***
(0.345) (0.345) (0.160) (0.160) (0.542) (0.542)
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 237,966 237,966 237,966 237,966 237,966 237,966
0.737 0.737 0.138 0.138 0.733 0.733


























Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; signifcance levels: * 10% ** 5% ***1%; Strict 
exogeneity refers to exogeneity of the currency decision and indicates whether (“No”) or not 
(“Yes”) France is treated as a Eurozone member
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Table II.III.2: Trade Volume Estmated with Country-Year Fixed-Efects and Time-Varying 
Country-Dummies
Following the choice of the most appropriate estmaton above, we reestmate column (4) in Table
II.III.2 for three diferent sectors to assess which of them drives results at the aggregate level and
show the estmates in Table II.III.3. Regression results at the sectoral level show that only trade of
agricultural goods yields signifcant estmates, but not trade in goods from the mining or
manufacturing sector. While exports of agricultural goods from the CFA Franc Zone to the Eurozone
show a signifcant positve increase of 46 percent in trade value, exports in the opposite directon
are afected negatvely with a decrease of 25 percent. The former could be explained with the start
of the Everything but Arms initatve (EBA) of the EU in 2001, under which all imports to the
European Union from the least developed countries are duty-free and quota-free, with the
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS FE FE RE RE 
0.648*** 0.647*** 0.697*** 0.697*** 0.691*** 0.691***




(0.00742) (0.00742) (0.0199) (0.0199)
-0.0928 -0.211*** 0.384** 0.384** 0.226* 0.218
(0.0726) (0.0787) (0.164) (0.164) (0.137) (0.140)
0.149*** 0.0873** -0.0842 -0.0843 -0.0557 -0.0643
(0.0363) (0.0385) (0.0773) (0.0775) (0.0690) (0.0699)
1.426*** 1.399*** 0.0675 0.0675 0.278** 0.275**
















(0.0267) (0.0267) (0.101) (0.101)
0.593*** 0.591*** 0.0994*** 0.0994*** 0.188*** 0.188***
(0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0218) (0.0218)
-0.373*** -0.380*** 0.00956 0.00957 -0.0720* -0.0728*
(0.0460) (0.0460) (0.0356) (0.0356) (0.0436) (0.0437)
Constant
23.66*** 23.66*** 10.54 10.55 23.63*** 23.63***
(0.376) (0.376) (194.8) (68.97) (0.586) (0.586)
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 237,966 237,966 237,966 237,966 237,966 237,966
0.744 0.744 0.146 0.145 0.739 0.739


























Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; signifcance levels: * 10% ** 5% ***1%; Strict 
exogeneity refers to exogeneity of the currency decision and indicates whether (“No”) or not 
(“Yes”) France is treated as a Eurozone member
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excepton of arms and ammuniton19. In order to be applicable for a certain good, all phases of
producton have to occur within least developed countries. This is the case for only very few non-
agricultural goods. Within the CFA Franc Zone, only manufactures show a weakly signifcant
increase in the value traded of 24 percent.
Table II.III.3: FE Regressions with Time-Varying Country-
Dummies by Sector
II.IV - Conclusion
The results of this study shed light on the robustness of trade efects from fxed exchange rates
without endogeneity bias. In sharp contrast to the results of other authors, I fnd that the
eliminaton of nominal exchange rate volatlity between CFA Franc Zone and the Eurozone has
boosted trade fows from the CFA Franc Zone to the Eurozone through an increase in exports of
agricultural goods, but not the other way around. Results are most likely driven by the EBA
initatve that due to its strict rules of origin is promotng almost exclusively the export of
agricultural goods and that started about the same tme as the Euro was introduced. Due to
complex transitonal agreements is hard to control for the initatve in an empirical setng. 
19 The initatve includes transitonal arrangements for sugar, rice and bananas untl 2006.
(1) (2) (3)
































Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; signifcance 
levels: * 10% ** 5% ***1%
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With regard to the endogeneity issues, results show that when estmatng the model with OLS
trade efects are much higher with France treated as an Eurozone member. In the strictly
exogenous case, the signifcant efect on trade fows disappears. This leads to the conclusion that
the high positve efects of the fxed peg between CFA Franc Zone and Eurozone found by Frankel
(2008) are not robust to endogeneity in the currency decision and probably are to large. It also
emphasizes that the bias caused by the endogeneity issues in studies investgatng trade efects
from exchange rate policy is signifcant and strong when using OLS. 
It can also be seen as an indicator that unobserved factors like other trade-facilitatng atempts
beside RTAs, well established business links and trade networks play a much bigger role in this
partcular case of trade between Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa than exchange rate risks. France,
due to its special role in the history of the region, may stll have very special relatonship with the
members of the CFA Franc Zone that goes beyond a common colonial past or a common language.
The veto power in the executve boards of both CFA Franc central banks is one example and
presence of military troops in the region another. Investgatng the economic and politcal role of
France in Sub-Saharan Africa with regard to trade in goods goes beyond the scope of this paper but
provides interestng research opportunites for future studies.
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III - Exchange Rate Policy and Exports of Firms
based on joint work with Inmaculada Martnez-Zarzoso
The impact of volatlity and movements of exchange rates on trade remains to be a vivid topic of
academic debate, which was dominated for a longer tme by the introducton of the Euro. While
for the Eurozone in partcular and currency unions in general a consensus was reached for most
economists that a robust positve efect exists, for volatlity in the bilateral exchange rate the
results remain mixed. In both felds, the most common approach to empirically evaluate the efect
on trade has been to estmate a gravity model using aggregated or sectoral trade data at the
country level.
A number of empirical studies however investgates the impact of exchange rate volatlity on
export behaviour using frm-level data yield mixed results. The estmated efects for the extensive
margin are not signifcant for Spain (Campa 2004) and positve for France (Guillou 2008). Studies
on the intensive margin fnd negatve efects for France (Berthou & Fontagne 2008) and China
(Héricourt & Poncet 2012) and no signifcant efects for Turkey (Solakoglu et al. 2008). The “Euro
Efect” yields signifcant positve efects only for the extensive margin in the case of France
(Berthou & Fontagne 2008), only the intensive margin for Italy (Vicarelli & Pappalardo 2012) or
both margins for Germany (Etzel et al. 2013). All are single country studies with a focus on big
economies with litle volatlity in the exchange rate or focus on large frms only.
In this paper we go a step further and extend the literature using frm-level data by examining a
huge region of 26 countries instead of a single country and by focusing on Eastern Europe, a region
where exchange rate fuctuatons are considerable. The second novelty of this paper is the focus
not only on the efect of exchange rate volatlity on trade alone, but also on the currency regime
efect. It is also worth mentoning that the region is dominated by countries that are not large in an
economic sense and have no well-developed fnancial markets. Furthermore, we examine whether
32 III - Exchange Rate Policy and Exports of Firms
importng actvites are afected in a similar fashion as exportng, the impact of diferent hedging
tools on frms' engagement in internatonal trade and provide results for several robustness
checks.
The investgated region is partcularly interestng as most countries located there have had a
similar history in the last two decades, have undergone remarkable changes in exchange rate
policy and contnue to have diferent policy approaches today, which provides sufcient variaton
at the country level to implement this research. So far, only single country survey analyses have
been conducted for Eastern Europe, in partcular for Hungary and the Czech Republic, which
investgate hedging practces of domestc frms (Bodnár 2009; Cadek et al. 2011).
Given the specifc characteristcs of the countries under examinaton, we frst hypothesize that
increasing volatlity in the bilateral exchange rate to the Euro leads to a rise in uncertainty for frms
about future revenues and thereby to less involvement in export actvites. Secondly, we expect
that the impact of the existng exchange rate agreements (e.g. Euro or ERM II) goes beyond the
reducton or eliminaton of exchange rate volatlity, as it reduces uncertainty about future changes
in the exchange rate and makes policy changes more difcult due to the binding character of the
agreements. The idea is that diferences in the domestc exchange rate policy towards the Euro
change the uncertainty horizon for the real value of frms' future revenues. While lower volatlity in
the exchange rate may encourage frms to engage in exportng actvites in the short term, a
certain degree of uncertainty remains as the exchange rate policy of their home country may
change in the near future. More binding commitments in the form of the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism II (ERM II) or Euro membership may lower the degree of uncertainty.
Our study is structured as follows: Secton III.I provides a brief overview of the theoretcal and
empirical evidence with a focus on frm-level data studies. Secton III.II contains informaton about
our data and the empirical strategy, secton III.III discusses the results and secton III.IV concludes.
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III.I - Literature Review
In this secton the main existng theories and empirical applicatons closely related to our work are
outlined and discussed. The next subsecton provides a summary of the theoretcal aspects and the
following a brief summary of empirical studies that evaluate the efect of exchange rate volatlity
on trade with a special focus on studies using frm-level data.
III.I.I - Theory
The theoretcal analysis of exchange rate volatlity and trade indicates that in most cases negatve
efects prevail due to uncertainty about future revenues as described by Clark (1973). But the
varying efects described in numerous scenarios rely to a large extent on the assumptons made. In
partcular, results show that the frms' level of risk aversion, the fexibility of a frm to shif from
one market to another and alter the compositon and origin of inputs appears to play an important
role.
Clark (1973) considers the case of a single frm with no market power producing a single good
under perfectly compettve conditons without imported components that is entrely exported to a
foreign market. The frm gets paid in the foreign currency and has to convert it at the current
exchange rate. As movements of the exchange rate are unpredictable and access to currency
hedging is assumed to be limited, the proceeds vary. High costs for adjustments to the scale of
producton keep the frm from altering output in advance of the realizaton of the exchange rate.
Thus, uncertainty about future exchange rates directly translates into uncertainty about future
receipts in the domestc currency.
Under the assumpton that the frm is risk averse and maximizes profts, it has to determine a level
of output that incorporates this uncertainty. In this situaton, the variability of profts depends
completely on changes in the exchange rate. Thus, an increase in volatlity of the exchange rate –
while the average level remains unchanged – leads to a decrease in producton, and hence in
exports, due to the increased exchange rate risk. Infexibility of frms to alter factor inputs can
amplify the efect (Hooper & Kohlhagen 1978).
Several studies have described certain scenarios in which increasing volatlity may have a positve
efect, e.g. due to the possibility of higher average revenues (Canzoneri & Clark 1984) or via
additonal proft possibilites and the principle of sunk market-entry costs (Dixit 1989; Franke
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1991). Broll & Eckwert (1999) describe the case of a frm that profts from variability in the
exchange rate by seeing the home market as a safe harbour and foreign markets as a source for
additonal revenues when the domestc currency depreciates.
In the specifc case of Eastern Europe, another source of positve efects may stem from frms'
common practce in that region to take out loans in foreign currencies to proft from lower costs of
credit20. Intensifying export actvites invoiced in the currency of the credit may then be seen as a
way to lower credit risks in case of a depreciaton of the frms' domestc currency. When assuming
risk aversion, a frm may even accept lower revenues from exportng instead of selling to the
domestc market in order to decrease total risk exposure. Higher exchange rate volatlity can in this
case lead to higher exports because of increasing exchange rate risks in order to lower credit risks.
To our knowledge this efect has not yet been considered by the existng theories.
III.I.II - Empirical Studies
The empirical literature investgatng trade efects of volatlity in the bilateral exchange rate or
currency unions is mostly based on country-level data. Some studies use disaggregated data to
control for diferences between industries or to emphasize the higher responsiveness of single
sectors. There are no unambiguous results of empirical macro studies investgatng the impact of
exchange rate volatlity, but most fnd weak and mostly signifcant negatve efect. Studies difer in
the sample of countries, the covered tme period, the degree of disaggregaton of the trade data
and empirical methodology.21 In a very comprehensive meta-regression on empirical macro-studies
of the topic, Córic & Pugh (2010) fnd exchange rate volatlity and trade to have a modestly
negatve relatonship with pronounced heterogeneity and with litle evidence of publicaton bias,
but mainly positve evidence that this relatonship is an authentc empirical efect. They fnd
uncertainty arising from exchange rate volatlity to be a serious concern for least developed
countries, what points towards the importance of hedging instruments and thus the stage of
development of fnancial markets in least developed countries.
The introducton of a common currency completely eliminates nominal exchange rate volatlity
between the members. Positve trade efects of currency unions can go beyond the eliminaton of
volatlity in the exchange rate as it also facilitates currency handling and lowers uncertainty in the
20 This Informaton has been obtained from surveys on exchange rate handling practce of frms for Hungary and the
Czech Republic described in secton III.I.III.
21 See survey papers on the relatonship between exchange rate volatlity and trade from Côté (1994), McKenzie
(1999), Ozturk (2006), Bahmani-Oskooee & Hegerty (2007) and Auboin & Ruta (2011).
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long term due to the binding character of a currency union. Studies investgatng trade efects of
currency unions usually fnd robust positve efects. While early studies found extremely high
results of an increase in trade up to 200 percent (Rose 2000), estmates have decreased to a
positve efect between 5 and 30 percent, but remain robust. Most of the later studies focus on
trade efects for the Eurozone.22
Only a few studies take advantage of data at the frm-level and usually focus on frms in a single
country. Empirical studies on trade efects of currency unions and exchange rate volatlity based on
frm-level data are shown in Table III.I.1. Campa (2004) investgates the case of 2188 Spanish
manufacturing frms for the years 1990-1997 and their responsiveness in export behaviour to
exchange rate changes by estmatng a dynamic discrete-choice model. He does not fnd a
signifcant efect of exchange rate volatlity on foreign market entry and exit, instead he fnds
evidence for sunk costs hysteresis to play an important role and that a depreciaton of the
domestc currency increases export volumes slightly via the extensive margin.
In a similar way, Guillou (2008) employs data on french manufacturing frms for the years 1994-
2004 and distnguishes between efects on the probability to export and export intensity. On the
one hand, she fnds that for most industries a depreciaton of the domestc currency afects the
probability to export, while there is fairly no impact on the export intensity when introducing the
lagged value of the dependent variable. Exchange rate volatlity yields positve results on the
probability to export for most industries.
Solakoglu et al. (2008) estmate the efect of exchange rate volatlity on real exports for the years
2001-2003 using a sample of 143 large Turkish frms. According to their results, exchange rate
volatlity does not afect trade and frm size and the level of internatonal actvity do not infuence
a frms' responsiveness to volatlity. They do fnd evidence for natural hedging via imported
intermediaries.
In a more recent study, Héricourt & Poncet (2012) investgate the efect of real efectve exchange
rate volatlity on export performance and the role of fnancial constraints. They employ export data
for more than 100,000 Chinese exporters over the period 2000-2006 and fnd a negatve efect on
extensive and intensive margins of trade. 
22 A good overview of the literature is delivered by Baldwin (2006).
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Several studies analyse the efect of membership in a currency union (usually the Euro) on export
behaviour of domestc frms. In general, studies using frm-level panel data fnd that Eurozone
membership signifcantly lowers the exchange rate risk to which domestc frms are exposed to
(e.g. Bartram & Karolyi 2006). Vicarelli & Pappalardo (2012) employ diference-in-diference
estmaton techniques for a panel of around 21,000 Italian frms for the years 1996-2004 and fnd
that the euro has had a positve infuence on Italian exports, mostly through the intensive margin.
Etzel et al. (2013) try to explain Germany’s export success story using data at the plant-level for the
years 1996-2008. They fnd that higher plant-level compettveness due to higher productvity or
lower wages is positvely correlated with export intensity at the intensive and extensive margins.
This lets them conclude that the introducton of the Euro has led to higher export demand for the
relatvely cheaper German products as separate regressions for the pre- and post-Euro periods
reveal that the export promotng efect of compettveness is strongest shortly afer the Euro was
introduced.
In the only other empirical study that includes both variables, measures for exchange rate volatlity
and currency unions, Berthou & Fontagne (2008) investgate export behaviour of French frms for
the years 1998-2003. Estmatng a model that consists of both variables allows to disentangle the
trade efect of eliminated exchange rate volatlity from the efect stemming from a common
currency. They fnd trade deterring efects via the intensive and extensive margin of trade for
exchange rate volatlity and trade boostng efects for Euro membership only via the extensive
margin.
Table III.I.1: Studies Investgatng Trade Efects of Exchange Rate Volatlity or Currency Unions at the Firm-level
Sample Efect on Margin Methodology
Authors # of Firms Time Country extensive intensive
2,188 1990-1997 Spain no efect - Dynamic discrete choice
Guillou (2008) 47,716 1994-2004 France positve** - RE Probit
143 2001-2003 Turkey - no efect OLS, FE, RE
? 1998-2003 France - negatve FE, RE
113,368 2000-2006 China - negatve FE
Eu
ro
? 1998-2003 France positve no efect FE, RE
21,000 1996-2004 Italy no efect positve Diference in Diference
16,000* 1996-2008 Germany positve positve FRACP, FRACPL, Tobit, Probit















Solakoglu et al. (2008)
Berthou & Fontagne (2008)
Héricourt & Poncet (2012)
Berthou & Fontagne (2008)
Vicarelli & Pappalardo (2012)
Etzel et al. (2013)
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Other studies focus on the impact of exchange rate volatlity on general economic performance of
frms (Carranza et al. 2003), frm value (Hutson & O’Driscoll 2010), plant-level investment (Kandilov
& Leblebicioglu 2011) or are only descriptve (Sanderson 2009).
Recent fndings suggest that the impact of exchange rates on trade fows in general may be lower
than expected due to the type of frms that export. Berman et al. (2012) fnd that exportng frms
are generally bigger and more productve than non-exporters and in a situaton of depreciaton of
the domestc currency tend to increase their margins rather than the volume of sales. For less
productve frms, the reverse is true: they increase the volume of exports rather than prices.
Although there is a positve impact of an exchange rate depreciaton on the number of exportng
frms or extensive margin, the efect is less evident on a macro level due to the smaller size of the
frms startng to export.
III.I.III - Hedging Behaviour of Firms
There are several ways in which frms can reduce the exposure to exchange rate uncertainty. For
instance, they can use internal hedging tools by importng intermediates in the currency of the
export destnaton. This only works when imports and exports are denoted in the same currency23
and prices are passed through to the domestc market24. This frm behaviour is is usually referred
to as “natural hedging”. Alternatve forms of internal hedging include pricing in the currency in
which the majority of the costs are incurred or in the currency of major compettors, ensuring that
comparatve prices are less afected and insertng an exchange rate variaton clause in trade
contracts to protect margins. In additon, frms can to a certain degree expedite or defer payments
and thereby lower the exposure to exchange rate peaks. 
The main alternatve is hedging with the help of a fnancial insttuton. For this external hedging to
be efectve, access to a well-developed and functoning fnancial market is crucial. When available,
a wide range of fnancial instruments is ofered that allow to lower or eliminate the risk exposure.
Among these are forward contracts, call and put optons and swaps. Furthermore, frms can lend
and borrow in foreign currencies, preferably in the currency of their export markets. Firms that are
23 Exports and imports do not have to be necessarily denoted in the same currency to ofset uncertainty efects.
When volatlity in the exchange rate is mostly driven by the domestc currency and exports and imports are
denoted in diferent but less volatle currencies, exposure to uncertainty will already be lower and could by
described as indirect hedging.
24 Fauceglia et al. (2012) provide evidence for a high exchange rate pass-through for intermediates in Switzerland.
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part of large multnatonals are even more fexible in this regard and have direct access to the
fnancial sector in several countries and commonly hold assets and liabilites in more than one
currency.
Nevertheless, all forms of hedging are either imperfect, associated with additonal costs and risks
or availability is limited to large frms25. Natural hedging is also not available when importng
intermediates is not an opton or suppliers of intermediates can not be changed. In a study
covering several countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Raddatz (2011) fnds that countries
with more volatle exchange rates tend to export goods from sectors where natural hedging is
possible and that this can help reduce the exposure to exchange rate risk. He fnds only weak
evidence showing that the availability of fnancial derivatves used for external hedging lowers the
importance of natural hedging in a given sector.
Litle evidence exists so far on how common the use of hedging instruments in the region covered
by our study is. Two descriptve studies on hedging practce in Eastern Europe yield interestng
fndings. Cadek et al. (2011) investgate hedging behaviour of 2330 Czech frms using a survey. They
fnd that around 60 percent of the frms are indeed hedging exports and that smaller frms are less
likely to hedge. In additon, their fndings indicate that the frms have not altered their hedging
behaviour afer the fnancial crisis. Bodnár (2009) analysing survey data for 672 frms for the year
2006 in a similar atempt for Hungary fnds that frms take out a considerably large share of loans
in Euros and Swiss Franc, but only an extremely small amount in US Dollars. Around 30 percent of
Hungarian frms raise debt in foreign currencies and 25 percent of them claim to do so because of
net income in foreign currencies. Hedging via the fnancial sector appears to be only a minor
reason for taking loans in foreign currencies and only a small fracton of frms in the sample,
around 7 percent, use foreign currencies mainly to hedge export revenues. According to the
survey, frms report to have debt in foreign currencies due to lower costs of credits as the most
important reason. Nevertheless, exchange rate volatlity is expected by the frms to have a negatve
impact on the revenues, especially by those with loans in foreign currencies.
25 Large corporatons in the Eurozone have indeed access to hedging instruments to reduce exchange rate risk and
they make use of it intensively (Döhring 2008). For small frms, this does not have to be the case.
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Summarizing, there is evidence that internal and external hedging are used by a notable number of
frms in the region of interest depending on their size and sector. It is worth to note that in the
case of external hedging it remains unclear whether hedging is the main purpose or just a side
efect in the frms' eforts to lower the costs of credits. Some evidence points in the directon of
the later.
III.II - Empirical Analysis
Our empirical analysis is separated in two parts. First, we quantfy the impact of volatlity of the
bilateral exchange rate of the domestc currency with the Euro and membership of currency
agreements on a frms' probability to export and second, on the export intensity. The frst queston
we try to answer with a probit regression on the probability of a single frm to export and the
second with a regression on the share of produced goods and services that is exported.
III.II.I - Data
Firm-level data is from the Eastern Europe & Central Asia Panel Dataset of the World Bank
Enterprise Surveys BEEPS and covers the years 2002, 2005, 2007 and 2009. The dataset combines
informaton gathered in diferent surveys and are matched by the World Bank. The panel structure
of the data is displayed in Tables C.1 and C.2 and countries and industries covered in this study are
shown in Tables C.3, C.4 and C.5.
Informaton for the exchange rate policy dummies comes from IMF, ECB, Eurostat and natonal
central banks. We distnguish between separate dummies for pegged exchange rates and
membership in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) or the Euro 26 and defne
exports as the sum of direct and indirect exports as reported by the frms. The number of regional
trade agreements (RTA) signed by each country in the panel as a measure of trade liberalizaton is
taken from De Sousa et al. (2012).
Unfortunately, the BEEPS dataset contains only limited informaton about the number of
employees for each frm. Only for some cohorts questons about the precise number of employees
are included in the questonnaire and due to the matching process, the BEEPS dataset only
includes informaton on the number of employees in categorical variables. This makes it impossible
to calculate a good measure of productvity without losing most of the observatons and thus, we
do not include a measure of productvity in our empirical approach.
26 We treat the unilateral adopton of the Euro in the case of Montenegro like a Euro membership.
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III.II.II - Volatlity Measure
The measure volatlity we use is the standard deviaton of the frst diference of the logarithms of
the monthly domestc exchange rate to the Euro for the twelve months of the past year:
Volatility jt=Std. dev. [ ln (e j ,m)−ln (e j ,m−1) ] ,m=1...12 , (III.1)
where e is the exchange rate of country j in month m.
Exchange rate movements are measured as the natural logarithm of the diference between the
average exchange rate of the past year and the year before. Data for the volatlity measure and
exchange rate movements are nominal monthly exchange rates from OANDA.com. Since we do not
have informaton about the destnaton of exports, we assume that the volatlity of the local
currency with respect to the Euro is a good proxy for exchange rate volatlity in general. This
assumpton is reasonable, because the main export destnaton for Eastern European countries is
the EU, as shown in Figure C.127. The EU is also the main compettor and the Euro is increasingly
been used as an invoicing currency, especially in countries with the prospect to adopt the Euro in
the future28. Evidence from some frm surveys supports this assumpton. For instance in the Czech
Republic, Cadek et al. (2011) fnd that more than 90 percent of frm exports go to other European
countries and 75 percent of all export revenues are in Euro.
Thus, the importance of the Euro is obvious for countries already aligning their monetary or
foreign policy towards the EU and the Euro, but less convincing for others. We assume that for the
countries in our sample that have a more or less free-foatng exchange rate, volatlity of the
exchange rate with the Euro is dominated by the volatlity of the domestc currency and not
volatlity of the Euro. As a robustness check, we have estmated the same regressions with a
volatlity measure constructed with exchange rates with respect to the US Dollar. Estmated
coefcients are lower and slightly less signifcant, but the general picture remains the same29.
The use of nominal exchange rates instead of real exchange rates is justfed by the fact that
reliability and availability of real exchange rates is not given for many countries in the sample.
Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that the choice between real and nominal exchange
rates does not change the magnitude and directon of the estmated coefcients and only tming
27 For most countries in the sample, more than half of total exports is exported to the EU-27 ( Figure C.1). Most
currencies of countries that are members of the EU but not the Eurozone have a rather stable exchange rate to the
Euro. 
28 The increasing relevance of the Euro as invoicing currency was found and well described by Kamps (2006).
29 Estmated coefcients for regressions with volatlity to the US Dollar as an explanatory variable instead of volatlity
to the Euro are available upon request. 
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efects can be diferent (Coter & Bredin 2011). In macro studies, a broad variety of exchange rate
volatlity measures has been used in the past. Nevertheless, a recent study shows that using more
sophistcated measures does not change the results signifcantly (Córic & Pugh 2010). The range of
the volatlity measure for each country for the years covered in our sample is displayed in Figure
C.2.
III.II.III - Model Specifcaton
Based on the theoretcal literature of heterogenous frms and internatonal trade, we distnguish
between the extensive and intensive margin of exports and estmate its determinants using two
separate model specifcatons. In order to estmate the determinants of the probability to export,
that we defne as the extensive margin of trade, we estmate a probit model that includes a
number of frm- and country-specifc variables and also industry (k), country (j) and tme (t) fxed-
efects and is given by:
Pr (Exporterijkt=1)=Φ (β0 +β1 ln Salesijkt+β2FirmSizeijkt+β3Qualityijkt+β4Euro jt+
β5ERM jt+β6Peg jt+β7 ln ExchangeRate jt+β8Volatility jt+β9RTA jt+κ j+λ k+α t+εijkt )
,   (III.2)
where Exporterijkt is a dummy variable that takes the value one if frm i is an Exporter at tme t and
zero otherwise, ln Salesijkt denotes the natural log of total sales, FirmSizeijkt is a measure of frm size
in terms of employees30, Qualityijkt is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the frm has
an internatonally-recognized quality certfcaton and zero otherwise.
We have introduced three dummy variables to control for the exchange rate policy in country j:
First, Eurojt takes the value one if the Euro is the domestc currency at tme t in country j and zero
otherwise. Second, ERMjt takes the value one if country j takes part in the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism II and fnally, Pegjt takes the value one if the domestc currency is pegged to the Euro or
to a basket of currencies that includes the Euro. Volatlityjt is our measure of choice for volatlity of
the exchange rate of the domestc currency with the Euro for the twelve months of the past year
specifed in equaton (III.1) and ln ExchangeRatejt is the natural log of the frst diference of the
average exchange rate of country j with respect to the Euro in year t-1. As a control for the degree
of trade liberalizaton in a given country, the model includes the variable RTA jt, which is the total
30 Firm size is a binary variable that takes the value one if the frm has less than 20 employees, two if the frm has
between 20 and 99 and three if the frm has 100 or more employees.
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number of RTAs in which country j partcipates in year t. In additon to a standard probit
regression, we estmate the model with random-efects and with and without industry, country
and year dummies. 
Furthermore, we estmate the determinants of the intensive margin of exports, defned as share of
sales to foreign markets. The model is given by:
ExportIntensityijkt=β0+β1ln Salesijkt+β2FirmSize ijkt+β3Qualityijkt+β4Euro jt+
β5ERM jt+β6Peg jt+β7 ln ExchangeRate jt+β8Volatility jt+β9RTA jt+κ j+λ k+α t+εijkt
,   (III.3)
where ExportIntensityijkt is the share of total producton that is exported of frm i at tme t and
varies between 0 and 100. All other variables are the same as described for equaton (III.2). 
The models specifed in equatons (III.2) and (III.3) are estmated with and without industry,
country and year dummies. In additon, each sector is estmated separately in order to analyse
sectoral diferences in the responsiveness to exchange rate policy.
III.III - Results
In this secton we present the estmaton results of the determinants of the extensive and intensive
margin of exports. Table III.III.1 shows the results of model (III.2), which estmates the
determinants of the extensive margin. In the frst three columns a pooled probit model is
estmated, that is augmented with year and industry fxed-efects in column two and country fxed-
efects are added in column three. Our measure for exchange rate volatlity yields negatve and
mostly signifcant estmates. This indicates that lower volatlity in the exchange rate with respect to
the Euro increases a frms' probability to export.
The estmates for variables capturing frm specifc characteristcs yield the expected signs and are
statstcally signifcant. The natural log of sales, the number of employees and the existence of
internatonally recognized quality certfcates in the frm all have a positve impact on the
probability and the intensity of exports. Higher sales and holding internatonal and quality
certfcates increases the probability to export. For country specifc variables, estmates are rather
mixed, especially for the exchange rate agreement dummies. Imperfectons in the fnancial sector,
which are likely to be present in many countries of our sample, can disturb the link between
exchange rate movements and exports (Berman & Berthou 2009). Nevertheless, our variable
capturing movements of the exchange rate has the expected sign and is mostly signifcant. Euro
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and ERM II membership increase the probability to export. Our measure for trade liberalizaton
yields signifcant positve estmates for all regressions, indicatng that a higher number of signed
regional trade agreements in a country increases the probability of a domestc frm to export.
Reliability of our probit estmates may for some variables sufer from unobserved heterogeneity
and in this case it is not possible to interpret them as a causal relatonship, but only as correlatons
between dependent and independent variables. Therefore, we estmate a linear probability and a
probit model in a diferences-in-diferences (DID) design, which are reported in column four to six.
While the interacton term for the year 2009 and ERM II dummy yields always insignifcant
estmates, it is always positve and signifcant for the Euro in the probit model. Interactons for
diferent years and our dummy for fxed pegs yields mixed results. Thus, once we estmate our
model in setng insusceptble for unobserved heterogeneity, the Euro is the only dummy variable
measuring exchange rate policy that has signifcant positve impact on the probability to become
an exporter. Movements and volatlity of the exchange rate we assume to be exogenous as they
depend on the interacton of domestc and foreign factors via fnancial markets. 
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Table III.III.1: Determinants of the Extensive Margin
Results of model (III.3), that estmates the efect of exchange rate policy on export intensity or the
intensive margin, are presented in Table III.III.2 columns (1) to (3). The estmates of the efect of
our measure of exchange rate volatlity on export intensity are always negatve and signifcant.
When estmatng with year and industry dummies, Euro membership increases the export intensity
Diferences in Diferences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit Probit Probit LPM Probit Probit
0.0625*** 0.130*** 0.167*** 0.0302*** 0.121*** 0.129***
(0.00529) (0.00655) (0.00988) (0.00173) (0.00691) (0.00722)
Quality 0.470*** 0.424*** 0.356*** 0.123*** 0.381*** 0.373***
(0.0261) (0.0286) (0.0299) (0.00889) (0.0286) (0.0288)
Size 0.293*** 0.183*** 0.163*** 0.0585*** 0.199*** 0.183***

































-0.0324*** -0.0340*** -0.380** -0.0106*** -0.0107*** -0.0529
(0.00435) (0.00469) (0.158) (0.00143) (0.00142) (0.0423)
Volatlity -0.716* -0.590 -0.875** -0.235* -0.150 -0.266**
(0.432) (0.392) (0.370) (0.142) (0.117) (0.109)
RTA 0.00559*** 0.00960*** 0.00556** 0.00184*** 0.00295*** 0.00225***
(0.000756) (0.000983) (0.00251) (0.000248) (0.000298) (0.000629)
RTA#2005








- - - - -
0.0228***
(0.00545)
Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies No No Yes No No No
Observatons 17,354 17,354 17,354 17,354 17,354 17,354
(Pseudo) R^2 0.104 0.216 0.260 0.214 - -
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ln Sales
ln ExchangeRate
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by slightly over fve percentage points. The impact of ERM II membership is slightly lower with
slightly less than fve percentage points. Much lower is the efect of exchange rate pegs with
around two percentage points.
When considering the unobserved heterogeneity and estmatng the model with a DID design
similar to estmatons on the extensive margin, estmates for the interactons measuring the efect
of exchange rate policy, as shown in columns four and fve, are no longer signifcant. Also pegged
exchange rates do no longer have a signifcant impact on export intensity. While exchange rate
volatlity stll has signifcant negatve impact, it turns insignifcant for exchange rate movements.
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Table III.III.2: Determinants of the Intensive Margin
In order to investgate sectoral diferences, the regressions in column (2) in Tables III.III.1 and
III.III.2 are run for each industry in the sample. The sign of the estmates are presented in Table
III.III.3 and Tables C.7 and C.8 in the Appendix show the complete regression results. We fnd
negatve efects for exchange rate volatlity on the probability to export for 13 of 18 industries,
DID
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
0.126 0.772*** 1.170*** 0.688*** 0.747***
(0.0964) (0.0990) (0.145) (0.104) (0.106)
Quality 5.900*** 4.762*** 3.751*** 4.783*** 4.604***
(0.590) (0.557) (0.558) (0.557) (0.557)
Size 7.030*** 4.899*** 4.556*** 5.052*** 4.936***

































-0.154* -0.139* -10.84*** -0.117 -0.116
(0.0808) (0.0761) (2.418) (0.0765) (0.0774)
Volatlity -17.71*** -20.81*** -11.53** -19.21*** -22.49***
(5.131) (4.900) (5.139) (4.883) (4.971)
RTA 0.133*** 0.125*** -0.0135 0.128*** -0.347***
(0.0137) (0.0141) (0.0347) (0.0142) (0.0951)
RTA#2005








- - - -
0.543***
(0.0959)
Constant -6.626*** 4.174*** 56.35*** 4.726*** 8.164***
(1.005) (1.336) (11.49) (1.375) (1.683)
Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies No No Yes No No
Observatons 17.354 17.354 17.354 17,354 17,354
R^2 0.087 0.191 0.217 0.192 0.194
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ln Sales
ln ExchangeRate
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which are signifcant only for the following six sectors: other manufacturing, fabricated metal
products, retail, hotels and restaurants and IT. Export intensity is afected negatvely in 12 of 18
sectors and the efect is signifcant for fve sectors. An appreciaton of the domestc currency leads
to a lower probability to export in 15 of 18 sectors with efects being signifcant for eight sectors,
and to a lower export intensity in 14 of 18 sectors, only in fve cases. Surprisingly, an appreciaton
increases export intensity of garments and IT sector31.
Euro and ERM II membership increase the probability to export in 12 of 18 sectors and the export
intensity in 14 of 18 sectors. Direct pegs yield very mixed estmates with 12 of 18 sectors facing
negatve efects on the probability to export and 8 on the export intensity. Trade liberalizaton
measured as the number of signed RTAs a has positve and signifcant impact on the probability to
export and export intensity for all non-service industries besides food.
Table III.III.3: Directon of Coefcients for Sectoral Regressions
31 Results for the IT sector should be interpreted with cauton, as more then half of the frms in this sector are from
Bulgaria.
Probability to Export Export Intensity
Industry Euro ERM Peg ExRate Volatlity Euro ERM Peg ExRate Volatlity
2 Other manufacturing + - - - - + + - + -
15 Food + + - - + - + - - -
17 Textles - + - - - - + - - -
18 Garments - + + - - - + + + -
23-24 Chemicals - - + - + + + + - +
25 Plastcs & rubber + + + - - + + + - +
26 Non-met. mineral products + - - + - + + + + +
27 Basic metals + - - - - + - - - -
28 Fabricated metal products - + - - - + + - - -
29 Machinery and equipment + + + - + + + + - +
31-32 Electronics - + - - - + + - - -
45 Constructon + + + - - + + + - -
50 Other services + + + - + + + + - +
51 Wholesale + + - - + + + + - +
52 Retail + + - - - + - - - -
55 Hotels and restaurants - - - + - + - - - -
60-64 Transport + + - - - + + + - -
72 IT + - - + - - - + + -
Notes: Shaded felds indicate signifcance at 10% level.
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III.III.I - Imported Intermediates
Firms are not only facing uncertainty about their revenues from exportng fnal goods and services
due to exchange rate volatlity, but also about their variable costs when importng inputs. To
further investgate the impact of exchange rate policy on the use of imported intermediates, we
use the share of directly and indirectly imported intermediates as the dependent variable in the
following equaton:
ImpIntermediatesijkt=β0+β1 ln Salesijkt+β2 FirmSizeijkt+β3Qualityijkt+β4Euro jt+
β
5
ERM jt+β6Peg jt+β7 ln ExchangeRate jt+β8Volatility jt+β9RTA jt+κ j+λ k+α t+εijkt
,   (III.4)
with all independent variables being identcal to the ones described for model (III.2).
Regression results presented in Table III.III.4 appear to be similar for some variables to the previous
regressions on the intensive margin of exports. Sales and quality certfcates have a signifcant
positve impact as do the more binding exchange rate agreements Euro and ERM II. The peg
dummy is also positve and signifcant, but only as long as no year or industry dummies are added
to the model.
Diferent to the regression on export intensity in secton III.II.III, a higher number of employees has
a negatve impact on import intensity, which is signifcant in half of the regressions. Coefcients of
our volatlity measure are all insignifcant and turn positve when country dummies are included in
the regression. Surprisingly, a depreciaton of the domestc exchange rate leads to higher import
shares for intermediates, although one should expect real prices for intermediates to increase 32.
This may be due to increased compettveness and therefore increasing producton due to higher
foreign demand and no or litle ability to substtute foreign intermediates with others from
domestc producton and the demand efect being stronger than the increase in producton costs.
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in columns (4) and (5) does not alter the results or
interpretaton to a larger extent. Also the positve and signifcant efect of Eurozone membership
remains.
32 Assuming a high pass-through for prices of intermediates.
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Table III.III.4: Determinants of Import Intensity
III.III.II - Exchange Rate Uncertainty Exposure
In this secton, we look at the impact of the availability of hedging instruments on a frms'
reluctance to be exposed to exchange rate uncertainty from trade actvites. We propose a
measure of exchange rate volatlity exposure that accounts for natural hedging in the form of
DID
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
1.686*** 1.534*** 2.685*** 1.379*** 1.245***
(0.222) (0.223) (0.285) (0.233) (0.235)
Quality 3.824*** 4.407*** 2.734*** 4.387*** 4.160***
(0.921) (0.901) (0.881) (0.898) (0.897)
Size -1.084* -0.552 -2.287*** -0.269 0.0739

































-0.581*** -0.425*** -16.56*** -0.401*** -0.394***
(0.138) (0.134) (4.220) (0.136) (0.137)
Volatlity -3.530 -3.982 2.811 0.0992 -10.07
(10.59) (10.28) (10.97) (10.15) (10.09)
RTA -0.0452* -0.130*** 0.0160 -0.139*** -1.117***
(0.0243) (0.0283) (0.0548) (0.0288) (0.159)
RTA#2005








- - - -
1.144***
(0.164)
Constant 12.51*** 27.35*** 115.0*** 28.09*** 37.32***
(2.369) (2.794) (20.07) (2.861) (3.265)
Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies No No Yes No No
Observatons 11,625 11,625 11,625 11,625 11,625
R^2 0.018 0.104 0.159 0.108 0.115
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
ln Sales
ln ExchangeRate
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imported intermediates by taking the absolute diference between the share of directly or
indirectly exported goods and services and directly and indirectly imported intermediate inputs.
The measure takes the value 0 if the frm is neither importng nor exportng or shares of imports
and exports are identcal and 100 if the frm exports all products and does not import any inputs or
imports all intermediates without exportng any fnal goods or services.
We control for access to the fnancial market by introducing as an additonal variable the
involvement of private and public banks in investments in fxed assets. As frms partly or
completely owned by foreign frms or individuals may have beter access to internal hedging and
foreign fnancial markets, we try to refect that in our regression by including the share of foreign
and state ownership of the individual frm as additonal variables.
We introduce the new dependent and independent variables in equaton (III.3) and estmate the
following model:
Uncertaintyijkt=β0+β1 ln Salesijkt+β2FirmSize ijkt+β3Qualityijkt+β4Euro jt+β5ERM jt+
β6Peg jt+β7 ln ExchangeRate jt+β8Volatility jt+β9RTA jt+β10 ForeignOwnerijkt+
β
11
StateOwned ijkt+β12 PrivateLoansijkt+β13 PublicLoansijkt+κ j+λ k+α t+εijkt
, (III.5)
where Uncertaintyijkt is our measure of exposure to exchange rate uncertainty. ForeignOwnerijkt
denotes the percentage of this frm that is owned by private foreign individuals, companies or
organizatons and StateOwnedijkt the percentage of this frm that is owned by the state or
government. The proporton of a frms' total purchases of fxed assets in the past year that was
fnanced is represented by PrivateLoansijkt for funds from private banks, while PublicLoansijkt
represents the proporton fnanced via state-owned banks. All other variables are the same as
described in secton III.II.
Regression results are presented in Table III.III.5. Unfortunately, the number of observatons in this
regression is considerably lower due to a high number of missing observatons for the additonal
variables and the uncertainty measure. Again, sales and quality certfcates show a signifcant
positve impact. Coefcients for all exchange rate policy dummies are positve with only ERM II and
Euro being signifcant. Firm size in terms of number of employees has a negatve impact on the
exchange rate risk levels frms are willing to accept. Exchange rate movements show a signifcant
negatve impact in most regressions, while our volatlity measure is always positve and mostly
signifcant. 
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The results indicate that membership in a more binding currency agreement allows frms to engage
in internatonal trade with a lower degree of internal hedging. Thus, a greater discrepancy
between exports and imports is acceptable for frms and allows for more fexibility with regard to
import and export actvites. 
Access to and willingness to utlize hedging tools ofered by the private fnancial sectors appears to
be important, as well. For the public fnancial sector, we do not fnd a similar efect. Government
or state owned frms choose to be less engaged in cross-border trade and thus less exposed to the
uncertainty associated. The reason for the later outcome could also be of politcal nature, e.g.
using local inputs to support the domestc industry or the producton of government subsidized
goods for domestc consumpton only. A depreciaton of the domestc currency we fnd to increase
exposure to exchange rate risk, probably driven by increasing exports due to improved
compettveness. Controls for unobserved heterogeneity with a DID approach shown in columns
(4) and (5) do not alter results considerably.
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Table III.III.5: Natural Hedging Regression Results
DID
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
1.930*** 1.602*** 2.610*** 1.573*** 1.451***
(0.278) (0.285) (0.347) (0.290) (0.294)
Quality 2.514** 2.883*** 2.050** 2.857*** 2.913***
(0.988) (0.997) (1.000) (0.997) (1.000)
Size -6.283*** -5.604*** -7.035*** -5.517*** -5.256***





























-0.309** -0.304** -4.905 -0.292** -0.176
(0.148) (0.146) (5.020) (0.147) (0.149)
Volatlity 15.14 15.01 12.46 15.86* 5.552
(9.432) (9.175) (11.21) (9.173) (9.456)
RTA -0.241*** -0.278*** -0.0786 -0.289*** -1.025***
(0.0263) (0.0312) (0.0695) (0.0315) (0.171)
RTA#2005




- - - -
0.713***
(0.177)
Foreign Owner 0.109*** 0.102*** 0.0919*** 0.101*** 0.102***
(0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145)
State Owned -0.0760*** -0.0555*** -0.0561*** -0.0553*** -0.0523***
(0.0145) (0.0151) (0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0151)
Private Loans 0.0587*** 0.0590*** 0.0434*** 0.0567*** 0.0587***
(0.0150) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0148)
Public Loans -0.0122 -0.0142 0.00864 -0.0125 -0.00597
(0.0239) (0.0237) (0.0243) (0.0238) (0.0238)
Constant 18.01*** 30.24*** 55.63** 30.37*** 36.93***
(2.994) (3.436) (24.17) (3.509) (3.854)
Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies No No Yes No No
Observatons 7,344 7,344 7,344 7,344 7,344
R^2 0.04 0.074 0.105 0.077 0.080
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
ln Sales
ln ExchangeRate
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III.III.III - Politcal Instability
Times of politcal instability can undermine trust in the independence of the central bank and
future monetary and exchange rate policy and thereby lead to an increase in volatlity of the
exchange rate. In such a case, trade deterring efects may actually stem from politcal uncertainty
rather than from exchange rate uncertainty. To ensure that politcal uncertainty is not the driver of
the negatve trade efects we have found, we reestmate column (2) of Tables III.III.1 and III.III.2
and include a measure for politcal instability and present the estmates in Table III.III.6. We use the
“politcal stability and absence of violence” variable from the Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) project of the World Bank which is supposed to capture “perceptons of the likelihood that
the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconsttutonal or violent means, including
politcally-motvated violence and terrorism”33. It is in standard normal units and ranges from -2.5
(high instability) to 2.5 (low instability). Although the measure for politcal instability is signifcant
and has the expected positve sign, coefcients of our exchange rate volatlity measure change only
slightly and remain highly signifcant for the intensive margin.
33 For a thorough descripton of the dataset see Kaufmann et al. (2010).
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Table III.III.6: Politcal Instability
III.III.IV - Regional Diferences
Despite many similarites with regard to their common history as Post-Soviet states, economic and
politcal background and orientaton difer within our sample of countries especially between
countries in Europe and Asia. We want to identfy whether a frms' export behaviour is afected
diferently by our variables of interest depending on the locaton.
Therefore, in an additonal robustness check we split the sample in two parts. The frst part
consists of countries that are located on the European contnent, the second of countries located
in Asia. We reestmate model (III.3) on export intensity for both groups of countries. Estmaton
results are presented in Table C.9. Coefcients for frm characteristcs, namely the natural
logarithm of sales, the dummy variable controlling for quality certfcates and the number of
Probability to Export Export Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Probit OLS OLS
0.0385*** 0.0371*** 0.772*** 0.734***
(0.00196) (0.00196) (0.0990) (0.0982)
Quality 0.140*** 0.139*** 4.762*** 4.734***
(0.0100) (0.0100) (0.557) (0.557)
Size 0.0580*** 0.0612*** 4.899*** 4.987***
(0.00568) (0.00570) (0.324) (0.324)
Euro 0.140*** 0.126*** 5.068*** 4.592***
(0.0264) (0.0263) (1.245) (1.259)
ERM 0.0886*** 0.0845*** 4.695*** 4.529***
(0.0165) (0.0164) (0.816) (0.818)
Peg -0.0116 -0.0111 2.062*** 2.078***
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.717) (0.718)
-0.0107*** -0.0110*** -0.139* -0.155**
(0.00142) (0.00142) (0.0761) (0.0765)
Volatlity -0.150 -0.0945 -20.81*** -18.88***
(0.117) (0.118) (4.900) (4.926)
RTA 0.0030*** 0.0021*** 0.125*** 0.0911***











Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies No No No No
Observatons 17,354 17,352 17,354 17,352
R^2 - - 0.191 0.192
ln Sales
ln ExchangeRate
Notes: Reported values are marginal efects at the mean of the 
independent variables; Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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employees in a frm, are positve and signifcant. The efect of quality certfcates on export
intensity is higher for Central Asian frms and the number of employees has a stronger impact of
European frms. The exchange rate variables show very partcular efects for both regions. While an
exchange rate appreciaton yields positve but insignifcant estmates for Asian frms, coefcients
are positve for European countries and signifcant when country dummies are included. Exchange
rate volatlity yields always negatve but signifcant estmates for European frms and positve and
mostly signifcant estmates for their Asian counterparts. Estmates for the number of signed RTAs
is mostly positve, but insignifcant. Exchange rate agreements were only signed by European
countries, thus there are no estmates for these variables for Asian frms.
The results indicate that the signifcant negatve estmates for the volatlity measure in the other
models were driven by European frms in the sample. The same applies for movements in the
exchange rate. Thus, the exchange rate appears to have very litle impact on export actvites for
Asian frms. Possible reasons are manifold, ranging from a higher importance of other trade
barriers such as tarifs, non-tarif barriers and transport costs to sufcient access to internal and
external hedging instruments or a higher importance of regional trade that is less afected by
exchange rate variatons of the domestc currency to the Euro.
III.IV - Conclusion
We fnd strong evidence for both the hypotheses tested in this paper: First, we fnd a clear
negatve efect of exchange rate volatlity on a frms' probability to export and on their export
intensity. Second, we fnd a signifcant positve impact of more binding currency agreements in the
form of Euro or ERM II membership. The later we fnd to be robust for the extensive margin only.
Our results concerning exchange rate volatlity are in contrast to some of the previous empirical
frm-level studies, but are more in line with country-level studies. Diferences in the outcome in
comparison to earlier micro studies are probably due to diferences between observed countries,
smaller average frm size in our sample compared to previous studies and slight diferences in
methodology and variables in the estmated models. Robustness checks show that the signifcant
negatve results for exchange rate volatlity are driven by frms located in Eastern Europe, while for
frms in Central Asia other aspects rather than movements of or volatlity in the exchange rate to
the Euro seem to determine export actvites. Furthermore, the efect of exchange rate volatlity
can not be atributed to politcal instability that could be increasing volatlity of the domestc
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exchange rate to the Euro and thereby has an impact on a frms' export behaviour. The efects of
Euro and ERM II on export intensity are smaller than the usual efect for Euro membership on
export volume found in most recent macro studies.
It is very striking that positve efects of Euro and ERM II membership are larger and signifcant for
sectors where long term investments play a huge role, such as machinery and equipment and
manufacturing. A possible explanaton is that more binding currency agreements encourage
investments in these sectors. While the impact of exchange rate volatlity on export behaviour is
more signifcant for sectors providing services, currency agreements have a more pronounced and
signifcant impact on industries producing goods. This could be atributed to the nature of
contracts that are more short-term based for services and therefore are less afected by long term
exchange rate agreements. For manufacturing exchange rate agreements are more important.
We also fnd evidence that frms do not lower the overall exposure to exchange rate risks from
trade actvites when exchange rate volatlity is rising, but binding exchange rate arrangements,
access to private credits and a higher share of foreign ownership lets them increase their exposure.
As argued in secton III.I.III, this could be due to frms taking out loans in foreign currencies due to
lower costs of credits and intensifying export actvites to hedge for the exchange rate risks of the
loans. The signifcant impact of private credits on exchange rate exposure due to importng and
exportng actvites could indicate this.
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IV - Direct and Indirect Exports and the Role of Uncertainty
based on joint work with Inmaculada Martnez-Zarzoso
In the past two decades, there has been a growing interest in the study of the internatonalizaton
strategies of frms (Bernard et al. 2003; Bernard & Jensen 2004). Three main modes of sales have
been considered in the related literature, namely domestc sales, direct exports and exports using
an intermediary (indirect exports). A frst strand of papers focused on studying the determinants of
the choice between exportng or not, without paying atenton to the choice between direct and
indirect exportng. In this line, according to the seminal paper by Melitz (2003) frms have to pay a
fxed entry cost to access foreign markets accompanied by variable trade costs when a product is
exported directly. If the fxed cost is high and expected sales are low, a frm is likely to serve only
the domestc market. The decision mainly depends on the productvity level of a frm in
comparison to other frms in the country. Only the most productve frms will select into exportng,
whereas the less productve frms will sell domestcally. Trade liberalizaton will lead to reallocaton
of frms within industries and to an increase in the average productvity. 
As for the choice whether to export directly or indirectly, several factors have been identfed in the
related literature infuencing the decision. Specifcally, intermediaries reduce search costs for the
producing frms (Spulber 1999), facilitate matching of sellers and buyers (Rubinstein & Wolinsky
1987) and can act as guarantor of quality (Biglaiser 1993). Studies that extend the model of Melitz
(2003) with intermediaries indicate that for less productve frms exportng could be an opton
using a middleman. Indirect exportng is assumed to have higher marginal costs, but lower or even
no fxed costs (Akerman 2014; Ahn et al. 2011; Felbermayr & Jung 2011; Crozet et al. 2013). Firms
tend to rely more on intermediaries when fxed costs are high or when destnaton markets are
small and higher-than-average productvity levels are needed to overcome lower profts.
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A recent study by McCann (2013) investgatng the determinants of export behaviour with frm-
level data fnds that productvity of indirect exporters lies between productvity levels of direct and
non-exporters. He also fnds strong evidence supportng the importance of productvity as well as
of other features and characteristcs of wholesalers as determinants of the export decision.
According to Bernard et al. (2011), wholesalers in Italy are smaller than direct exportng
manufacturers and export a larger variety of products to less countries. They emphasize the
importance of intermediaries when frms are exportng to destnatons with weak contractng
environments and when exportng homogeneous products. Crozet et al. (2013) fnd that French
wholesalers mainly serve countries with smaller market size and higher trade costs than the
average destnaton.
Abel-Koch (2011), using survey data for Turkey, shows that indirect exporters are mostly small
frms, producing low-quality goods, or introducing an entrely new product to foreign markets, but
other factors such as foreign ownership or the existence of credit constraints do not infuence the
decision of exportng indirectly. Also using a World Bank survey data, but for frms in Sub-Saharan
Africa, Zerihun (2012) provides evidence showing that the decision to export indirectly is positvely
infuenced by frm size, being a subsidiary of a mult-plan frm and having access to informaton
technology and negatvely afected by the frms' perceptons of obstacles in the form of corrupton
or access to fnance.
In the above-mentoned studies, litle emphasis has been put on the role of perceived uncertainty
on the decision of exportng indirectly. To export directly a frm has to deal with several potental
obstacles that can induce additonal costs of unforeseeable size. These include, among others,
foreign and domestc bureaucracy and corrupton, customs proceedings, transportaton and cross-
border fnancial transactons. Due to the uncertainty of these costs, risk averse frms may choose
to use a middleman in some markets in order to lower the overall exposure to uncertainty.
Especially in unstable foreign markets, frms will be willing to accept higher variable costs even if
the productvity level is above average. Risk averse frms may also want to test demand in a foreign
market using an intermediary frst paying the fxed costs of entry for direct exportng, even more so
when fxed costs are high or market potental is low.
We investgate the determinants of the decision to export directly or via intermediaries with a
special focus on the frms' percepton of uncertainty that afects transacton costs. In partcular,
factors such transportaton impediments, crime, weak legal systems and volatlity in the exchange
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rate are considered. To our knowledge, this is the frst paper to investgate this issue with a larger
variety of measures used as proxies for perceived obstacles to trade. In additon, we distnguish
between trade in goods and trade in services, as the characteristcs of both actvites are diferent
and could be afected by uncertainty in diferent ways. We focus on the Eastern Europe and Central
Asia for three reasons. First, the region is partcularly interestng as it consists of many highly
integrated countries for historic reasons that share a similar cultural background with most of their
direct neighbours and have lower language barriers. Second, in these countries politcal instability,
corrupton and criminality are well-known factors deterring a well-functoning market economy.
Finally, this is the frst paper to focus in the efect of uncertainty on the internatonalizaton
strategies of frms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia34.
We assume that the uncertainty is a greater threat to direct exporters and can be avoided by using
an intermediary. The modelling strategy consists of an estmaton of a probit model to investgate
the determinants of the decision to export indirectly and a fxed efects model to estmate the
efects on the intensity of the indirect exportng. As a robustness check we also estmate a two-
stage approach that consists of estmatng the probability to export in the frst step as a selecton
equaton and the share of indirect exports with respect to total exports in the second step
including elements of the frst step to control for sample selecton bias.
The main results suggest that frms that are larger and more productve export a smaller share of
their exports indirectly. While percepton of transportaton and the legal system as an obstacle and
higher volatlity in the exchange rate increases the share of indirect exports especially for services,
crime has a similar efect on exports of goods.
The paper is structured as follows: secton IV.I analyses the data and explains the empirical
approach, secton IV.II presents the fndings and secton IV.III concludes.
IV.I - Empirical Analysis
In this study we focus on the percepton of obstacles to trade and their infuence on the decision
to export directly or via an intermediary. In order to obtain the variables that are used as
determinants of this decision we combine informaton from the World Bank Enterprise Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) with country specifc informaton on
34 McCann (2013) also focuses on Eastern Europe and Central Asia. However, his main aim is diferent to ours, as he
gives descriptve evidence of the characteristcs of indirect exporters, compares the likelihood to export indirectly
of single-product and mult-product frms and focuses exclusively on manufacturing frms, excluding the service
sector from the analysis.
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regional integraton and volatlity in the exchange rate of the diferent currencies with respect to
the Euro. Data on exchange rates comes from OANDA Corporaton. A descripton of the variables is
shown in Table IV.I.1.
The dataset includes informaton taken from BEEPS for 26 countries over 4 years (2002, 2005, 2007
and 2009) and 18 sectors. A number of variables related to transacton costs and uncertainty are
selected from the surveys. In partcular, foreign ownership, percepton of transportaton, customs,
crime and legal system as being an obstacle for the frm's actvity, tme needed to clear customs.
The surveys used stratfed random sampling techniques to select a representatve sample for each
country using industry, establishment size and region as levels of stratfcaton. 
We use a broad defniton of indirect exports, which includes all frms that export through an
intermediary. This also includes those using a mixed strategy with part of their foreign sales
exported directly35. Table IV.I.2 presents a list of covered sectors and the share of frms that use
intermediaries for at least a part of their exports. Out of all exporters, most frms in our sample
35 We follow McCann (2013) in using the same defniton of indirect exports. Although he frst uses a narrow




share of indirect exports of total exports 0-100
Firm characteristcs
natural logarithm of the number of permanent full-tme workers 0-9.21
natural logarithm of sales divided by the number of workers 1.72-26.84
share of exported sales 1-100
=1 if a part of the frm is owned by foreign private individuals 0 or 1
percepton of transportaton as an obstacle 0=no obstacle - 4=very severe
percepton of customs and trade regulaton as an obstacle 0=no obstacle - 4=very severe
percepton of crime, thef and disorder as an obstacle 0=no obstacle - 4=very severe
percepton of the court system as fair, impartal and uncorrupted 1=agree - 4=disagree
number of av. days it tool for exported goods to clear customs 1=1 or less - 5=more than 20
Country variables
=1 if country j was a member of the EU in year t 0 or 1
=1 if country j was a member of the CEFTA in year t 0 or 1
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only export directly and around 24 percent use also or exclusively an intermediary. The share
varies across sectors going from 11 percent for the IT-sector to 34 percent for hotels and
restaurants. 
Table IV.I.2: Direct and Indirect Exporters
Table D.1 in the Appendix shows the distributon of exportng frms for all sectors over all
countries. The largest sectors in the sample in terms of number of frms are food, wholesale and
other manufacturing. Concerning the countries in the sample, Bulgaria, Croata and Slovenia are
the ones with the largest share of frms in the dataset. Summary statstcs of frm and country
specifc variables are displayed in Table IV.I.3. The average share of exports over total sales is 42
percent, of which 17 percent on average are exported indirectly. About 26.5 percent of the frms
are at least partly foreign owned and while 36 percent are located in a member country of the






Other manufacturing 2 338 139 29.14 477
Food 15 705 226 24.27 931
Textles 17 110 37 25.17 147
Garments 18 244 103 29.68 347
Chemicals 24 98 35 26.32 133
Plastcs & rubber 25 68 26 27.66 94
Non metallic mineral products 26 71 17 19.32 88
Basic metals 27 31 10 24.39 41
Fabricated metal products 28 286 92 24.34 378
Machinery and equipment 29 270 80 22.86 350
Electronics 31 66 19 22.35 85
Constructon 45 161 32 16.58 193
Other services 50 230 39 14.50 269
Wholesale 51 401 120 23.03 521
Retail 52 180 56 23.73 236
Hotel and restaurants 55 69 35 33.65 104
Transport 60 322 117 26.65 439
IT 72 76 9 10.59 85
Total - 3726 1192 24.24 4918
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Table IV.I.3: Summary Statstcs
IV.I.I - Model Specifcaton
The frst part of our econometric approach consists of estmatng a probit model with country and
industry fxed-efects to explain the probability of exportng indirectly. In a second step we
estmate a OLS regression with fxed-efects using the share of indirect exports over total exports
as dependent variable. As a robustness check, we use a two-stage approach to correct for potental
sample selecton bias, which could be present due to the fact that we restrict our sample to
exportng frms only.
The specifcaton of the probit model used to predict indirect exports is given by:






Legalsystemijktβ9+Customstimeijkt+β10 EU jt+β11CEFTA jt+β12Volatility jt−1+κ j+λ kt+εijkt )
,(IV.1)
where IndirectExporterijkt is a dummy variable that takes the value one if frm i in country j and
sector k exports a part of its foreign sales using an intermediary and zero if all exports are direct
exports. Firm specifc variables include ln Employeesijkt, which is the natural log of the total number
of permanent full-tme workers, ln LaborProdijkt for the natural log of total annual sales divided by
the number of workers, Exportntensityijkt, that denotes the share of exported sales and Foreignijkt,
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max
dependent variable
4,918 17.173 34.578 0 100
frm characteristcs
4,918 4.144 1.573 0 9.206
4,918 10.623 1.768 1.725 26.843
4,918 41.924 34.662 1 100
4,918 0.265 0.441 0 1
4,918 0.818 1.146 0 4
4,918 1.211 1.162 0 4
4,918 0.948 1.138 0 4
4,918 2.501 0.979 1 4
3,538 1.711 0.924 1 5
country variables
4,918 0.362 0.481 0 1
4,918 0.313 0.464 0 1
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which is dummy variable that takes the value of one when a part of the frm is owned by a foreign
individual or frm and zero otherwise36. A frms' percepton of obstacles is captured by three
diferent variables on a scale from zero to four. First, for transportaton (Transportatonijkt), second
for customs and trade regulaton (Customsijkt) and third for crime, thef and disorder (Crimeijkt). The
percepton of fairness of the legal system is also measured on a scale from one to four
(Legalsystemijkt), while for tme efciency of customs authorites we use a scale from one to fve
(Customstmeijkt). We introduce country specifc dummy variables that take the value one if country
j is member of the European Union (EUjt) or the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTAjt)
in year t and a measure of volatlity for the nominal exchange rate of the domestc currency with
the Euro (Volatlityjt-1). The later is defned as the standard deviaton of the frst diference of the
logarithms of the monthly domestc nominal exchange rate to the Euro for the twelve month of
the past year:
Volatilityjt−1=Std. dev.[ ln(e j , m)−ln(e j ,m−1)] ,m=1. ..12 .  (IV.2)
In a next step, we estmate the determinants of a frms' intensity of indirect exports with pooled
OLS and fxed-efects:




Customstimeijkt+β10 EU jt+β11CEFTA jt+β12Volatility jt−1+κ j+λ kt+εijkt
, (IV.3)
where the dependent variable is the share of indirect exports of total exports for frm i in year t. All
other variables are identcal to the model in (IV.1).
The previous two models assume that frms frst decide whether or not to export and second
about the modality and that both decisions are independent from each other. Following the
approach of Heckman (1978), we estmate a two-stage model that allows us to control for the
sample selecton bias caused by ignoring non-exporters and by assuming that the error terms in
equaton (IV.1) and (IV.3) are independent.
In the frst stage, we estmate a probit model on the probability to export:






EU jt+β9CEFTA jt+β10Volatility jt−1+κ j+λkt+εijkt )
. (IV.4)
36 We are unable to include a measure of productvity in the model, as the World Bank frm-level data for the selected
region does not provide the number of employees for each frm, but only a discrete variable with 4 group-size
categories.
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The second stage is estmated using an OLS model with fxed-efects and is given by:




β7EU jt+β8CEFTA jt+β9Volatility jt−1+IMR+κ j+λkt+εijkt
. (IV.5)
In order to fulfl the exclusion restricton, we use a variable that only afects the probability to
export, but not the intensity of indirect exportng. Therefore, we estmate the second stage
without the variable measuring the percepton of customs proceedings as an obstacle, which yields
no signifcant estmates when controlling for diferences between countries in the sample. In the
second step regression, we include the inverse Mill's rato (IMR) in the model. It is a correcton for
sample selecton which addresses the biases generated by unobserved shocks.
IV.II - Main Findings
Results from the probit estmaton are shown in Table IV.II.1 in the form of marginal efects at
mean of the independent variables. A number of versions are estmated including diferent sets of
fxed efects and control variables. Column (1) shows the results from estmatng the model with
country, year and industry fxed efects, while column (2) includes country and industry-year fxed
efects as specifed in model (IV.1). The inclusion of the exchange rate volatlity variable reduces
the sample size considerably. Hence, for comparison purposes the model is estmated in columns
(3) and (4) with and without this variable for the same sample. Finally in column (5), the variable
measuring tme intensity of customs proceedings, for which there are many missing observatons,
is added.
According to our estmates, larger frms in terms of more employees tend to have a lower
probability to export indirectly, whereas frms with a larger share of total sales going to non-
domestc markets are more likely to export using an intermediary. A possible explanaton for the
later could be the greater exposure to uncertainty concerning expected profts when exportng
directly, which increases when exportng a lot. The use of an intermediary lowers uncertainty as it
only involves higher variable costs. In partcular, a 10 percentage points increase in overall export
intensity of a frm increases the probability to use an intermediary by 0.5 percent according to
column (2). A 1 percent increase in the number of employees decreases the probability to use an
intermediary by around 1 percent. The estmates turn out to be positve and insignifcant when a
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variable controlling for the tme to clear customs is included in the model. This is probably due to
the fact that the inclusion of this variable considerably reduces the number of observatons by
more than one ffh.
Foreign ownership decreases the probability of export indirectly by around 7 percentage points.
This fact could be explained by the lower fxed costs of exportng or accessing to the owners
internatonal networks. While potental obstacles like transportaton, crime and the legal system
lower the probability to export directly signifcantly, customs impediments do not show a
statstcally signifcant efect. A 1 point increase in the percepton of the severity increases the
probability of indirect exportng by around 2 percentage points for transportaton, 1.4 percentage
points for crime and 1.5 percentage points for the legal system. Longer tme to clear customs and
volatlity in the exchange rate also increase the probability of exportng indirectly. Although the
decision for the mode of export appears to be afected signifcantly by the percepton of
uncertainty in various felds, we do not fnd any signifcant efects of membership in EU or CEFTA
on the probability to use an intermediary.
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Table IV.II.1: Probit Regression Results - Probability to Export Indirectly
Regression estmates of the OLS model with fxed-efects specifed in model (IV.3), with the share
of indirect exports as the dependent variable, are provided in Table IV.II.2. The main results are in
general similar to the ones of the previous model in terms of signifcance levels. The main
diference is that estmates for country specifc dummy variables for EU and CEFTA membership
yield signifcant results indicatng that membership in either of the two agreements decreases the
share of indirect exports. This can be atributed to economic integraton facilitatng export
procedures and thereby lowering fxed costs of exportng, which in turn afects mainly direct
exportng. The efect is larger for the EU with a decrease in the share of indirect exports of around
11 percentage points than for CEFTA with a decrease of around 5 percentage points (column (2)).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.0103** -0.0109** -0.0133*** -0.0136*** 0.000476
(0.00429) (0.00435) (0.00473) (0.00474) (0.00402)
-0.00580 -0.00448 -0.0235*** -0.0243*** 0.000497
(0.00512) (0.00524) (0.00683) (0.00685) (0.00525)
0.00052*** 0.00052*** 0.00071*** 0.00071*** 0.00099***
(0.000192) (0.000193) (0.000211) (0.000211) (0.000178)
-0.0697*** -0.0733*** -0.0681*** -0.0663*** -0.0372***
(0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0127)
0.0191*** 0.0186*** 0.0178*** 0.0177*** 0.0191***
(0.00590) (0.00592) (0.00636) (0.00635) (0.00544)
0.00430 0.00377 0.00508 0.00520 0.00185
(0.00601) (0.00603) (0.00650) (0.00651) (0.00573)
0.0149** 0.0149** 0.0144** 0.0140** 0.0103*
(0.00578) (0.00581) (0.00630) (0.00630) (0.00542)
0.0139** 0.0148** 0.0167** 0.0165** 0.00968
(0.00701) (0.00705) (0.00779) (0.00779) (0.00672)
-0.0521 -0.0599 -0.0413 -0.00222 0.00370
(0.0510) (0.0516) (0.0700) (0.0764) (0.0528)
-0.0128 -0.0172 0.0158 0.0613 0.00724
(0.0353) (0.0359) (0.0522) (0.0604) (0.0351)







Year Dummies Yes No No No No
Industry Dummies Yes No No No No
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observatons 4,918 4,916 4,287 4,287 3,415


























Notes: Reported values are marginal efects at the mean of the independent 
variables; Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1; Sample in (3) is reduced to the same observatons as used in (4).
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Both variables turn insignifcant when controls for exchange rate volatlity and tme to clear
customs are added to the model. However, we are able to show in column (3), which shows
insignifcant estmates for both agreements, that this is due to the reducton in observatons and
not due to the inclusion of the additonal variables. Column (3) includes the same variables used in
column (2), but with the same observatons as in column (4). Another diference in the estmates is
found for export intensity. While the efect is positve and highly signifcant for the probability to
export indirectly, it is only weakly signifcant and mostly negatve for the share of indirect exports.
Only in column (5) with a reduced sample and estmated with the tme to clear customs as an
additonal variable, the efect is signifcant and positve.
Table IV.II.2: OLS Regression Results - Share of Indirect Exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-1.427*** -1.429*** -1.523*** -1.551*** -0.0361
(0.350) (0.354) (0.381) (0.381) (0.204)
-0.940** -0.823* -2.516*** -2.585*** 0.00845
(0.455) (0.464) (0.585) (0.586) (0.330)
-0.0269* -0.0266* -0.0191 -0.0199 0.0326***
(0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.00940)
-4.778*** -5.066*** -4.163*** -3.972*** -1.971***
(1.089) (1.093) (1.186) (1.188) (0.635)
1.295** 1.217** 1.173** 1.169** 0.793**
(0.515) (0.514) (0.543) (0.541) (0.321)
-0.231 -0.245 -0.285 -0.271 0.0969
(0.487) (0.489) (0.524) (0.524) (0.313)
1.237** 1.243** 1.178** 1.138** 0.380
(0.493) (0.493) (0.529) (0.529) (0.303)
1.056* 1.053* 1.037* 1.017 0.549
(0.560) (0.565) (0.624) (0.624) (0.335)
-10.39*** -11.09*** -8.263 -5.559 -2.455
(3.974) (4.058) (5.074) (5.110) (2.482)
-4.682* -4.837* -1.480 1.756 -1.564
(2.620) (2.684) (3.491) (3.575) (1.525)








24.70*** 37.40*** 55.82*** 55.83*** -6.365
(5.948) (12.67) (17.76) (17.74) (4.026)
Year Dummies Yes No No No No
Industry Dummies Yes No No No No
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observatons 4,918 4,918 4,300 4,300 3,538


























Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Sample in (3) is reduced to the same observatons as used in (4).
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IV.II.I - Goods versus Services
The dataset used in this study covers frms producing goods and services and both are very
diferent in terms of export procedures. For this reason we present in this secton separate
estmates for each type of frms. Thereby we will be able to analyse the diferences in the impact
of percepton of uncertainty on the decision to export indirectly between both sets of exporters.
We estmate the models (IV.1) and (IV.3) separately for goods and services with the same
specifcaton as in column (2) and (4) in Table IV.II.1 and Table IV.II.2 to be able to compare the
estmates. Table IV.II.3 shows the estmaton results for goods in columns with uneven numbers
and for services in columns with even numbers. The table is divided into two parts. The frst part
with columns (1) to (4) shows the results of estmatng model (IV.3) and the second with columns
(5) to (8) shows estmates of model (IV.1).
According to the results shown in Table IV.II.3 for goods and services separately and the whole
sample, a higher export intensity has a signifcant positve impact on the probability to use an
intermediary for frms producing goods, but a negatve impact on the share of exports via a
middleman for frms in the service sector. Foreign ownership promotes direct exports only of
goods, but not for services. With regard to regional integraton, EU membership decreases indirect
export intensity to a very similar extent for goods and services, while CEFTA membership does so
only for services. The efect of volatlity in the exchange rate to the Euro increases the probability
of indirect exports for services only, but no efect is found for goods. A similar outcome is obtained
for percepton of legal system, which only shows a positve and signifcant estmate for indirect
exports of services. While percepton of crime as an obstacle has a signifcant impact on the
probability to export directly and their volume of goods, Transportaton has a higher and more
signifcant impact on the choice of the export channel for services than for goods.
Summarizing, determinants of the probability to export indirectly and the intensity of indirect
exports difer to some extent for goods and services. While the percepton of crime as an obstacle
appears to be more important for trade in goods, exports of services are more afected by
uncertainty related to future revenues due to volatlity in the domestc exchange rate and to a
well-functoning legal system. The frst outcome seems intuitve when considering crime in the
form of physical thef of goods. The later could be due to peculiarites of the service sectors in
general that make it more vulnerable to fuctuatons in the exchange rate. For instance, infrequent
use of indirect hedging as less inputs are needed in the producton process of services or more
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difcult access to fnancial hedging due to a lack of assets could be reasons for these fndings.
Furthermore, transportaton is a greater concern for frms in the service sector than for frms in
goods sectors. A likely explanaton is that services are frequently non-traded goods and ofen
provided in locatons close to the customer and hence make it necessary for frm providing the
service to transport employees and tools. In such a case, transportaton obstacles could be a
serious concern. In contrast to that, cross-border transport of goods are usually taken care of by a
logistcs company, which is then afected by obstacles with regard to the transportaton of goods.
From the perspectve of the frm, these obstacles do increase the costs of exportng and thereby
afect the decision to export37. But as transportng the goods is not an issue the frms have to deal
with directly, percepton of transportaton as an obstacle might be seen only with reference to
transportaton conducted by the frm itself. Results may look diferent for questons regarding the
percepton of other trade costs as an obstacle, diferent form transportaton. Unfortunately,
questons going in this directon are not included in the survey of the World Bank.
37 See secton IV.II.II for the impact of the percepton of transportaton as an obstacle on the decision to export at all.
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Table IV.II.3: Regression Results - Goods vs. Services
In order to assess the relatve importance of each of the variables in model (IV.3) in comparison to
our measure of exchange rate volatlity, we present beta coefcients in Table IV.II.4. Beta
coefcients are measured in standard deviatons and therefore the magnitude of the coefcients
can be compared also for variables measured in diferent units. As shown in column (1), which
contains the beta coefcients for the model in Table IV.II.2 column (2), a one standard deviaton
increase in export intensity decreases the share of indirect exports on total exports by 0.0199
standard deviatons. Beta coefcients based on models estmated in Table IV.II.3 columns (3) and
(4) indicate the relatve importance of labor productvity for goods and services and of foreign
ownership for goods in explaining the share of intermediated exports. In comparison with the
other variables in our models, we fnd volatlity in the domestc exchange rate with the Euro to
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit Probit Probit
Goods Services Goods Services Goods Services Goods Services
-1.822*** -1.162** -1.923*** -1.254** -0.0136** -0.00829 -0.0164** -0.0106
(0.485) (0.525) (0.510) (0.572) (0.00597) (0.00635) (0.00642) (0.00705)
-0.659 -1.359* -2.602*** -2.545*** -0.00621 -0.00441 -0.0260*** -0.0215**
(0.598) (0.763) (0.752) (0.964) (0.00694) (0.00822) (0.00930) (0.0104)
0.000160 -0.0667*** 0.00903 -0.0708** 0.00064*** 0.000331 0.00084*** 0.000431
(0.0192) (0.0255) (0.0206) (0.0285) (0.000246) (0.00032) (0.00027) (0.00036)
-7.277*** -2.318 -6.391*** -0.468 -0.103*** -0.0364 -0.0985*** -0.0204
(1.365) (1.876) (1.453) (2.073) (0.0173) (0.0223) (0.0189) (0.0257)
0.800 1.816** 0.865 1.607* 0.0132* 0.0267*** 0.0143* 0.0225**
(0.622) (0.900) (0.654) (0.949) (0.00755) (0.00956) (0.00808) (0.0103)
-0.747 0.607 -0.620 0.375 -0.000117 0.00829 0.00216 0.00777
(0.632) (0.779) (0.669) (0.850) (0.00783) (0.00941) (0.00839) (0.0104)
1.893*** -0.0340 1.755*** -0.0774 0.0214*** 0.00350 0.0197** 0.00534
(0.625) (0.809) (0.667) (0.867) (0.00748) (0.00925) (0.00804) (0.0102)
0.515 1.740* 0.650 1.679* 0.0118 0.0174 0.0168* 0.0157
(0.732) (0.894) (0.799) (1.002) (0.00922) (0.0109) (0.0102) (0.0122)
-10.39* -11.06* -8.968 -1.694 -0.0550 -0.0362 -0.0613 0.0935
(5.407) (6.349) (6.876) (8.063) (0.0716) (0.0774) (0.0988) (0.128)
-2.078 -7.738* 0.477 3.797 0.0167 -0.0454 0.0293 0.112





(20.79) (24.03) (0.321) (0.295)
Constant
38.42*** 22.79** 58.01*** 30.68**
- - - -(13.35) (10.28) (18.71) (12.40)
Observatons 3,071 1,847 2,685 1,615 3,071 1,839 2,685 1,596























Notes: Reported values for probit regressions are marginal efects at the mean of the independent 
variables; Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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have a relatvely large impact on the share of intermediated exports of services (column (3)). The
impact on the share of intermediated exports of goods we fnd, besides that the estmates are
insignifcant, to be rather small.
Table IV.II.4: Beta Coefcients
IV.II.II - Robustness: Two-Stage Approach
Estmates for the two-stage approach are presented in Table IV.II.5. The frst stage specifed in
model (IV.4) uses as dependent variable the probability to export and the second stage denoted in
model (IV.5) the share of indirect exports. While a higher number of employees, labor productvity
and foreign ownership increase a frms' probability to export and decreases the share of indirect
exports, stronger percepton of crime and transportaton as an obstacle decreases the probability
to export and increases the share of intermediated exports. The quality of the legal system only
seems to afect the choice of the export mode by promotng direct exports, but it does not seem to
afect the decision to export. Surprisingly, the variable customs proceedings shows a signifcant
and positve efect on the probability to export, indicatng that when customs proceedings are















Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
Observatons 4,300 2,685 1,615
R^2 0.067 0.072 0.083
























72 IV - Direct and Indirect Exports and the Role of Uncertainty
experience with problems associated with exportng see customs proceedings as a bigger problem.
As explained in Secton IV.I, we exclude the later variable from the second stage to fulfl the
exclusion restricton.
Euro and CEFTA dummies as controls for economic and trade integraton have a signifcant positve
impact on the probability to the export of 12 and 6 percentage points and decrease the share of
intermediated exports by 12 and 5 percent. Both variables turn insignifcant when the measure of
exchange rate volatlity to the Euro is introduced as they did in the estmates without controls for
sample selecton bias in Table IV.II.2. While volatlity in the domestc exchange rate has no
signifcant impact on the probability to export, it increases the share of indirect exports. The fact
that the inverse Mill's rato is signifcant in the second stage indicates that there is evidence that a
selecton bias is present in model (IV.3), but the efect on coefcients appears to be rather small.
Table IV.II.5: Heckman Two-StageRegression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit OLS Probit OLS
0.0791*** -1.637*** 0.0777*** -1.512***
(0.00292) (0.380) (0.00259) (0.354)
0.0352*** -2.601*** 0.0226*** -0.824*
(0.00404) (0.585) (0.00295) (0.464)
0.167*** -4.287*** 0.184*** -5.453***
(0.0141) (1.176) (0.0126) (1.082)
-0.0101** 1.088** -0.00834** 1.130**






-0.0288*** 1.127** -0.0288*** 1.233**
(0.00388) (0.522) (0.00349) (0.488)
0.00412 1.024* -0.000372 1.090*
(0.00483) (0.622) (0.00425) (0.564)
-0.00476 -5.524 0.0728** -11.21***
(0.0430) (5.103) (0.0329) (4.056)
-0.0246 1.624 0.0442** -5.062*














Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observatons 13,626 4,300 16,304 4,918
R^2 0.280 0.067 0.273 0.059






















Notes: Reported values for probit regressions are marginal efects at 
the mean of the independent variables; Robust standard errors in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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IV.III - Conclusion
Although being vague in its nature, uncertainty, measured as the perceived severity of obstacles,
appears to play an important role in explaining a frms' choice between direct and indirect
exportng and seems to have a slightly diferent impact on goods than services. 
Firms that are large, more productve, foreign owned and export a higher share of their producton
prefer direct exportng, while uncertainty in diferent felds makes frm prefer increasingly the use
of intermediaries. In partcular, the percepton of potental threats like criminality, problems with
the transport infrastructure or the legal system have a signifcant impact on the mode of export.
Furthermore, we show that uncertainty about future revenues due to volatlity in the domestc
exchange rate with the Euro increases the share of indirect exports on total exports for services,
but has no signifcant impact on exports of goods. We could also show that our results are not
driven by sample selecton bias and the inclusion of various controls confrms its robustness.
Finally, our fndings highlight the importance of intermediaries in countries where frms perceive
challenges in the business environment that increase the level of uncertainty and thus the fxed
costs of exportng. Lowering perceived uncertainty as well as improving conditons for
intermediaries would help domestc frms with their exportng actvites.
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V - Politcal Determinants of Internatonal Arms Transfers
based on joint work with Inmaculada Martnez-Zarzoso
In the past few years, a number of investgatons have stressed the importance of analysing the
determinants of internatonal trade at the industry/product level, in partcular to be able to
account for specifc economic and politcal factors that are industry-specifc. The armament
industry is usually referred to as being partcularly diferent from other industries with regard to
the role played by the politcal environment on the decision to export. Many fast growing
developing countries have been increasing their capacity to produce arms and are trying to
establish a domestc military industry to be less dependent on imported arms (Brauer 2000).
However, these countries have not yet been successful in becoming exporters of arms on a larger
scale (Brauer 2007). For this reason, supply of military goods is very concentrated globally38 and
internatonal trade of arms remains an important issue.
Understanding how the politcal environment afects the decision to export arms is crucial to
provide a scientfc basis to the public debate about the regulaton of trade in major weapon
systems. Furthermore, it is also relevant to investgate the relatve importance of the main drivers
of demand constraints in arms' trade, in partcular conficts, the degree of militarizaton of the
society, the existence of military agreements and the efectveness of embargoes. Despite the
undisputed importance of the politcal environment in the transfer decision, litle has been done
so far to investgate the politcal factors determining transfers of arms between countries. To the
best of our knowledge, there are only two studies (Akerman & Seim 2012; Comola 2012) that have
made some progress in this directon. 
38 This is commonly atributed to “military malthusianism”, which describes that unit costs of major weapon systems
rise faster than government budget revenues and make it impossible for countries to achieve economies of scale
and entrely cope with costs of development and producton of arms for a country on its own (Brauer & Dunne
2011).
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The principal aim of this paper is to investgate a number of politcal factors that afect the decision
to exports arms and the value of the transfer. As main politcal factors, we consider the level of
democracy in the trading partners as well as the politcal orientaton of the ruling governments.
Moreover, we also account for the politcal diferences between trading partners and the politcal
environment in their respectve regions and for military and strategic pacts. To our knowledge, this
is the frst study that consistently investgates the politcal determinants of the extensive and
intensive margins of internatonal trade in arms using up-to-date panel data econometric models
and a comprehensive sample of countries and years.
The main noveltes with respect to previous studies are threefold. First, we focus not only on the
level of democracy as Akerman & Seim (2012) do, but also on the politcal orientaton of the ruling
governments and on the politcal similarites between trading partners and the politcal
environment of regions where they are located. Second, whereas Comola (2012) used a categorical
variable with only three dimensions, limited tme coverage and country-tme variaton to measure
politcal orientaton, we use a measure based on the countries' votng behaviour in the United
Natons General Assembly, which has more variability and an extended tme coverage. Third, in our
research, we control for a number of factors that were not included in previous studies and we
also distnguish between the determinants of the decision to export (extensive margin of exports)
and the determinants of the average amount exported (intensive margin of exports). Since both
decisions are related, we use a Helpman et al. (2008) two-stage estmaton procedure to control
for selecton bias and frm heterogeneity. We also control for tme-invariant unobservable
heterogeneity by experimentng with diferent sets of fxed efects. Our estmaton framework is
based on a theoretcally justfed gravity model of trade, which is applied to data for more than 100
countries over the period of 1950 to 2007. In order to test for the robustness of the results, we
estmate the model using several variatons of our dataset and estmaton techniques.
Furthermore, we compare the transfer of arms with trade in other goods and evaluate diferences
in the impact of the two politcal dimensions.
The main results show that the politcal factors considered are relevant in explaining the two trade
margins of arms transfers. The end of the Cold War appears to have changed the impact and
directon for several politcal factors, especially for those measuring the politcal environment in
the region. Diferences in politcal orientaton contnue to have a signifcant negatve impact on
two countries' probability to transfer arms.
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This paper is structured as follows: secton V.I describes the existng empirical literature in this feld
and secton V.II gives an overview of the data used. Secton V.III presents the empirical analysis,
secton V.IV discusses the main fndings and secton V.V concludes.
V.I - Literature
In order to approve a transfer of arms, the countries involved must frst evaluate whether the
associated benefts outweigh the risks and costs atached to the transfer. Whereas the gains for the
exportng country include revenues for the domestc industry in related sectors and in turn the
protecton of jobs in these industries, the costs are mainly related to politcal, economic and
strategic factors (Brauer 2000 and 2007). Furthermore, exportng should also generate increasing
economies of scale, resultng in lower costs and enhanced internatonal compettveness of
involved frms. These gains, however, can be ofset by potental negatve efects, which are linked
to the fact that the exportng country loses control over the arms once they are exported 39. Thus,
these arms could eventually be used against the exporter or his allies and the transfer of tools of
destructon can as problematc from a strategic standpoint. In additon, potental copyright
infringements or negatve reactons and pressure from third countries can emerge as a response to
weapon exports. Democratc countries, in partcular, may have a strong and negatve reacton in
the public opinion.
On the other hand, for the trade partners, the transfer can establish or strengthen their
relatonship. It can also lead to a transfer of knowledge40, possible atempts to infuence the
importers' policy41 and may start or fuel an arms race in the region of the importer. All efects have
diferent implicatons for the potental trading partners depending on the conditons of the
contract. In additon to the mostly self-serving reasons described above, arms transfers can also be
the result of an altruistc behaviour with the aim to help the receiving country maintain or re-
establish safety and security (Akerman & Seim 2012).
The described potental positve and negatve efects create uncertainty about the real outcomes in
diferent aspects related to the transfer. The politcal environment in the recipient country can be
an indicator of the level of uncertainty as well as the politcal diferences between the supplier and
39 Contracts over the export of arms ofen contain clauses that forbid their use in certain regions of the importng
country with ongoing conficts (e.g. exports of arms from Germany to Turkey and Mexico), but usually do not lead
to any consequences when broken.
40 According to Brauer & Dunne (2009), the knowledge transfer of ofset agreements is, if existng at all, relatvely
small.
41 Investgatng arms exports of the US, Sislin (1994) fnds successful atempts to infuence the partner countries
under certain conditons, especially in the frst decades of the Cold War.
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the recipient. Indeed, some authors fnd that countries may discriminate against certain politcal
regimes. In partcular, Blanton (2000) fnds that the United States largely exports arms to
democratc countries. This can either be due to support of the United States for countries that are
politcally close or be du to the fact that the United Sates expect negatve efects to be in general
lower when exportng to democratc countries than when sending arms to autocratc regimes.
The politcal determinants of arms transfers have been investgated, to the best of our knowledge,
by only two studies. Both studies use the same dataset on transfers in arms and put the main
emphasis on changes afer the end of the Cold War. However, the studies difer in the politcal
aspects and tme periods covered, the econometric approach implemented and the main results.
The frst study, by Akerman & Seim (2012), investgates the impact of the level of democracy on
the probability to trade arms for 34 countries for the years 1950-2007, using a linear probability
model with fxed efects. They fnd that the squared diference in polity between trading partners
has a large and signifcant negatve impact on the target variable, but that the efect turns out to
be positve and insignifcant afer the end of the Cold War. The main shortcoming of this study is
the use of a linear probability model, since the residuals violate assumptons about
homoskedastcity and normality of errors and this results in invalid standard errors and hypothesis
tests. A second limitaton is that they only focus on the decision to transfer arms, thus disregarding
the efect on the quantty transferred.
The second study, by Comola (2012), extends the analysis by using the politcal orientaton of the
trading countries as a second politcal dimension. She investgates the efect of both politcal
dimensions, namely democracy and politcal orientaton, on the volume of arms exported from the
20 major exporters to all independent countries recognized by the United Natons in the period
1975-2004. The estmaton method is a gravity-type Tobit model with exporter, importer and tme
fxed-efects. The main fndings are that democracies tend to export and import more arms than
autocracies and that while democracies export them mostly to rich countries, autocracies have the
tendency to export to poor countries. Furthermore, sharing a politcal orientaton has a positve
impact on trade that sharply decreases afer the end of the Cold War, especially for democracies. It
is worth notng that the measure of politcal orientaton used by Comola, which is constructed
using the World Bank Development Research Group’s Database of Politcal Insttutons, has several
shortcomings. First, it only covers the tme period afer 1974 and in many cases has no informaton
on the politcal orientaton of the ruling party. Thus, the dataset contains many missing values.
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Second, the variable is a subjectve measure, which is not strictly comparable between countries42
and distnguishes only three categories43 that can not capture smaller changes in the politcal
orientaton. Third, it focuses on economic policy rather than on foreign policy and has no variaton
over tme for communist countries, while capitalist or market liberal countries have governments
from all three categories. Finally, methodologically, it fails to acknowledge the recent advances in
gravity-modelling concerning panel data since it does not include dyadic fxed efects, but only
exporter and importer fxed efects, which do not control for all the unobserved heterogeneity that
is tme-invariant and country-pair specifc.
Both studies fnd that politcal determinants are important in terms of explaining internatonal
fows of major conventonal weapons (MCW). Both studies also describe a decrease in the
importance of politcal diferences between supplier and recipient afer the end of the Cold War.
We will extend these studies by using a more comprehensive dataset that includes all exporters
and importers trading arms, an extended set of policy variables and controls as well as a more
suitable estmaton technique that allows us to distnguish between the efect on the extensive and
intensive margins of arms trade.
V.II - Data
In our analysis we combine informaton from diferent felds of research and various sources in
order to control for diferent aspects of the transfer of arms. This secton describes the data and
the constructon of our variables. The study covers the period from 1950 to 2007 and uses data for
104 suppliers of arms and 154 recipients listed in Tables E.1 and E.2 in the Appendix.
V.II.I - Data on Arms Transfers
The identfcaton of the trade in arms and ammuniton in the available trade classifcatons is not
straightorward. Although recent revisions of the categories listed in the Harmonized Commodity
Descripton and Coding Systems (HS) allow us to isolate exports and imports of arms and
ammuniton44, the data is mostly based on reports of the importng and exportng countries45 and
42 For example, the Clinton and Carter governments in the USA are defned as lef-wing. Thus, are labeled with the
identcal politcal orientaton as communist countries like the Democratc People's Republic of Korea.
43 The dataset distnguishes between regimes that are either lef, right, centrist or cannot be assigned to any of the
three.
44 For example, the HS12 goods categories has an entry for “arms and ammuniton and parts and accessories thereof”
(HS12-93).
45 Due to confdentality reasons, countries may not report all of its detailed trade. In data sources like UN Comtrade
these trade fows will usually be included in a category called “others” or in the total trade value only. This makes it
impossible to identfy the sum of trade for some commodites.
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covered trade in arms is described as being “spoty” (Brauer 2007). Therefore, we use data on
arms transfers from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. It covers MCWs including air defence
systems, aircrafs, ant-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artllery, engines (for
ships, armoured vehicles and aircrafs), missiles, satellites, sensors, ships and components such as
guns and turrets for the years from 1950 to 2012. Informaton comes from various sources
including the media, governments, non-governmental organizatons (NGO) and internatonal
insttutons. The transfers can be of ofcial and unofcial nature and not necessarily involves a
direct payment. Transfers to rebel groups or NOGs within the recipient countries are excluded from
our sample.
In additon to agreements of transfers, SIPRI also provides informaton on the volume transferred
between the two partes for the year of the delivery in a separate dataset. This dataset is based on
the known unit producton costs of a core set of weapons and is intended to represent the transfer
of military resources rather than the fnancial value or sales price of the transfer. For used arms the
volume is discounted by 33 or 60 percent depending on whether or not it has been signifcantly
refurbished. The volume is denoted as trend-indicator value (TIV) in million US$ at constant (1990)
prices. Deliveries with a value of less than US$ 500,000 are denoted as a zero. When the transfer is
carried out over several years, the value is split according to the deliveries for each single year.
V.II.II - Politcal Dimensions
In order to derive a simplifed picture of the global politcal landscape, we distnguish between two
diferent politcal dimensions: the level of democracy and politcal orientaton. This results in four
main groups of governments: lef-wing democracies, right-wing democracies, lef-wing autocracies
and right-wing autocracies (Figure V.II.1).
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Figure V.II.1: Politcal Dimensions
For the level of democracy, data comes from the polity2 variable in the POLITY IV database hosted
by the Center for Systemic Peace and George Mason University. It ranges from -10 (strongly
autocratc) to +10 (strongly democratc).
As described in secton V.I, the most common measure for politcal orientaton has several faws.
We therefore measure politcal orientaton using a new approach, which clearly difers from
Comola (2012). In the last sixty years, the world may have shifed from a bipolar system to a
unipolar or multpolar system, but the USA remains a (sole) superpower.  Therefore, we assume
that the politcal orientaton of the USA is constant throughout our sample period. We use the USA
as a point of reference in politcal orientaton and measure the distance to the politcal orientaton
of the USA by using diferences in the votng behaviour in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). We
take UNGA Votng Data by Voeten and Strezhnev, where the authors constructed a votng similarity
index ranking from 0 to 1, which is computed based on three categories (approval, abstain and
disapproval for an issue) and where abstenton is counted as half-agreement with a yes or no vote.
The data is described by the authors as measuring common “interests” or “preferences” and we
atribute diferences in the UNGA votng behaviour to diferences in the politcal alignment of the
foreign policy. We believe that our method captures politcal orientaton in a more accurate way
than the measure used by Comola (2012). To illustrate our argument, we give an example: The
labour government of Tony Blair in United Kingdom (1998-2010) and the republican government of
George W. Bush in the USA (2001-2008) have usually been perceived as being very similar with
regard to foreign policy. Nevertheless, according to the dataset of the World Bank they are on
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opposite ends with regard to politcal orientaton, while their votng concordance in the UN
General Assembly is one of the highest for all countries during that period. Furthermore, the two
governments cooperated heavily in the exchange of arms. According to the SIPRI dataset, there are
44 agreements to transfer arms between both countries between 2001-2008, which is a very high
number.
We look at the two above-mentoned dimensions for supplier and recipient separately, while also
considering bilateral and regional diferences. In this way, we are able to account for the spatal
dimension of politcal and internatonal security aspects that could also afect arms transfers.
Hence, we frst use the level of both dimensions for supplier and recipient to control for its level of
democracy and its politcal orientaton. Second, we use the absolute diference of each dimension
between supplier and recipient to control for diferences between both countries in both
dimensions. Third, we also include as regressors the average value of the politcal dimensions for
all countries in the region, separately and in absolute diferences. The later is supposed to control
for the politcal environment in the region of supplier and recipient to ensure that the efect of the
politcal country variables are not just capturing the fact that countries with a certain politcal
angle are ofen located geographically close together. For example, countries surrounded by
autocracies may in general have a diferent supply or demand for arms than those surrounded by
democracies.
In what follows, we examine the degree of correlaton between both politcal dimensions. Figure
V.II.2 shows that democratc countries in general do not have higher votng concordance with the
US, although in the past two decades there has been a stronger relatonship. Votng concordance
with USA is on average declining over tme, and the level of democracy is rising afer a downturn
around the 1970s. The only persistent patern we fnd is a group of highly democratc countries
with relatvely similar votng behaviour to the USA that mostly consists of northern democracies.
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Figure V.II.2: Politcal Orientaton and Level of Democracy in Single Years
Notes: Markers indicate countries. The red markers shows a few countries as examples tracked over tme; The fgure 
only shows countries that were members of the UN and partcipated in the votng of the UN General Assembly.
V.II.III - Control Variables
Other variables included in the analysis come from a number of diferent sources. Informaton on
gross domestc product (GDP) was extracted from the Maddison Project, that, to our knowledge, is
the only source of GDP data that also covers socialist or communist countries. Cultural and
geographical characteristcs are measured with several variables taken from the Centre d'Etudes
Prospectves et d'Informatons Internatonales (CEPII). We use data on conficts provided by the
dataset of armed conficts from the Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) and the Uppsala
Confict Data Program (UCDP) at the Department of Peace and Confict Research at Uppsala
University and informaton on mandatory UN embargoes from the SIPRI Arms Embargoes
Database. Data on the share of military personnel comes from the Natonal Material Capabilites
(v4.0) dataset and informaton on military and strategic pacts comes from the Formal Alliances
(v4.0) dataset of the Correlates of War Project (COW).
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V.III - Analysis
In this secton, we frst conduct a simple descriptve analysis that looks at diferences between
country-pairs that trade and those that do not trade arms and at the politcal similarity between
the trading countries. Second, we conduct an empirical analysis to investgate the determinants of
the probability to trade arms and the volume of the transactons.
V.III.I - Descriptve Analysis
The evoluton of the politcal similarity of countries trading arms for each decade is shown in
Figure V.III.1. The fgure shows that in the 1950s, transfers of arms mostly occurred between
members of a defence agreement, and the largest amount of transfers were between countries
with very similar levels of democracy and politcal orientaton. In the following decades, transfers
were increasingly conducted between countries more unequal in both politcal dimensions. Since
the end of the Cold War, transfers have again mostly been taking place between countries that are
politcally close in both dimensions. The share of transfers within defence agreements is declining
over tme. Interestngly, in the last three decades, transfers within defence agreements have ofen
been between countries that were very diferent in terms of politcal orientaton, but did not difer
in the level of democracy.
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Figure V.III.1: Similarity in Level of Democracy and Politcal Orientaton Between Trading Partners
Notes: Blue and red markers indicate agreement on a transfer of arms in the given decade; Red markers indicate that a
defence agreement between trading partners is in place; Locaton of Markers are slightly perturbed to avoid 
overprintng of markers.
When comparing the average level of democracy over tme of countries that are involved in the
transfer of arms with those not involved, it is striking that for the exportng country, the average
polity2 is much higher (Figure V.III.2). The diference varies over tme between four and nine points
on the polity2 scale and is decreasing over tme. For the importng country, polity tends to be
slightly higher than for non-importers except for the period from the mid 1960s untl the early
1980s when the diference is close to zero. For the same tme period, absolute diference in polity2
between countries that trade arms is higher than for others. Apparently, in the “hotest phase” of
the Cold War, countries trading arms had more pronounced diferences in the level of democracy
than countries not involved in the transfer of arms. Before and afer this period, diferences in the
level of democracy are smaller for country-pairs that trade arms.
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Figure V.III.2: Diference in Polity of Countries Transferring Arms
Notes: Graph shows the diference in the mean polity2 of countries transferring arms from 
the total sample. Negatve values indicate lower polity for countries that transfer arms.
Figure V.III.3 analyses diferences in politcal orientaton over tme. On the one hand, we fnd that
countries exportng arms tend to have on average, a votng behaviour more similar to the USA than
countries that do not export arms. Whereas importer of arms tend to show slightly higher
orientaton towards the USA than non-importers, but less pronounced than exporters and only for
some years. On the other hand, similarity in politcal orientaton tends to be lower between
countries trading arms than between those not trading arms from the mid 1960s onwards. Politcal
diferences between trading countries and politcal orientaton towards the USA of the suppliers of
arms is increasing strongly over tme.
In short, countries exportng arms appear to be more democratc and oriented towards the US,
while recipient countries are close to non-trading countries with regard to both dimensions. While
countries trading arms appear to be closer in terms of democracy level, they tend to be more
diferent with regard to their politcal orientaton than countries that do not trade arms.
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Figure V.III.3: Diference in Votng Concordance with USA of Countries Transferring Arms 
Notes: Graph shows the diference in the mean votng concordance with the USA of countries 
transferring arms with the total sample. Negatve values indicate lower votng concordance 
with the USA.
V.III.II - Econometric Approach
Our econometric analysis is based on the gravity model of trade augmented with a number of
variables that capture the politcal situaton of supplier and recipient and others that are expected
to infuence trade in arms for the reasons explained below. The gravity model has been widely
used to model bilateral trade fows and is suitable to estmate the efect of specifc economic and
politcal factors on trade. It was frst used to estmate trade fows by Tinbergen (1962), extended
with theoretcal foundatons by Anderson (1979) and later by Anderson & van Wincoop (2003)
taking into account relatve trade costs in the form of multlateral resistance to trade46.
We use standard gravity variables, namely GDP and GDP per capita, distance between the country-
pair and categorical variables that control for geographical and cultural closeness. In additon, we
control for the demand and supply of arms due to conficts in the recipient country, arms
embargoes against the recipient country and military pacts and strategical agreements between
supplier and recipient. 
46 For a thorough descripton of the gravity model of trade, see Chapter V in Feenstra (2004).
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In order to estmate determinants of arms transfer correctly, we also need informaton on the
industrial capacity of the domestc arms industry and domestc demand for arms. As informaton
on both for the tme period of this study is difcult to fnd, we add to the model the share of
military personnel divided by the total populaton as a measure of the degree of militarizaton in a
society and demand for equipment. Militarizaton can afect supply and demand for arms through
various channels. A ceteris paribus higher degree of militarizaton and therefore higher domestc
demand for arms, is expected to strengthen the domestc arms industry. This is because the
domestc producton of arms and equipment is usually preferred over foreign producton for
politcal and strategic reasons. This is especially the case if domestc producton can satsfy the
needs of the military. Increased demand for domestc producton then makes exports of arms
more likely due to the existence of economies of scale. Concerning the probability to import, a
higher degree of militarizaton has an ambiguous efect: if higher domestc demand for arms
contributes to the formaton of a compettve arms industry that can satsfy domestc demand, it
should lead to a decrease in the imports of arms. Otherwise, demand for foreign arms should be
positvely related to the size of the military industry.
Politcal factors, the main focus of this investgaton, are modelled using several variables: frst, we
include the level of democracy and our measure of politcal orientaton for supplier and recipient.
Second, we introduce the absolute diference in both dimensions between supplier and recipient.
And third, in order to capture the politcal environment in the region of the exporter and the
region of the importer, we include the average value for both variables of all countries that are
geographically close. The empirical model is specifed as a probit model to estmate the
determinants of the probability that countries i and j agree on a transfer of MCWs:
Pr (transferijt=1∣X )=ϕ(α+ X 'β+κi+λ j+α t+εijt) ,     (V.1)
where the dependent variable, transferijt, takes the value one if j placed an order of major
conventonal arms in i, or in the case of licensed producton, a licence was issued in year t and zero
otherwise. The vector of regressors X is assumed to infuence the outcome and consists of the
following variables47: ln GDPit and ln GDPjt denote the natural logarithm of the gross domestc
product for the supplier and the recipient in year t and ln GDPpcit and ln GDPpcjt, the natural
logarithm of gross domestc product per capita for both countries. Trade costs proxied by
geographical and cultural distance are measured by the natural logarithm of distance between
47 See Table III.III.1 for an extensive descripton of all variables in the model.
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capitals of i and j (lnDistanceij); a dummy variable that takes the value one if i and j share a border
(Contguityij); a common language (Languageij); or common colonial past (Colonyij) and a variable
that takes the value one if i or j, and two if both are landlocked (Landlockedij).
The frst politcal dimension in the model is the level of democracy. We account for the level of
democracy for the supplier (Polityit) and the recipient (Polityjt), the absolute diference in the level
of democracy between both (Polity_difijt) and the average level of democracy of the surrounding
countries for the supplier (Polity_regionit) and the recipient (Polity_regionjt). Our measure for the
second dimension politcal orientaton is covered in a similar fashion for the supplier
(votewithUSAit), the recipient (votewithUSAjt), the absolute diference between both variables
(votewithUSA_difijt) and the average value of surrounding countries of the supplier
(votewithUSA_regionit) and the recipient (votewithUSA_regionjt).
The degree of militarizaton is included for the supplier (Militarizatonit) and the recipient
(Militarizatonjt). The dummy variable Confictjt indicates involvement of the government of the
recipient in a military confict with another party and at least 25 batle-related deaths. Pact ijt is a
variable that takes the value one if countries i and j have any kind of military or strategic
agreement in place in year t. This can either be to remain neutral, a promise not to atack each
other, to consult each other if a crisis occurs, or to defend each other. Embargojt takes the value
one if a mandatory UN embargo is in place against country j in year t. Besides the nonlinear probit
model, we estmate a linear probability model (LMP) that has the advantage of giving a rough but
easily interpretable impression of the size of the efect for each variable in the model without
calculatng marginal efects.
The main concern regarding the estmaton of equaton (V.1) is that estmates are rendered biased
by unobservable heterogeneity that is tme invariant and country specifc or tme varying and
common to all countries and correlated with the error term. Given the large number of
observatons of over 500,000 in our sample, we have chosen to include fxed-efects by “brute-
force” which has the disadvantage of having high demands in terms of computatonal power.
According to Baltagi (2013), the bias is then considerably reduced when having a high number of
observatons. In order to control for the bilateral tme-invariant heterogeneity, we employ a
separate regression based on the approach by Mundlak (1978) and include in equaton (V.1) the
tme averages of the tme variant covariates as additonal explanatory variables.
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V.III.III - Volume of Transferred Arms
Estmates on the probability to transfer arms do not account for the size of the transfer, only
whether or not a transfer was agreed upon. Thus, the transfer of a single armoured vehicle is given
the same importance as the transfer of 200 fghter aircrafs. In order to account for the size of the
transfer, we estmate a model with the same explanatory variables as in model (V.1) on a measure
of the volume of transferred arms:
lnVolumeijt=β0+β1 X +κi+λ j+αt+εijt . (V.2)
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the value of transferred major conventonal
arms from country i to country j in year t measured with the TIV of the SIPRI Dataset on
Transferred Arms. Diferent from model (V.1), where t specifes the year of the agreement about
the transfer, the transferred value t denotes the tme of the delivery. Thus, a transfer that was
agreed on in one year and appears in model (V.1) only one tme can be conducted over several
years and appear in model (V.2) several tmes, always with the transferred value of that year. As
described in secton V.II.I, transfers with a TIV of below 500,000 in constant (1990) US$ are
denoted as zero and are therefore not included the regression. 
V.III.IV - Two-Stage Approach
The later model has the disadvantage that because the dependent variable is transformed by
taking the natural logarithm, all trade fows with a TIV of zero are not included in the model. This
may cause a sample selecton bias associated with unobserved barriers to transfers of arms that
are correlated with observed ones and are important in explaining the volume of transfers
between country i and j. The bias could be partcularly large due to the very high fracton of zeros
in the dependent variable of almost 98 percent. Furthermore, due to the wide range of industries
involved in the military industrial complex and the importance of cooperatons of frms and
consorta we expect the frms in this sector to be very heterogeneous. When leaving this
heterogeneity uncontrolled, estmates of the intensive margin will be biased.
Following Helpman et al. (2008), we estmate a two-stage model that allows us to control for
unobserved frm heterogeneity and for sample selecton bias. The estmaton of the model consists
of an extension of the Heckman two-stage approach commonly used to correct for selecton bias.
In this approach, elements of the frst stage estmaton (a probit model on the probability to export
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arms) are used in a second stage as proxies for frm productvity and as correcton for sample
selecton bias. In the frst stage, we estmate the probit model on the probability to transfer MCWs
from country i to j in year t:
Pr (Transfer ijt=1∣X )=ϕ (α+X 'β+κi+λ j+αt+εijt) ,     (V.3)
The model difers from the model in equaton (V.1) as the dependent variable in equaton (V.3) is
the probability of a physical transfer of arms from country i to country j in year t (Transfer ijt) and
not the probability of placing an order or the agreement on a to transfer arms48. In the second
stage, we estmate the volume of transferred MCWs from country i to j in year t. The model can be
writen as:
lnVolume ijt=β0+β1 X +β2 Ẑ +β3 IMR+κi+λ j+αt+εijt . (V.4)
Following Helpman et al. (2008), we include two additonal terms as regressors in the second
stage: the linear predicton of the export down-weighted by its standard error (Ẑ) and the inverse
Mill's rato (IMR), both calculated using elements obtained from the estmaton of equaton (V.3).
The former term corrects the bias generated by the underlying unobserved frm-level
heterogeneity, whereas the later is a correcton for sample selecton which addresses the biases
generated by unobserved shocks. 
In order to fulfl the exclusion restricton of the Heckman approach, we use an exclusion variable,
which should only afects the probability to export, but not the volume, and hence must not enter
the second step model. The variable measuring mandatory UN embargoes is the best candidate for
this purpose. In fact, the assumpton that mandatory embargoes, which have the purpose to
eliminate trade of arms to a certain destnaton, only afect probability and not the volume seems
intuitve and reasonable and indeed this variable yields no signifcant estmates when included in
model (V.2). The intuiton behind this is that once a supplier of arms is willing to violate the
embargo, he will do so regardless of the size of the deal.
V.III.V - Trade in Arms versus Trade of Goods 
In previous sectons we have emphasized the importance of politcal factors in explaining transfers
of arms. However, we have not yet answered the queston of whether the impact of these factors
is specifc to the nature of transfers in arms or whether it applies for trade fows in general. A
48 The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database provides informaton on the order of a transfer and the value of the transfer in
separate datasets with diferent tmings, which prevented us from matching both datasets.
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direct comparison of estmates for all goods provides evidence of how politcal orientaton and the
level of democracy difers in the directon, extent and signifcance of the impact on trade in goods
and transfers of arms49.
In order to make a direct comparison, we construct a dataset that covers the same set of countries
over the same years for trade in goods and transfers of arms. Unfortunately, this reduces the
number of observatons signifcantly, especially for communist countries and in the early years.
Therefore, results are not directly comparable with the results of the previous sectons.
Informaton on trade fows of goods comes from the United Natons Comtrade Database for the
years 1962-2007. 
V.IV - Findings
Panel estmates of equaton (V.1), obtained for the variables measuring the diferent aspects of the
two politcal dimensions are reported in Table V.IV.1 and estmates for all variables in Table E.6 in
the Appendix. The complete Tables can be found in the Appendix. Column (1) shows the results
obtained from a linear probability model, columns (2) and (3) show estmates from a probit model
with country and tme fxed efects and with country-decade and year fxed efects. Finally,
columns (4) and (5) are panel estmates with dyadic random-efects and year and country fxed
efects in (4) and using the Mundlak approach in columns (5) to (7).
The variables that serve as a proxy for the country-specifc politcal dimensions have in general, a
statstcally signifcant impact on the probability of ordering a transfer of arms in most
specifcatons. An increase in the polity index of the supplier increases the probability to transfer
arms signifcantly, whereas for the recipient, the efect is always signifcant and negatve.
Concerning the diferences in politcal factors between trading countries, both an increase in the
absolute diference between the polity index and an increase in the discrepancy in votng
behaviour, have a signifcant negatve impact on the probability of a transfer. In terms of regional
politcal aspects, only votng with USA in the region of the supplier has a positve and signifcant
efect on the probability of ordering a transfer of arms. When relaxing the assumpton of no
correlaton between unobserved heterogeneity and covariates by using the Mundlak approach in
column (5), we fnd that estmates for all variables have the same sign and remain statstcally
signifcant. The only excepton is similarity in the level of democracy, which turns insignifcant. 
49 A comparison between trade in arms and other goods besides arms is not possible. As described in secton V.II.I,
arms or components of arms (e.g. engines of ships) are ofen labeled as non-military goods or not reported due to
confdentality reasons.
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Other explanatory variables are also relevant. While military pacts and conficts in the recipient
countries always signifcantly increase the probability of a transfer, embargoes against the recipient
have a negatve impact. Militarizaton of the society in the recipient country has a negatve and
signifcant efect on the probability to import arms. A higher domestc demand for arms from the
military industry, ceteris paribus, could strengthen the domestc arms industry. If the domestc
arms industry is meetng domestc needs, it could lower the probability of order transfers of arms
from abroad. This efect appears to overcompensate the demand efect. Estmates for standard
gravity variables mostly have the expected signs. GDP has a signifcant and positve impact on the
probability of a transfer in arms and GDP per capita has a signifcant and negatve impact for the
exporter and positve impact for the importer. Geographical variables also show expected results,
with negatve and signifcant coefcients for distance and positve and signifcant coefcients for
contguity. Cultural similarites, measured by colonial past and common ofcial language, always
have a positve and signifcant impact.
When estmatng the Mundlak approach for the tme before and afer the end of the Cold War, we
fnd that the directon and signifcance of some variables change as shown in columns (6) and (7).
For instance, less democratc countries are more likely to export arms afer 1989. Also regional
factors now have a signifcant impact on the likelihood to transfer arms. In the tme before 1990,
exporters and importers tend to be surrounded by more democratc countries. Afer that,
exporters tend to be surrounded by less democratc countries and estmates for the importers'
region turn insignifcant. Also insignifcant now are estmates for politcal orientaton of the
exporter in both periods and for the importer afer 1989. Interestngly, we fnd that the degree of
militarizaton shows a strong variaton over tme. For the exporter, a more militarized society has a
positve impact on the probability to export before and a negatve impact afer then end of the
Cold War. For the importer, the negatve impact found for the full sample is only signifcant in the
later period. Pacts between countries and conficts in the recipient country both have a signifcant
and positve impact on the probability of a transfer in both tme periods. Contrary to the results by
Comola (2012), we do not fnd that diferences in the politcal orientaton have no signifcant
impact on the probability of two countries to trade arms afer 1989.
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Regression results for models (V.2) and (V.4) on the transferred volume of arms are shown in Table
V.IV.3 for the politcal variables and for all variables in Table E.7 in the Appendix. The dependent
variable is the average value of the arms transferred. In order to control for various biases
described in secton V.III.IV, we include results for a Helpman et al. (2008) approach in columns (5)
to (7).
The politcal variable estmates are slightly diferent from the ones shown for the probability to
order a transfer, as described above. While polity of the supplier now yields non-signifcant
estmates, the polity index of the recipient is negatve and statstcally signifcant, indicatng that a
one point increase in the level of democracy decreases the transferred volume for the recipient by
around 1.2 percent (column (7)). Absolute diferences in polity have a signifcant and negatve
impact on the volume of transferred arms of 1.7 percent (column (4)) but turns insignifcant when
controlling for sample selecton bias in columns (6) and (7). Votng concordance with the USA in
Table V.IV.1: Probability to Agree on a Transfer of Arms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LPM Probit Probit RE Probit
1950-2007 1950-1989 1990-2007
0.00037*** 0.0183*** -0.00805 0.0213*** 0.0193*** 0.00598 -0.0191**
-0.00010** -0.0159***-0.0179***-0.0123***-0.00753***-0.00698** 0.00519
-0.00038*** -0.0152***-0.0135***-0.0102*** -0.00264 -0.000231 0.00359
0.000010 0.00643 0.0136* 0.00820 0.00687 0.0302*** -0.0383**
0.000021 -0.00220 0.0124 -0.00364 -0.00314 0.0168** -0.000119
-0.0090*** 0.641*** 0.691*** 0.579*** 0.436*** -0.163 0.289
-0.00623*** -0.855*** -0.966*** -0.759*** -0.689*** -0.930*** -0.214
-0.0457*** -1.392*** -1.928*** -1.196*** -0.941*** -0.911*** -0.528**
0.0299*** 0.516*** 0.210 0.530*** 0.559*** 0.593*** 0.0924
0.00393 -0.0141 0.443 0.0517 0.109 0.0357 0.508
-0.0140 -1.572 1.155 -1.226 -0.724 9.344*** -36.67***
-0.0441 -2.971* -1.157 -4.497** -4.401** -3.139 -8.332**
0.0397*** 0.497*** 0.544*** 0.412*** 0.355*** 0.433*** 0.202***
0.00496*** 0.182*** 0.131*** 0.190*** 0.189*** 0.166*** 0.203***
-0.00925*** -0.541*** -0.147 -0.628*** -0.644*** - -0.545***
Year Dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Yes*** Yes*** No Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Country-Decade No No Yes*** No No No No
Observatons 530,205 530,205 333,932 530,205 530,205 273,521 186,549
R^2 (Pseudo R^2) 0.165 (0.440) (0.421) - - - -
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the UN General Assembly yields mixed results for the supplier and the recipient, which turns out to
be non-signifcant when using the Helpman et al. (2008) approach. Interestngly, regional politcal
factors present diferent results. Indeed, when the surrounding countries of the exporter have a
more similar votng patern to the USA, they tend to transfer less arms. When the opposite is true
for the importer region, imports of arms increases. These results are in sharp contrast to those
obtained from estmatng model (V.1). In this case, the probability of agreeing to a transfer
increases when the exporters' votng patern is more in concordance with the US, although the
amounts transferred tend to be lower.
The variables military pact and confict are only afectng arms transfers in the panel estmates
when we do not apply the two-stage approach. In this case, a military or strategic pact signed
between supplier and recipient increases the volume of arms transferred by about 47 percentage
points (column 5). When an armed confict is taking place in the recipient country, the volume of
arms transfers received by the country increases by around 10 percentage points (column 5).
Estmates are smaller and even lose statstcal signifcance when using the Heckman two-stage
approach with fxed- or random-efects. A mandatory embargo by the UN on the recipient has a
non-signifcant efect on the volume of arms exported. This variable is therefore excluded from the
second stage in columns (5) to (7) in order to fulfl the exclusion restricton of the model. The
degree of militarizaton of the society yields mixed estmates for supplier and recipient. While the
efect is negatve but insignifcant for the supplier, it is positve and signifcant as long as the
country-fxed efects are not varying by decade. The efect lies between 14 and 41 percent given an
increase of one percentage point in the share of military personnel of the total populaton.
The volume of arms transfers tends to be higher for suppliers and recipients with higher GDP and
lower GDP per capita. Geographical characteristcs such as landlockedness and contguity in most
regressions yield positve and signifcant estmates. At frst, it may seem surprising that distance
between supplier and recipient also has a signifcant and positve impact on the volume of arms
exported when assuming that larger distance refects higher transport costs. The positve efect of
distance can be explained by the fact that suppliers prefer selling arms to destnatons further away
to lower the probability of facing these arms in batle. While common colonial past of supplier and
recipient has a positve impact on trade volume, the common language efect is negatve.
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We also fnd a lower impact of politcal variables on the volume for estmatons that include
controls for sample selecton bias and frm heterogeneity and variables measuring politcal
diferences between supplier and recipient to turn out insignifcant. The same happens with
variables controlling for conficts as well as pacts between supplier and recipient in fxed- and
random-efects regressions. The fact that the inverse Mill's rato is insignifcant in the second stage
for the random-efects estmaton indicates that there is no evidence that selecton bias is
quanttatvely important in this model. The impact of politcal variables on the volume of trade
changes with the end of the Cold War. Estmates for separate fxed-efects regressions for the tme
during and afer the Cold War in columns (8) and (9) show that the efects of politcal orientaton in
the region measured for the full sample are driven by the tme untl 1989. The same applies for the
impact of the degree of militarizaton in the recipient country, pacts and conficts. This is in sharp
contrast to estmaton results on the probability of a transfer. In the period afer 1989, less
democratc countries tend to export more arms.
Table V.IV.2: Volume of Transferred Arms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS OLS FE RE OLS FE RE FE FE
1950-2007 1950-1989 1990-2007
0.0119 -0.00006 0.00130 0.00538 0.0143* -0.0140 -0.00930 0.0284 -0.0836**
-0.0242*** -0.0122* -0.0238***-0.0233***-0.0262*** -0.0119* -0.0121** -0.00786 -0.00112
-0.0204***-0.0138***-0.0156***-0.0173***-0.0226*** -0.00537 -0.00728 0.00397 -0.0163
0.0235** -0.0163 0.0205* 0.0255** 0.0231** 0.0134 0.00814 0.0125 -0.00351
0.00603 0.0213 -0.0110 -0.00735 0.00527 0.00222 0.0104 -0.00213 0.0570
0.450* 1.076** -0.0569 -0.00343 0.518** -0.422 -0.494* 0.196 -0.550
-0.598*** -0.992*** -0.212 -0.268 -0.681*** 0.257 0.297 0.0668 0.433
-1.614*** -1.928*** -0.848*** -1.038*** -1.778*** -0.0464 -0.0576 -0.414 -1.298
-1.042*** 0.443 -0.683** -0.868*** -0.911*** -1.118***-1.222*** -1.026* 1.153
-0.250 0.400 0.544** 0.338 -0.266 0.747*** 0.539** 1.304*** -1.120
-3.511 -14.19 -3.293 -1.688 -4.286 1.149 4.512 -12.62 -24.92
14.86*** 1.721 15.09*** 13.69*** 15.05*** 14.37*** 12.56*** 13.88** 1.477
0.246*** 0.355*** 0.368*** 0.319*** 0.382*** -0.0302 -0.177 0.526*** 0.0665
0.0730* 0.0169 0.138*** 0.114*** 0.0924** -0.0216 -0.0781 0.179** 0.00911
-0.129 -0.0540 -0.165 -0.183 - - - - -0.358
Ẑ - - - - -0.124 0.0668 0.190*** - -
Inverse Mills Rato - - - - 53.41** -0.123*** -0.00157 - -
Year Dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes**
Country Dummies Yes*** No - Yes*** Yes*** - Yes*** - -
No Yes*** No No No No No No No
Observatons 12,700 12,700 12,700 12,700 12,699 12,699 12,699 7,639 5,061
R^2 0.400 0.470 0.169 0.382 0.400 0.171 0.386 0.068 0.021
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;
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We identfy diferences between the politcal determinants of trade in arms and trade in goods by
estmatng in identcal models the probability to export arms and goods. The sample is reduced to
ensure that the estmatons are comparable as described in secton V.III.V. When comparing the
results for the probability to transfer arms with those for trade in goods in Table V.IV.3, we fnd
both politcal dimensions to afect both types of trade, but to difer in the extent and sometmes in
the directon of the efect. For the trade volume of arms (Table V.IV.4), exportng countries tend to
export more arms when they are more oriented towards the USA, but less so for the volume of
other goods. Politcal diferences between exporter and importer appear to afect the volume in
the same directon, but much stronger for arms.
Table V.IV.3: Probability to Trade - Arms vs. Goods (1962-2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit RE Probit RE Probit RE Probit RE
Arms Goods Arms Goods Arms Goods Arms Goods
0.0135*** 0.0074*** -0.00690 0.00740*** 0.0227*** 0.0203*** 0.0149*** 0.0075***
-0.0159*** 0.0042*** -0.0184*** -0.00185 -0.0112*** 0.0092*** -0.0131*** 0.0044***
-0.0140***-0.0106***-0.0131***-0.0129***-0.0065***-0.0027***-0.0099***-0.0050***
0.00456 0.000709 0.00943 -0.00518 0.0178*** 0.0148*** 0.00606 -0.00658**
-0.0126** -0.00523** 0.00788 -0.0108** -0.0173*** 0.0107*** -0.0129** -0.00365
0.602*** -0.186*** 0.526** 0.380*** 1.969*** 0.224*** 0.546*** -0.550***
-0.109 0.303*** -0.630*** -0.00535 -0.215* 0.302*** -0.0748 0.270***
-0.969*** -1.126*** -1.205*** -1.522*** -0.941*** -0.154*** -0.899*** -0.390***
0.653*** -0.0189 0.467 -0.516*** 1.245*** -0.645*** 0.703*** -0.530***
0.348** 0.0342 0.551* 0.199 -0.106 -0.316*** 0.467** -0.370***
Year Dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Country Dummies Yes*** Yes*** No No No No Yes*** Yes***
Country-Decade Dum. No No Yes*** Yes*** No No No No
Observatons 340,391 370,438 232,005 347,400 373,290 373,290 373,290 373,290
Pseudo R^2 0.415 0.512 0.398 0.529 - - - -
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Table V.IV.4: Trade Volume - Arms vs. Goods (1962-2007)
In order to validate the results obtained by estmatng models (V.1) to (V.4), we carry out two
robustness checks. The frst check evaluates the possible endogeneity of the politcal factors. The
second analyses whether the variaton in the sample of countries afects the results.
In the previous regressions, it could be claimed that the measure for the second politcal
dimension could yield an endogeneity bias. Indeed, votng behaviour could be altered by a
potental recipient of arms in order to please or appease a potental supplier and make the deal
more likely to happen. We investgate the existence of an endogeneity bias by using a three year
lag of all variables measuring politcal orientaton. The results are shown in Table E.10 in the
Appendix. According to our estmates, the bias, if existing at all, is quanttatvely very small and
does not afect the main results. The second robustness check consists of excluding the USA from
the sample. We do so, because the second politcal dimension, which is votng concordance with
the USA in the UN General Assembly, is using the USA as a reference point. Hence, the value for
the country-specifc measure always takes the value of one for the USA and the bilateral measure
always takes the value of the country specifc measure for the partner country. The obtained
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS FE FE RE RE
Arms Goods Arms Goods Arms Goods Arms Goods
0.00972 0.0122*** 0.000451 0.00209 0.0301 0.00301** 0.0122 0.00288**
-0.0202*** 0.00189* -0.0122 -0.0054*** 0.00154 -0.0049*** -0.00601 -0.0048***
-0.0145*** -0.0071*** -0.0139** -0.0059*** 0.00236 -0.0029*** -0.00655 -0.0025***
0.00441 0.0124*** -0.0134 -0.00125 -0.0237 0.00512 -0.0146 0.00451
-0.00661 -0.00407 0.0208 -0.0101** 0.0163 -0.00625* 0.0164 -0.00667*
0.927*** -0.564*** 1.817*** -0.0604 0.754 0.274*** 1.127** 0.249***
-0.181 0.0418 -1.008** 0.0607 -0.103 -0.170*** -0.519 -0.147**
-1.323*** 0.0976*** -1.761*** 0.0394 -0.325 -1.218*** -0.941*** -1.120***
-0.853** -0.432*** -0.0115 -0.433** 0.551 -0.517*** 0.255 -0.514***
-0.741** 0.692*** -0.0213 0.329** 0.271 0.287** 0.136 0.292**
Year Dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Country Dummies Yes*** Yes*** No No - - No No
Country-Decade Dum. No No Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Observatons 10,282 285,374 10,282 285,374 10,282 285,374 10,282 285,374
R^2 0.343 0.728 0.407 0.748 0.001 0.400 0.381 0.742
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estmaton results (Table E.11 and Table E.12) are very similar to the results shown above,
indicatng that the fndings are neither dominated by largest supplier of arms, nor by the lack of
variaton in politcal orientaton of the largest exporter.
V.V - Conclusion
The results presented in this paper show the impact of a number of politcal factors on the
probability and volume of arms transfers. We fnd that the level of democracy and the politcal
orientaton of the supplier and recipient countries as well as the diferences between them, are
important determinants of the probability to trade arms. While suppliers with higher levels of
democracy have a higher probability to transfer arms, we fnd the opposite result for the recipient
countries. In additon, when a country is more oriented towards the USA or when both countries
tend to be close in both politcal dimensions, it is more likely that they agree to trade arms While
similar politcal orientaton maintains to have a positve efect on the likelihood of transfer afer the
end of the Cold War, the impact of the politcal environment in the region of the supplier and the
recipient on both margins of trade is afected.
Countries that are involved in conficts are more likely to import arms and countries with a UN
embargo imposed against them are less likely to import arms. Our results are all robust to a
number of sensitvity tests, including sample selecton bias, the large amount of zero trade fows
and reverse causality between UNGA votng behaviour and agreements to transfer arms.
Moreover, the efects are not dominated by a single country in the sample. We fnd that politcal
determinants also play an important role in explaining fows of goods between countries, but that
the size of the impact is larger for transfers of arms.
Our results suggest that politcal closeness between a pair of countries is an important
determinant of transfers in arms and that economic and strategic interests are not the only drivers
of the transfers. Any atempt to regulate trade in major conventonal weapons should therefore
refect the politcal interests involved. Mandatory UN embargoes appear to be successful in
decreasing the probability of arms transfers but have no signifcant impact on the volume.
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Figure A.1: Share of Total Exports by BEC Category, 1996-2010
  Capital Goods         Intermediates Final Goods








Figure A.2: Log of Total Trade Value
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Table A.1: Coverage
Table A.2: BEC Categories
BEC Code Descripton
Food and beverages / primary / mainly for industry
Food and beverages / primary / mainly for household consumpton
Food and beverages / processed / mainly for industry
Food and beverages / processed / mainly for household consumpton
Industrial supplies n.e.s. / primary
Industrial supplies n.e.s. / processed
Fuels and lubricants / primary
321 Fuels and lubricants / processed / motor spirit
Fuels and lubricants / processed / other
Capital goods (except transport equipment)
Capital goods / parts and accessories
510 Transport equipment and parts and accessories thereof / passenger motor cars
Transport equipment and parts and accessories thereof / other / industrial
Transport equipment and parts and accessories thereof / other / non-industrial
Transport equipment and parts and accessories thereof / parts and accessor.
Consumer goods n.e.s. / durable
Consumer goods n.e.s. / semi-durable
Consumer goods n.e.s. / non-durable

















Superscript denotes whether the category is 1 capital, 2 intermediate or 3 consumpton good.
Countries
Austria Estonia Ireland Netherlands Slovenia
Belgium Finland Italy Norway Spain
Bulgaria France Japan Poland Sweden
Cyprus Germany Latvia Portugal Switzerland
China Greece Lithuania Romania Turkey
Czech Republic Hungary Luxembourg Russia United Kingdom
Denmark India Malta Slovakia USA





Log of distance between capitals of country i and j in km CEPII




Bilateral volatlity measure of the nominal exchange rate of the countries i and j at tme t WM Company/Reuters
Log of the bilateral nominal exchange rate of the countries i and j at tme t WM Company/Reuters
Cross-product of the corrupton measure of countries i and j at tme t Internatonal Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
ln X
ijkt Log of exports of good k from country  i to j  at tme t in US$
ln Y




ijt CIA World Factbook 2011
Euro
ijt Dummy whether (1) or not (0) the countries i and j have the Euro as a common currency and tme t CIA World Factbook 2011
Border
ij Dummy whether (1) or not (0) the countries i and j share a common border
Language
ij Dummy whether (1) or not (0) the countries i and j share a common ofcial language
Landlocked
ij Dummy whether none (0), one of the countries i and j (1), or both (2) are landlocked CIA World Factbook 2011
Island
ij Dummy whether none (0), one of the countries i and j (1), or both (2) are on an island CIA World Factbook 2011
Colony







Table A.4: Fixed Efects Regressions - Capital Goods Table A.5: Fixed Efects Regressions - Intermediates
(1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)
0.506*** 0.560*** 0.473*** 0.606*** 0.493*** 0.631***
(0.0325) (0.0131) (0.0159) (0.0104) (0.0199) (0.0174)
0.0891*** 0.0890*** 0.101*** 0.103*** 0.0936***
(0.00898) (0.00898) (0.00888) (0.00887) (0.00897)
0.0939*** 0.0939*** 0.104*** 0.100*** 0.101***
(0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0116)
-2.435*** -2.450*** -2.559*** -2.659***
(0.285) (0.284) (0.284) (0.284)
-2.560*** -2.534*** -2.722*** -2.866***
(0.339) (0.338) (0.338) (0.337)
-1.865*** -1.875*** -1.993*** -2.203***
(0.282) (0.282) (0.282) (0.280)
-0.615** -0.613** -0.738** -0.648**
(0.298) (0.298) (0.297) (0.298)
-0.0911** -0.115*** -0.0910** -0.0904**
(0.0394) (0.0383) (0.0394) (0.0394)
0.0820** 0.0892*** 0.0820** 0.0809**
(0.0349) (0.0337) (0.0349) (0.0349)
-0.0136 -0.0217 -0.0139 -0.0122
(0.0409) (0.0407) (0.0409) (0.0409)
0.0191 0.0192 0.0195 0.0185
(0.0301) (0.0299) (0.0301) (0.0301)
Obs. 1,045,992 1,045,992 1,057,399 1,073,052 1,045,992 1,045,992
























Standard errors in parentheses; signifcance levels: * 10% ** 5% ***1%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.426*** 0.504*** 0.632*** 0.575*** 0.446*** 0.457***
(0.0300) (0.0313) (0.0291) (0.0207) (0.0382) (0.0272)
0.119*** 0.119*** 0.138*** 0.143*** 0.113***
(0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0160)
-0.112*** -0.112*** -0.100*** -0.0923*** -0.101***
(0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0204) (0.0207)
-2.805*** -2.923*** -2.656*** -3.091***
(0.514) (0.513) (0.513) (0.512)
-3.485*** -3.520*** -3.286*** -3.879***
(0.612) (0.612) (0.611) (0.610)
-3.528*** -3.459*** -3.370*** -3.965***
(0.509) (0.508) (0.508) (0.505)
-1.468*** -1.455*** -1.323** -1.505***
(0.531) (0.531) (0.530) (0.531)
-0.301*** -0.332*** -0.302*** -0.300***
(0.0710) (0.0689) (0.0710) (0.0710)
0.0499 0.0849 0.0499 0.0486
(0.0634) (0.0612) (0.0634) (0.0634)
0.271*** 0.241*** 0.272*** 0.274***
(0.0734) (0.0730) (0.0734) (0.0734)
0.0825 0.0933* 0.0823 0.0809
(0.0547) (0.0544) (0.0547) (0.0547)
Obs. 283,895 283,895 287,010 291,256 283,895 283,895
























Standard errors in parentheses; signifcance levels: * 10% ** 5% ***1%
Table A.6: Fixed Efects Regressions - Final Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.417*** 0.352*** 0.639*** 0.538*** 0.439*** 0.456***
(0.0127) (0.0140) (0.0134) (0.0132) (0.0109) (0.0128)
0.202*** 0.202*** 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.205***
(0.00787) (0.00787) (0.00778) (0.00780) (0.00785)
0.0648*** 0.0647*** 0.0705*** 0.0722*** 0.0813***
(0.00999) (0.00999) (0.00996) (0.00992) (0.00997)
-2.426*** -2.492*** -2.502*** -2.896***
(0.234) (0.234) (0.234) (0.233)
-2.186*** -2.193*** -2.288*** -2.846***
(0.282) (0.282) (0.282) (0.281)
-1.438*** -1.420*** -1.518*** -2.189***
(0.235) (0.235) (0.235) (0.233)
-0.967*** -0.979*** -1.045*** -1.001***
(0.247) (0.247) (0.247) (0.247)
-0.276*** -0.291*** -0.276*** -0.275***
(0.0347) (0.0338) (0.0347) (0.0347)
-0.0592* -0.0582* -0.0591* -0.0615**
(0.0311) (0.0301) (0.0311) (0.0311)
0.0667* 0.0654* 0.0665* 0.0713**
(0.0360) (0.0359) (0.0360) (0.0360)
-0.0589** -0.0447* -0.0587** -0.0614**
(0.0268) (0.0267) (0.0268) (0.0268)
879,509 879,509 889,410 902,978 879,509 879,509

























Standard errors in parentheses; signifcance levels: * 10% ** 5% ***1%
Table A.7: Beta Coefcients
Capital Goods Intermediates Final Goods
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE
0.364 0.385 0.198 0.380 0.492 0.368 0.476 0.372 0.346 0.374 0.195 0.374
-0.374 -0.374 -0.429 -0.434 -0.401 -0.403
0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034
-0.013 -0.012 -0.008 -0.009 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008
0.062 0.067 0.106 0.103 0.088 0.088
0.015 0.016 0.006 0.005 0.011 0.012
0.037 0.040 0.018 0.017 0.024 0.024
-0.107 -0.111 -0.078 -0.079 -0.039 -0.040
-0.352 -0.355 -0.322 -0.326 -0.119 -0.119
-0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
-0.008 -0.008 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005
-0.009 -0.008 -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
-0.004 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
-0.306 -0.301 -0.304 -0.300 -0.083 -0.082 -0.082 -0.082 -0.289 -0.289 -0.287 -0.287
0.051 0.059 0.051 0.058 0.074 0.074 0.075 0.075 -0.062 -0.062 -0.063 -0.063
0.277 0.245 0.277 0.246 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 0.070 0.069 0.069 0.068
0.085 0.077 0.082 0.075 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.017 -0.062 -0.062 -0.064 -0.063
-0.021 -0.020 0.001 0.002
0.028 0.015 -0.007 -0.009 0.007 0.004
IMR 0.005 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.009 0.009
283,895 283,895 283,895 283,895 1,045,992 1,045,992 1,045,992 1,045,992 879,509 879,509 879,509 879,509








































Table A.8: Robustness Checks (RE Regressions as in Column (2) in Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sample 1999-2010 Without Big Four Adding Countries to Sample (Capital Goods)
Sectors 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 1 1
0.474*** 0.529*** 0.477*** 0.448*** 0.489*** 0.390*** 0.477*** 0.461*** 0.460*** 0.459***
(0.0134) (0.0109) (0.00954) (0.0112) (0.00964) (0.00840) (0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0129)
-1.201*** -1.549*** -1.265*** -1.266*** -1.575*** -1.315*** -1.246*** -1.222*** -1.217*** -1.297***
(0.0554) (0.0499) (0.0437) (0.0482) (0.0473) (0.0415) (0.0488) (0.0498) (0.0502) (0.0524)
0.130*** 0.0958*** 0.204*** 0.0564*** 0.0775*** 0.136*** 0.0893*** 0.119*** 0.127*** 0.129***
(0.0162) (0.00902) (0.00797) (0.0165) (0.00980) (0.00846) (0.0165) (0.0163) (0.0161) (0.0163)
-0.0761*** 0.134*** 0.107*** -0.103*** 0.116*** 0.0680*** -0.104*** -0.103*** -0.105*** -0.0841***
(0.0244) (0.0140) (0.0120) (0.0211) (0.0127) (0.0108) (0.0211) (0.0209) (0.0206) (0.0208)
0.601*** 1.153*** 0.860*** 0.539*** 1.255*** 0.816*** 0.501*** 0.581*** 0.603*** 0.492***
(0.0998) (0.0897) (0.0790) (0.0885) (0.0869) (0.0766) (0.0896) (0.0888) (0.0900) (0.0946)
0.193* 0.103 0.152* 0.304*** 0.00207 0.179** 0.298*** 0.249** 0.213** 0.322***
(0.115) (0.104) (0.0906) (0.105) (0.104) (0.0908) (0.101) (0.102) (0.104) (0.108)
0.548*** 0.290*** 0.338*** 0.172 0.247** 0.143 0.363*** 0.543*** 0.533*** 0.819***
(0.121) (0.109) (0.0959) (0.122) (0.120) (0.106) (0.113) (0.108) (0.109) (0.117)
-0.815*** -0.578*** -0.156 0.149 0.104 1.210*** -0.912*** -1.034*** -1.027*** -1.293***
(0.199) (0.172) (0.152) (0.186) (0.167) (0.147) (0.184) (0.185) (0.186) (0.193)
-1.510*** -2.275*** -1.116*** -1.247*** -1.575*** 0.872*** -2.123*** -1.721*** -1.655*** -1.358***
(0.264) (0.193) (0.169) (0.247) (0.191) (0.166) (0.248) (0.237) (0.235) (0.263)
-0.0637 -1.349*** -1.162*** -0.236 -1.024** -0.968*** -0.250 -0.452 -0.329 -0.154
(0.764) (0.424) (0.341) (0.769) (0.455) (0.355) (0.776) (0.738) (0.731) (0.748)
-0.699 1.202** -0.00509 -0.510 1.176** -0.277 -0.561 -1.590 -1.709* -1.744*
(0.985) (0.550) (0.443) (0.999) (0.596) (0.465) (1.008) (0.970) (0.959) (0.987)
2.008** 0.0105 1.635*** 1.626 -0.682 1.761*** 1.814* 1.427 1.373 1.564
(1.007) (0.560) (0.454) (1.040) (0.616) (0.482) (1.049) (0.996) (0.983) (1.016)
-0.547 0.153 -0.225 -0.480 0.970** 0.436 -0.518 -0.807 -0.550 -0.555
(0.753) (0.415) (0.339) (0.795) (0.464) (0.365) (0.801) (0.746) (0.737) (0.760)
0.878 -0.408 -0.195 0.363 -0.524 -0.0683 0.930 0.279 0.155 -0.0256
(0.582) (0.323) (0.286) (0.655) (0.386) (0.336) (0.633) (0.490) (0.471) (0.508)
-3.464*** 0.645 -0.183 -2.301 0.699 -0.325 -2.837** -1.863* -1.632 -1.437
(1.255) (0.694) (0.616) (1.445) (0.851) (0.739) (1.399) (1.080) (1.041) (1.116)
3.299*** 0.00908 0.838 1.647 -0.133 0.535 1.439 1.226 1.300 1.531
(1.179) (0.650) (0.579) (1.434) (0.846) (0.735) (1.392) (1.058) (1.022) (1.096)
-0.831* -0.256 -0.802*** 0.376 0.0121 -0.448 0.549 0.249 0.0475 -0.386
(0.499) (0.274) (0.245) (0.640) (0.378) (0.329) (0.621) (0.466) (0.450) (0.485)
-0.00826** 0.00143 0.00143 0.00280 0.00737*** 0.0115*** 0.00230 -0.00394 -0.00577* -0.0112***
(0.00332) (0.00184) (0.00164) (0.00345) (0.00202) (0.00176) (0.00349) (0.00325) (0.00316) (0.00311)
Year > 1998 yes yes yes - - - - - - -
USA yes yes yes - - - yes yes yes yes
Russia yes yes yes - - - - yes yes yes
Japan yes yes yes - - - - - yes yes
China yes yes yes - - - - - - yes
Turkey yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes -
Obs. 258,383 950,750 800,811 226,992 837,354 702,413 242,764 256,432 270,343 270,092
0.694 0.619 0.680 0.719 0.649 0.704 0.715 0.709 0.705 0.708






































Standard errors in parentheses; signifcance levels: * 10% ** 5% ***1%
Sector 1, 2 and 3 denote capital, intermediate and fnal goods, respectvely.
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B  The CFA Franc Zone and the Euro
Table B.1: Countries
Countries
Albania Egypt Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Rwanda
Algeria Eritrea Lithuania Saudi Arabia
Argentna Estonia Luxembourg Senegal
Armenia Ethiopia Macao Sierra Leone
Australia Fiji Macedonia Singapore
Austria Finland Madagascar Slovakia
Azerbaijan France Malawi Slovenia
Bangladesh Gabon Malaysia South Africa
Belarus Gambia Mali Spain
Belgium Georgia Malta Sri Lanka
Benin Germany Mauritania Sudan
Bolivia Ghana Mexico Suriname
Botswana Greece Morocco Swaziland
Brazil Guinea Mozambique Sweden
Bulgaria Guinea-Bissau Namibia Switzerland
Burkina Faso Hait Nepal Syrian Arab Republic
Burundi Hong Kong Netherlands Thailand
Cambodia Hungary New Zealand Togo
Cameroon Iceland Niger Tunisia
Canada India Nigeria Turkey
Central African Republic Indonesia Norway Uganda
Chile Iran Pakistan Ukraine
China Iraq Papua New Guinea United Arab Emirates
Colombia Ireland Paraguay United Kingdom
Congo Israel Peru United Republic of Tanzania
Cyprus Italy Philippines United States of America
Czech Republic Jamaica Poland Uruguay
Côte d'Ivoire Japan Portugal Venezuela
Denmark Jordan Republic of Korea Viet Nam
Djibout Kenya Republic of Moldova Yemen
Dominican Republic Latvia Romania Zambia
Ecuador Lesotho Russian Federaton Zimbabwe
Table B.2: Variables
Variable Descripton Source
Log of nominal exports of from country i to j in year t UN Comtrade
Penn World Tables
Log of distance between capitals of country i and j in km CEPII
Dummy whether (1) or not (0) exporter i is a CFA member and importer j is a Eurozone member in year t BCEAO / BEAC / Eurostat
Dummy whether (1) or not (0) exporter i is a Eurozone member and importer j is a CFA member in year t
Dummy whether (1) or not (0) exporter i  and importer j are both CFA members in year t
Dummy whether (1) or not (0) country i and j share a common border CEPII
Dummy whether (1) or not (0) a language is spoken by at least 9 percent of the populaton in i and j CEPII
CIA's World Factbook 2011
Dummy whether (1) or not (0) the countries i and j ever had a colonial link CEPII
Dummy whether (1) or not (0) the countries i and j have signed a RTA in year t de Sousa (2012)










ijt BCEAO / BEAC / Eurostat
IntraCFA
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C  Exchange Rate Policy and Exports of Firms
Table C.1: BEEPS Surveys
Table C.2: Number of Firms in Every Round of the Survey by Country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2002 2005 2007 2009 Total
Albania 110 146 215 32 503
Belarus 0 0 0 226 226
Georgia 0 0 0 258 258
Ukraine 381 453 0 604 1438
Uzbekistan 0 0 0 361 361
Russia 298 390 0 745 1433
Poland 333 750 0 299 1382
Romania 206 524 0 355 1085
Serbia 82 165 0 361 608
Kazakhstan 198 424 0 431 1053
Moldova 0 0 0 350 350
Bosnia 0 0 0 280 280
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 355 355
FYROM 0 0 0 311 311
Armenia 0 0 0 278 278
Kyrgyz 0 0 0 185 185
Estonia 163 202 0 261 626
Czech Republic 142 304 0 192 638
Hungary 194 480 0 281 955
Latvia 160 171 0 248 579
Lithuania 178 180 0 247 605
Slovakia 128 151 0 205 484
Slovenia 182 200 0 270 652
Bulgaria 194 214 980 238 1626
Croata 115 188 601 97 1001
Montenegro 0 2 0 80 82
Total 3,064 4,944 1,796 7,550 17,354
(1) (2)
Freq. Percent
only in 2009 5,967 34.38
only in 2007 1,789 10.31
only in 2005 3,387 19.52
only in 2002 2,232 12.86
only in 2002, 05 1,334 7.69
only in 2005, 09 1,917 11.05
only in 2007, 09 11 0.06
only in 2002, 05, 09 712 4.10
Total 17,354 100
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Table C.3: Exportng Firms by Country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Not Exportng Exportng Total Share
Albania 364 139 503 0.28
Armenia 241 37 278 0.13
Azerbaijan 329 26 355 0.07
Belarus 170 56 226 0.25
Bosnia 176 104 280 0.37
Bulgaria 1,083 543 1,626 0.33
Croata 570 431 1,001 0.43
Czech Republic 402 236 638 0.37
Estonia 399 227 626 0.36
FYROM 174 137 311 0.44
Georgia 225 33 258 0.13
Hungary 600 355 955 0.37
Kazakhstan 952 101 1,053 0.10
Kyrgyz 157 28 185 0.15
Latvia 409 170 579 0.29
Lithuania 388 217 605 0.36
Moldova 290 60 350 0.17
Montenegro 68 14 82 0.17
Poland 993 389 1,382 0.28
Romania 853 232 1,085 0.21
Russia 1,186 247 1,433 0.17
Serbia 356 252 608 0.41
Slovakia 289 195 484 0.40
Slovenia 289 363 652 0.56
Ukraine 1,118 320 1,438 0.22
Uzbekistan 320 41 361 0.11
Total 12,401 4,953 17,354 0.29
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Table C.4: Exportng Firms by Industry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Industry Not Exportng Exportng Total Share
Other manufacturing 2 667 496 1,163 0.43
Food 15 1,376 786 2,162 0.36
Textles 17 97 139 236 0.59
Garments 18 551 391 942 0.42
Chemicals 24 120 131 251 0.52
Plastcs & rubber 25 83 88 171 0.51
Non metallic mineral 26 153 91 244 0.37
Basic metals 27 38 42 80 0.53
Fabricated metal products 28 508 416 924 0.45
Machinery and equipment 29 316 397 713 0.56
Electronics 31 83 93 176 0.53
Constructon 45 1,588 181 1,769 0.10
Other services 50 1,308 273 1,581 0.17
Wholesale 51 1,480 507 1,987 0.26
Retail 52 2,608 257 2,865 0.09
Hotel and restaurants 55 646 117 763 0.15
Transport 60 595 432 1,027 0.42
IT 72 184 116 300 0.39
Total All 12,401 4,953 17,354 0.29
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Figure C.1: Range of the Share of Exports to EU-27 by Country (2002, 2005, 
2007 and 2009)*
Source: UN Comtrade
*Data for Uzbekistan is unavailable. Data for Montenegro is for the years 
2007 and 2009 only.
Table C.5: Firms per Industry and Country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
Industry
2 15 17 18 23-24 25 26 27 28 29 31-32 45 50 51 52 55 60-64 72
All
 Food Textles Garments Chemicals Electronics Constructon  Wholesale Retail Transport IT
Albania 21 59 22 7 8 5 10 7 14 1 0 60 41 84 68 51 44 1 503
Belarus 21 13 7 13 6 5 7 1 8 4 0 12 5 25 81 1 11 6 226
Georgia 22 39 1 1 1 1 12 7 4 0 0 45 7 14 70 17 17 0 258
Ukraine 119 225 11 135 11 2 17 2 38 113 3 123 180 175 144 58 64 18 1,438
Uzbekistan 15 28 10 10 9 3 17 3 7 12 6 36 7 28 112 25 31 2 361
Russia 106 198 13 102 78 16 16 8 76 82 16 165 160 145 153 34 58 7 1,433
Poland 48 160 12 131 2 17 16 3 142 66 2 155 131 177 155 35 114 16 1,382
Romania 53 187 8 104 13 7 9 4 87 55 3 87 97 97 169 40 59 6 1,085
Serbia 53 68 14 7 11 9 6 4 29 11 6 64 63 83 103 28 44 5 608
Kazakhstan 64 204 4 65 5 4 16 1 32 54 9 140 87 121 169 28 44 6 1,053
Moldova 15 47 2 18 2 2 3 0 14 3 1 41 13 24 128 10 27 0 350
Bosnia 44 11 3 8 2 5 2 2 18 8 2 34 9 38 75 9 10 0 280
Azerbaijan 22 39 8 3 4 1 13 1 6 10 7 30 21 33 120 15 16 6 355
FYROM 25 25 6 27 2 2 4 3 10 3 2 43 3 38 82 12 23 1 311
Armenia 22 28 4 2 9 1 6 6 7 5 1 24 8 16 83 26 20 10 278
Kyrgyz 20 29 8 3 2 4 5 2 1 3 4 24 6 13 42 5 13 1 185
Estonia 64 46 5 12 2 4 7 1 11 7 3 77 87 69 116 58 50 7 626
Czech Republic 47 60 3 4 9 11 9 7 25 25 7 82 87 67 92 45 49 9 638
Hungary 61 108 8 47 5 13 8 6 129 63 5 90 87 121 112 35 45 12 955
Latvia 54 49 4 12 0 1 5 2 7 6 0 51 81 109 124 24 48 2 579
Lithuania 58 58 14 10 1 4 6 0 6 10 7 84 53 73 101 50 65 5 605
Slovakia 22 40 3 5 7 3 5 4 18 18 2 58 100 67 73 24 28 7 484
Slovenia 32 57 10 4 7 12 10 3 33 29 4 90 101 80 85 41 44 10 652
Bulgaria 71 215 24 159 47 23 18 1 75 103 73 70 83 155 233 52 70 154 1,626
Croata 76 157 31 53 7 16 16 2 123 22 13 80 64 126 143 35 29 8 1,001
Montenegro 8 12 1 0 1 0 1 0 4 0 0 4 0 9 32 5 4 1 82





















Figure C.2: Range of Volatlity to the Euro (2001, 2004, 2006 and 2008)*
*Coverage for years and countries as in the study sample (see Table C.3)
Table C.6: Correlaton Table
ExportIntensity ln Sales Quality Size Euro ERM Peg ln ExRate Volatlity RTA
ExportIntensity 1.00 0.18 0.17 0.24 0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.03 -0.06 0.12
ln Sales 0.18 1.00 0.28 0.61 0.17 0.02 0.07 0.15 -0.01 0.12
Quality 0.17 0.28 1.00 0.31 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.03 -0.04 0.12
Size 0.24 0.61 0.31 1.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.01
Euro 0.05 0.17 0.08 0.03 1.00 -0.06 -0.07 0.03 -0.09 0.21
ERM 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.06 1.00 -0.12 -0.19 -0.17 0.36
Peg 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.02 -0.07 -0.12 1.00 -0.28 -0.17 0.16
ln ExchangeRate -0.03 0.15 0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.19 -0.28 1.00 0.07 -0.09
Volatlity -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.09 -0.17 -0.17 0.07 1.00 -0.35
RTA 0.12 0.12 0.12 -0.01 0.21 0.36 0.16 -0.09 -0.35 1.00
Table C.7: Probability to Export by Industry (Probit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Industry
2 15 17 18 23-24 25 26 27 28 29 31-32 45 50 51 52 55 60-64 72
 Food Textles Garments Chemicals Electronics  Wholesale Retail Transport IT
ln Sales 0.166*** 0.398*** 0.301 0.171*** 0.720*** 0.652* -0.00987 1.296** 0.215*** 0.944*** 0.0916 0.254*** 0.456*** 0.325*** 0.120*** 0.153*** 0.336*** 0.144
(0.0521) (0.100) (0.184) (0.0319) (0.247) (0.393) (0.0514) (0.517) (0.0648) (0.205) (0.0736) (0.0668) (0.0960) (0.0719) (0.0401) (0.0402) (0.0741) (0.226)
Quality 0.495** 1.110*** 0.224 0.249 1.982* 4.738*** 0.518* 2.056 0.471** 0.0594 0.119 0.832*** 0.993*** 1.110*** 0.718*** 0.401** 0.742*** -0.0139
(0.200) (0.303) (0.382) (0.153) (1.036) (1.501) (0.292) (1.858) (0.195) (0.589) (0.230) (0.228) (0.290) (0.265) (0.207) (0.169) (0.244) (0.800)
Size 0.562*** 0.544*** 0.913* 0.740*** 1.485* 0.228 0.746* 0.0827 0.550*** 2.388*** 0.355** -0.163 -0.332** 0.0237 0.176* 0.360*** -0.695*** 0.776
(0.155) (0.165) (0.535) (0.0806) (0.774) (0.803) (0.401) (1.335) (0.171) (0.471) (0.172) (0.142) (0.160) (0.121) (0.100) (0.101) (0.174) (0.683)
Euro 0.496 0.896 -0.907 -0.0321 -1.229 4.139 0.606 76.55 -0.108 4.573** -0.227 0.454 0.0709 0.163 0.737*** -0.227 0.0972 1.465
(0.428) (0.562) (0.938) (0.716) (3.397) (3.573) (0.664) (0) (0.367) (1.851) (0.676) (0.423) (0.827) (0.436) (0.284) (0.358) (0.518) (2.390)
ERM -0.131 1.806*** 0.669 0.491 -0.307 0.151 -0.172 -8.612** 0.508 1.016 0.293 0.0347 0.604** 0.523 0.0969 -0.218 0.587* -2.986
(0.250) (0.619) (0.763) (0.305) (3.168) (2.669) (0.386) (3.777) (0.408) (1.885) (0.715) (0.325) (0.280) (0.331) (0.209) (0.249) (0.314) (1.876)
Peg -0.571** -0.333 -1.247 0.378** 0.668 1.050 -0.0136 -1.882 -0.735** 3.234** -1.351** 0.487 0.127 -0.243 -0.487** -0.544* -0.0467 -1.663
(0.258) (0.254) (0.794) (0.179) (2.075) (1.403) (0.355) (3.993) (0.294) (1.445) (0.544) (0.332) (0.372) (0.256) (0.228) (0.305) (0.315) (1.721)
ln ExchangeRate -0.0569* -0.134*** -0.172 -0.0151 -1.080*** -0.447 0.00761 -0.732* -0.0681**-0.323*** -0.102 -0.0922** -0.0564 -0.0683** -0.0227 0.0326 -0.0677* 0.220
(0.0318) (0.0420) (0.121) (0.0189) (0.252) (0.294) (0.0451) (0.380) (0.0306) (0.117) (0.0711) (0.0422) (0.0378) (0.0343) (0.0241) (0.0265) (0.0370) (0.207)
Volatlity -23.97*** 0.770 -12.61 -2.398 34.90 -29.94 -3.954 -118.5** -17.47** 2.526 -6.442 -2.242 0.429 2.416 -16.26***-17.22*** -1.786 -131.0*
(6.496) (1.176) (12.88) (2.897) (32.08) (55.36) (6.128) (46.88) (7.382) (11.96) (10.68) (2.389) (1.531) (1.590) (6.075) (6.327) (1.721) (73.97)
RTA 0.0117** -0.0152* 0.0118 0.0324*** 0.109** 0.0952** 0.0229* 0.231*** 0.0165** 0.0819***0.0218** -0.00410 0.00126 0.0258***0.0116** 0.00209 0.00714 0.0142
(0.00559) (0.00778) (0.0149) (0.00459) (0.0445) (0.0411) (0.0129) (0.0834) (0.00653) (0.0229) (0.0106) (0.00680) (0.00735) (0.00758) (0.00525) (0.00561) (0.00664) (0.0337)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dum. No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Observatons 1,163 2,162 236 942 251 171 244 80 924 713 176 1,769 1,581 1,987 2,865 763 1,027 300























Table C.8: Export Intensity Regression Results by Industry (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Industry
2 15 17 18 23-24 25 26 27 28 29 31-32 45 50 51 52 55 60-64 72
 Food Textles Garments Chemicals Electronics  Wholesale Retail Transport IT
0.947* 1.493*** 2.124* -0.0244 2.003** 1.391* -0.880 3.683** 2.521*** 2.952*** -1.016 0.503*** 1.185*** 0.581** 0.111 1.498*** 3.016*** -0.626
(0.556) (0.294) (1.278) (0.666) (0.831) (0.816) (0.747) (1.696) (0.630) (0.825) (1.578) (0.129) (0.230) (0.230) (0.0808) (0.472) (0.541) (1.225)
Quality 1.711 6.528*** 0.885 -2.340 -0.422 14.55*** 1.005 1.860 3.114 1.459 5.014 1.177* 4.571*** 4.885*** 1.731** 8.006** 7.707*** -2.363
(2.450) (1.427) (5.556) (3.849) (3.397) (4.386) (3.695) (5.717) (2.482) (2.867) (5.186) (0.644) (1.682) (1.373) (0.773) (3.817) (2.906) (5.522)
Size 10.65*** 5.254*** 17.61*** 24.80*** 6.608** 1.459 11.31*** 2.527 10.16*** 10.30*** 13.85*** -0.163 -0.640 0.234 0.805** 5.658*** -9.704*** 7.659*
(1.724) (0.936) (3.583) (1.865) (2.737) (2.911) (2.449) (4.301) (1.739) (2.040) (3.478) (0.412) (0.702) (0.795) (0.358) (1.441) (1.583) (4.150)
Euro 10.66* -5.376** -13.16 -7.742 21.38 9.898 22.77* 38.99*** 7.129 25.40*** 17.04 1.163 1.871 0.187 3.335** 0.588 0.782 -8.247
(6.069) (2.488) (13.10) (11.83) (18.61) (8.303) (13.49) (9.294) (6.297) (6.920) (15.10) (1.686) (5.794) (2.945) (1.576) (6.277) (7.221) (7.105)
ERM 10.22*** 9.731** 19.97** 20.73*** 7.387 13.05 3.142 -9.883 7.037 16.14*** 18.76 1.210 0.683 3.563 -0.568 -4.611 7.978** -6.314
(3.734) (4.043) (9.253) (6.795) (11.62) (10.84) (8.555) (11.91) (6.640) (5.865) (14.63) (0.944) (1.351) (2.706) (0.841) (2.826) (3.914) (4.619)
Peg -1.397 -1.046 -10.90 17.52*** 5.837 10.09* 2.624 -1.563 -5.015 3.854 -18.10** 1.976 1.818 4.384** -1.323*** -5.846** 2.810 6.645
(3.718) (2.095) (7.548) (4.164) (5.381) (5.183) (6.430) (13.04) (4.097) (6.619) (8.564) (1.458) (1.948) (1.857) (0.495) (2.287) (4.028) (9.377)
0.0351 -0.512** -0.901 1.389*** -4.342*** -0.469 0.149 -1.818* -0.179 -0.243 -0.180 -0.0803 -0.0610 -0.0457 -0.0858 -0.0604 -0.583 2.082*
(0.424) (0.223) (1.202) (0.477) (0.742) (0.710) (0.689) (1.074) (0.352) (0.481) (1.241) (0.0685) (0.149) (0.178) (0.0643) (0.346) (0.389) (1.234)
Volatlity -149.3** -29.66*** -67.60 -31.87 179.0 93.39 32.39 -121.5 -263.0*** 132.2** -51.52 -11.39** 0.130 7.206 -25.82***-56.96*** -20.31 -34.78
(61.80) (7.819) (172.6) (56.35) (173.2) (99.28) (83.46) (164.1) (82.99) (60.69) (201.2) (5.763) (5.759) (9.137) (9.726) (21.63) (24.65) (59.75)
RTA 0.167** -0.0867* 0.348* 0.678*** 0.733*** 0.389*** 0.470*** 0.508** 0.229*** 0.418*** 0.482** -0.0306 0.00286 0.108*** 0.0152 0.109* 0.00691 0.314*
(0.0688) (0.0457) (0.178) (0.0960) (0.167) (0.109) (0.133) (0.192) (0.0771) (0.0909) (0.191) (0.0187) (0.0259) (0.0379) (0.0148) (0.0634) (0.0787) (0.168)
Constant -23.39*** -4.194 -39.93***-45.47*** -15.22 -21.68** -11.66 -47.25** -38.24***-53.80*** 2.498 -2.571** -7.541*** -3.860* -0.390 -15.68*** 2.521 -11.90
(7.901) (3.010) (15.30) (6.727) (9.873) (10.48) (9.086) (21.04) (7.200) (9.061) (21.31) (1.225) (2.245) (2.139) (0.908) (4.616) (5.949) (11.86)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Observatons 1,163 2,162 236 942 251 171 244 80 924 713 176 1,769 1,581 1,987 2,865 763 1,027 300
R^2 0.182 0.190 0.260 0.359 0.362 0.304 0.233 0.521 0.207 0.243 0.234 0.024 0.049 0.038 0.029 0.141 0.071 0.121



























Table C.9: Robustness Check - Regional Diferences
Asia Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
0.279** 0.327** 1.048*** -0.0311 0.691*** 1.117***
(0.138) (0.139) (0.198) (0.129) (0.132) (0.175)
Quality 5.752*** 4.715*** 3.912*** 5.557*** 4.292*** 3.566***
(0.934) (0.915) (0.914) (0.695) (0.650) (0.651)
Size 2.148*** 1.547*** 0.676 8.885*** 6.358*** 5.769***















0.0561 0.0577 85.54 -0.0737 -0.0272 -9.118***
(0.146) (0.142) (96.50) (0.0903) (0.0850) (2.344)
Volatlity 58.91** 84.38*** 90.55 -23.35*** -37.65*** -14.93***
(23.14) (24.48) (181.4) (5.212) (5.503) (5.365)
RTA 2.197*** 2.219** 38.03 0.0474*** 0.0297* 0.0151
(0.739) (0.867) (38.50) (0.0153) (0.0172) (0.0406)
Constant -29.27*** -27.43*** -466.1 -3.622*** 7.576*** 50.23***
(8.775) (9.698) (480.3) (1.362) (1.742) (11.23)
Year Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country Dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Observatons 3,923 3,923 3,923 13,431 13,431 13,431
R^2 0.046 0.089 0.105 0.086 0.216 0.232
ln Sales
ln ExchangeRate
Notes: Reported probit regressions results are marginal efects; Robust standard 
errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table D.1: Covered Countries and Sectors
Country Sector
2 15 17 18 24 25 26 27 28 29 31 45 50 51 52 55 60 72 All %
Albania 10 25 9 5 3 0 1 3 3 0 0 2 6 12 3 16 27 0 125 2.54
Belarus 15 29 4 4 3 2 3 0 3 4 0 18 2 24 3 2 29 1 146 2.97
Georgia 4 29 2 1 1 0 3 1 0 1 0 3 9 6 5 0 10 0 75 1.53
Tajikistan 6 18 9 4 3 2 2 1 0 1 1 2 2 13 1 0 1 0 66 1.34
Ukraine 26 61 5 26 6 0 2 0 10 50 1 4 23 22 4 6 24 1 271 5.51
Uzbekistan 6 36 6 3 6 2 3 0 0 7 1 0 7 7 0 0 8 1 93 1.89
Russia 24 46 3 4 31 3 1 4 11 38 8 10 8 13 2 1 12 0 219 4.45
Poland 19 49 6 39 2 11 6 3 43 34 1 14 12 37 7 1 40 5 329 6.69
Romania 16 24 3 45 3 2 5 3 17 20 0 2 7 9 6 9 16 3 190 3.86
Serbia 29 36 12 5 8 5 3 2 17 7 2 12 13 28 18 5 21 2 225 4.58
Kazakhstan 7 42 0 2 2 0 1 0 4 9 2 5 4 15 0 0 2 0 95 1.93
Moldova 9 47 2 15 0 0 2 0 15 2 1 0 7 12 13 1 15 0 141 2.87
Bosnia 35 17 1 6 2 4 2 2 13 9 0 19 4 18 6 4 15 0 157 3.19
Azerbaijan 2 12 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 2 1 1 1 0 28 0.57
FYROM 26 16 6 24 4 0 5 2 6 3 2 13 2 20 11 2 21 2 165 3.36
Armenia 8 56 3 8 5 5 3 1 3 6 1 0 5 5 0 1 7 3 120 2.44
Kyrgyz 8 23 9 1 1 1 3 0 2 2 1 2 4 10 1 0 6 0 74 1.50
Estonia 33 22 3 6 1 3 3 0 7 3 3 11 16 17 13 9 18 2 170 3.46
Czech Republic 28 37 2 1 4 7 4 6 16 15 5 7 22 24 14 2 20 5 219 4.45
Hungary 16 43 7 20 4 10 5 5 69 33 3 14 12 31 17 8 16 0 313 6.36
Latvia 25 35 0 7 0 0 1 0 3 1 0 7 13 17 11 2 20 0 142 2.89
Lithuania 28 34 11 5 1 3 4 0 3 7 4 7 11 27 18 2 31 0 196 3.99
Slovakia 12 25 1 4 5 2 1 4 7 14 1 11 26 24 12 2 15 2 168 3.42
Slovenia 23 44 8 3 6 10 6 2 28 28 3 16 28 42 38 11 32 7 335 6.81
Bulgaria 22 63 12 83 25 15 7 1 23 40 36 3 13 40 10 3 18 49 463 9.41
Croata 37 62 21 25 6 7 11 1 73 14 9 8 13 44 19 16 14 1 381 7.75
Montenegro 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 1 12 0.24
Total 477 931 147 347 133 94 88 41 378 350 85 193 269 521 236 104 439 85 4918 100
% 9.7 18.9 2.99 7.06 2.7 1.9 1.789 0.8 7.69 7.12 1.7 3.92 5.47 10.6 4.8 2.11 8.93 1.7 100
Notes: Sectors 45-72 are considered as service sectors.
Table D.2: Correlaton
1.000 0.0102 0.0196 0.0526 -0.0514 0.0757 0.0363 0.0514 0.0102 0.0441 0.013 -0.016 0.013
0.0102 1.000 -0.0829 0.1105 0.1436 0.0487 0.0559 -0.0138 0.0581 0.04 -0.093 -0.022 0.0755
0.0196 -0.0829 1.000 -0.1102 -0.0261 0.1007 -0.0367 0.0672 -0.089 -0.0308 0.104 -0.019 -0.0764
0.0526 0.1105 -0.1102 1.000 0.1576 -0.0057 0.0067 -0.0245 -0.0413 0.0013 0.074 0.0121 -0.0472
-0.0514 0.1436 -0.0261 0.1576 1.000 0.0038 0.0547 -0.0577 0.0351 -0.02 -0.015 -0.044 -0.0039
0.0757 0.0487 0.1007 -0.0057 0.0038 1.000 0.3523 0.2988 -0.1452 0.0772 0.04 -0.083 0.0361
0.0363 0.0559 -0.0367 0.0067 0.0547 0.3523 1.000 0.2511 -0.1007 0.1663 -0.153 -0.006 0.1187
0.0514 -0.0138 0.0672 -0.0245 -0.0577 0.2988 0.2511 1.000 -0.1475 0.0791 0.002 -0.095 0.0602
0.0102 0.0581 -0.089 -0.0413 0.0351 -0.1452 -0.1007 -0.1475 1.000 -0.0381 0.019 0.0375 -0.0278
0.0441 0.04 -0.0308 0.0013 -0.02 0.0772 0.1663 0.0791 -0.0381 1.000 0.015 -0.185 0.0369
0.0127 -0.0927 0.1044 0.0743 -0.0145 0.0398 -0.1528 0.0016 0.0186 0.0148 1.000 -0.624 -0.2074
-0.0158 -0.0224 -0.0191 0.0121 -0.0438 -0.0829 -0.0059 -0.0953 0.0375 -0.1847 -0.624 1.000 -0.120






















































E  Politcal Determinants of Internatonal Arms Transfers
Table E.1: List of Suppliers
Country Name
Algeria Czechoslovakia Japan Norway Sweden
Angola DR Congo Jordan Oman Switzerland
Argentna Denmark Kazakhstan Pakistan Syria
Australia Egypt Kenya Panama Taiwan
Austria Estonia Kuwait Peru Thailand
Bahrain Finland Kyrgyzstan Philippines Turkey
Bangladesh France Latvia Poland Uganda
Belarus Gabon Lebanon Portugal Ukraine
Belgium Georgia Libya Qatar United Arab Emirates
Bosnia and Herzegovina Germany Lithuania Romania United Kingdom
Brazil Ghana Malawi Russia United States of America
Bulgaria Greece Malaysia Saudi Arabia Uruguay
Cambodia Guatemala Mexico Senegal Uzbekistan
Canada Hungary Moldova Serbia Venezuela
Chad India Morocco Singapore Vietnam
Chile Indonesia Netherlands Slovakia Yemen Arab Republic
China Iran New Zealand South Africa Yemen People's Republic
Colombia Iraq Nicaragua South Korea Yugoslavia
Croata Ireland Niger Soviet Union Zambia
Cuba Israel Nigeria Spain Zimbabwe
Czech Republic Italy North Korea Sudan
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Table E.2: List of Recipients
Country Name
Afghanistan Congo India Mozambique South Korea
Albania Costa Rica Indonesia Myanmar Spain
Algeria Croata Iran Namibia Sri Lanka
Angola Cuba Iraq Nepal Sudan
Argentna Czech Republic Ireland Netherlands Swaziland
Armenia Czechoslovakia Israel New Zealand Sweden
Australia DR Congo Italy Nicaragua Switzerland
Austria Denmark Jamaica Niger Syria
Azerbaijan Djibout Japan Nigeria Taiwan
Bahrain Dominican Republic Jordan North Korea Tajikistan
Bangladesh East Timor Kazakhstan Norway Tanzania
Belarus Ecuador Kenya Oman Thailand
Belgium Egypt Kuwait Pakistan Togo
Benin El Salvador Kyrgyzstan Panama Trinidad and Tobago
Bolivia Equatorial Guinea Laos Paraguay Tunisia
Bosnia and Herzegovina Eritrea Latvia Peru Turkey
Botswana Estonia Lebanon Philippines Turkmenistan
Brazil Ethiopia Lesotho Poland Uganda
Bulgaria Finland Liberia Portugal United Arab Emirates
Burkina Faso France Libya Qatar United Kingdom
Burundi Gabon Lithuania Romania United States of America
Cambodia Gambia Madagascar Russia Uruguay
Cameroon Georgia Malawi Rwanda Venezuela
Canada Germany Malaysia Saudi Arabia Vietnam
Cape Verde Ghana Mali Senegal Yemen
Central African Republic Greece Mauritania Sierra Leone Yemen Arab Republic
Chad Guatemala Mauritus Singapore Yemen People's Republic
Chile Guinea Mexico Slovakia Yugoslavia
China Guinea-Bissau Moldova Slovenia Zambia
Colombia Honduras Mongolia Somalia Zimbabwe
Comoros Hungary Morocco South Africa
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1 2 3 4 5 6 All 1 2 3 4 5 6 All
Algeria - 1 0 1 0 0 2 Lithuania - - - - 0 1 1
Angola - - 1 1 1 0 3 Malawi - 0 0 0 1 0 1
Argentna 0 4 6 7 4 4 25 Malaysia 0 0 1 1 1 0 3
Australia 2 6 15 11 8 16 58 Mexico 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Austria 0 2 8 14 9 21 54 Moldova - - - - 6 6 12
Bahrain - - 0 0 0 1 1 Morocco 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
Bangladesh - - 0 1 0 0 1 Netherlands 22 43 74 70 77 91 377
Belarus - - - - 25 19 44 New Zealand 0 3 4 2 3 2 14
Belgium 2 14 1 10 13 24 64 Nicaragua 2 0 0 3 11 0 16
BIH - - - - 0 1 1 Niger - 0 1 0 0 0 1
Brazil 0 4 22 53 12 18 109 Nigeria - 0 0 1 0 0 1
Bulgaria 0 0 0 5 25 17 47 North Korea - - - - 8 3 11
Cambodia 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 Norway 2 8 7 12 17 22 68
Canada 46 51 59 71 52 44 323 Oman - - 1 1 1 1 4
Chad - 0 0 2 0 0 2 Pakistan 0 1 1 1 1 6 10
Chile 0 0 2 7 5 2 16 Panama 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
China - - 53 144 127 108 432 Peru 0 0 0 2 0 3 5
Colombia 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Poland 2 9 15 8 29 21 84
Croata - - - - 0 1 1 Portugal 0 0 17 3 1 2 23
Cuba 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 Qatar - - 0 0 4 1 5
Czech Republic - - - - 33 30 63 Romania 0 0 7 11 11 4 33
Czechoslovakia 4 19 15 7 4 - 49 Russia 215 628 905 828 303 300 3,179
DR Congo - 0 1 0 0 0 1 Saudi Arabia 1 1 3 5 1 1 12
Denmark 0 6 1 9 15 12 43 Senegal - 0 1 0 0 0 1
Egypt 7 9 11 34 5 0 66 Singapore - 1 4 13 4 7 29
Estonia - - - - 1 0 1 Slovakia - - - - 17 9 26
Finland 1 4 2 4 18 19 48 South Africa - 2 2 - 25 45 74
France 92 328 542 449 230 165 1,806 South Korea - - - - 12 13 25
Gabon - 0 1 0 0 0 1 Spain 1 2 15 49 36 41 144
Georgia - - - - 2 2 4 Sudan 0 1 0 1 0 0 2
Germany - - 137 155 235 180 707 Sweden 5 14 48 67 53 73 260
Ghana - 0 1 0 0 1 2 Switzerland - - - - - 29 29
Greece 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 Syria 0 1 2 10 2 1 16
Guatemala 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Taiwan 0 1 0 - - - 1
Hungary 1 1 1 2 3 4 12 Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
India 0 0 4 2 5 14 25 Turkey 0 0 1 0 5 20 26
Indonesia 0 1 2 1 3 1 8 Uganda - 1 0 0 0 0 1
Iran 0 3 3 3 4 13 26 Ukraine - - - - 88 139 227
Iraq 2 0 2 11 0 0 15 UAE - - 1 3 5 7 16
Ireland 0 0 1 0 1 2 4 United Kingdom 311 280 310 307 183 83 1,474
Israel 3 10 45 59 81 156 354 USA 849 1,042 1,225 1,127 980 718 5,941
Italy 6 65 181 151 108 118 629 Uruguay 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
Japan 5 12 6 4 2 1 30 Uzbekistan - - - - 0 2 2
Jordan 1 0 4 8 3 5 21 Venezuela 0 1 1 0 0 3 5
Kazakhstan - - - - 12 2 14 Vietnam - - 0 0 0 1 1
Kenya - 0 0 1 1 0 2 Yemen AR 0 0 0 1 - - 1
Kuwait - 1 1 2 2 0 6 Yemen PR - 0 2 1 - - 3
Kyrgyzstan - - - - 2 3 5 Yugoslavia 3 8 13 12 3 1 40
Latvia - - - - 1 0 1 Zambia - 0 0 1 0 0 1
Lebanon 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 Zimbabwe - - - 0 0 1 1





=1 if arms were exported from i to j in year t
value of arms exported from i to j in year t 
Gravity Variables
natural logarithm of GDP in 1990 US$ for i
natural logarithm of GDP in 1990 US$ for j
natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 1990 US$ for i
natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 1990 US$ for j
natural logarithm of Distance between capitals of i and j in km
=1 if i and j share a common border
=1 if a language is spoken by at least 9% of the populaton in i and j
=1 if i and j share a common colonial history
=1 if i or j are landlocked and 2 if both
Politcal Variables
interpolated and prolonged polity2 of i in year t*
interpolated and prolonged polity2 of j in year t*
Military, Alliances and Conficts
share of military personnel of total populaton for i in year t
=1 if any kind of military pact is in place between i and j in year t
=1 if an armed confict is ongoing in j in year t
=1 if a mandatory embargo was imposed by the UN against c in year t

































  in year t
Polity_neigbours
it mean of polity2 index for contgous countries and within 3000km of i in year t*
Polity_neigbours
jt mean of polity2 index for contgous countries and within 3000km of j in year t*
USA
it UN General Assembly Votng similarity index ( agree3un) for i with the USA in year t
USA
jt UN General Assembly Votng similarity index ( agree3un) for i with the USA in year t
USA_similarity
ijt




  in year t
USA_neighbours
it mean of agree3un index for contgous countries and within 3000km of i in year t
USA_neighbours
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Table E.5: Summary Statstcs
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
530,205 0.0172 0.1302 0 1
12,700 3.0766 1.7752 0 8.43
530,205 10.9758 1.7168 6.80 16.06
530,205 10.2121 1.9067 4.99 16.06
530,205 1.4370 1.1026 -2.88 3.75
530,205 1.1143 1.1399 -2.88 3.92
530,205 8.6510 0.7974 2.35 9.90
530,205 0.2968 0.4995 0 2
530,205 0.0185 0.1347 0 1
530,205 0.1415 0.3485 0 1
530,205 0.0268 0.1615 0 1
530,205 1.0452 7.7146 -10 10
530,205 0.3727 7.4651 -10 10
530,205 8.0176 6.5430 0 20
530,205 0.3585 4.0740 -8.6 10
530,205 -0.1974 4.0644 -9 10
530,205 0.4681 0.2107 0 1
530,205 0.4434 0.2054 0 1
530,205 0.1616 0.1493 0 1
530,205 0.4532 0.1577 0.14 0.98
530,205 0.4392 0.1646 0.14 0.98
530,205 0.0082 0.0084 0 0.08
530,205 0.0069 0.0078 0 0.08
530,205 0.1720 0.3774 0 1
530,205 0.0855 0.2797 0 1






















































Table E.6: Probability to Agree on a Transfer of Arms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LPM Probit Probit RE Probit
1950-2007 1950-1989 1990-2007
0.0180*** 0.713*** 0.355** 0.729*** 0.722*** 0.755*** 0.307*
(0.00122) (0.0455) (0.165) (0.0507) (0.0516) (0.137) (0.161)
0.00404*** 0.0574 0.213 0.0571 0.0218 0.409*** 0.225
(0.00114) (0.0385) (0.147) (0.0468) (0.0477) (0.0873) (0.154)
-0.0133*** -0.526*** -0.538*** -0.550*** -0.542*** -0.286* -0.451**
(0.000951) (0.0541) (0.184) (0.0606) (0.0614) (0.147) (0.192)
0.00377*** 0.185*** 0.212 0.244*** 0.287*** -0.126 -0.0364
(0.00114) (0.0370) (0.137) (0.0442) (0.0451) (0.0835) (0.152)
0.00175*** -0.162*** -0.169*** -0.282*** -0.255*** -0.321*** -0.193***
(0.000369) (0.0130) (0.0135) (0.0250) (0.0253) (0.0347) (0.0338)
0.00848*** 0.0784** 0.0970*** 0.00317 -0.0119 0.00565 0.105
(0.00183) (0.0322) (0.0331) (0.0679) (0.0677) (0.0931) (0.0867)
-0.0086*** 0.0744*** 0.0689*** 0.122*** 0.114** 0.00317 0.198***
(0.000730) (0.0230) (0.0239) (0.0469) (0.0469) (0.0628) (0.0623)
0.0580*** 0.518*** 0.552*** 0.588*** 0.599*** 0.901*** 0.269***
(0.00309) (0.0264) (0.0276) (0.0667) (0.0671) (0.0856) (0.0884)
0.0592*** -0.229 0.508 -0.635* -0.311 1.649 -0.672
(0.00877) (0.247) (0.329) (0.342) (0.565) (1.464) (0.741)
0.00037*** 0.0183*** -0.00805 0.0213*** 0.0193*** 0.00598 -0.0191**
(3.54e-05) (0.00264) (0.00604) (0.00301) (0.00305) (0.00515) (0.00953)
-0.00010** -0.0159***-0.0179***-0.0123***-0.00753*** -0.00698** 0.00519
(4.65e-05) (0.00195) (0.00307) (0.00219) (0.00230) (0.00332) (0.00575)
-0.00038*** -0.0152***-0.0135***-0.0102*** -0.00264 -0.000231 0.00359
(2.85e-05) (0.00139) (0.00149) (0.00183) (0.00213) (0.00307) (0.00466)
0.0000103 0.00643 0.0136* 0.00820 0.00687 0.0302*** -0.0383**
(0.000118) (0.00490) (0.00819) (0.00549) (0.00552) (0.00846) (0.0170)
0.0000205 -0.00220 0.0124 -0.00364 -0.00314 0.0168** -0.000119
(0.000132) (0.00427) (0.00866) (0.00477) (0.00484) (0.00759) (0.0146)
-0.0090*** 0.641*** 0.691*** 0.579*** 0.436*** -0.163 0.289
(0.00280) (0.0932) (0.173) (0.105) (0.107) (0.162) (0.267)
-0.00623*** -0.855*** -0.966*** -0.759*** -0.689*** -0.930*** -0.214
(0.00224) (0.104) (0.179) (0.108) (0.110) (0.157) (0.289)
-0.0457*** -1.392*** -1.928*** -1.196*** -0.941*** -0.911*** -0.528**
(0.00187) (0.0762) (0.102) (0.0856) (0.0919) (0.126) (0.211)
0.0299*** 0.516*** 0.210 0.530*** 0.559*** 0.593*** 0.0924
(0.00429) (0.123) (0.283) (0.144) (0.145) (0.204) (0.662)
0.00393 -0.0141 0.443 0.0517 0.109 0.0357 0.508
(0.00391) (0.131) (0.274) (0.149) (0.150) (0.224) (0.515)
-0.0140 -1.572 1.155 -1.226 -0.724 9.344*** -36.67***
(0.0364) (2.290) (4.239) (2.465) (2.477) (3.350) (8.026)
-0.0441 -2.971* -1.157 -4.497** -4.401** -3.139 -8.332**
(0.0504) (1.523) (2.728) (1.795) (1.810) (2.383) (3.992)
0.0397*** 0.497*** 0.544*** 0.412*** 0.355*** 0.433*** 0.202***
(0.00129) (0.0229) (0.0250) (0.0352) (0.0356) (0.0505) (0.0616)
0.00496*** 0.182*** 0.131*** 0.190*** 0.189*** 0.166*** 0.203***
(0.000648) (0.0205) (0.0285) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0317) (0.0443)
-0.00925*** -0.541*** -0.147 -0.628*** -0.644***
-
-0.545***
(0.00196) (0.135) (0.169) (0.139) (0.140) (0.161)
Constant
-0.304*** -8.242*** -5.527** -7.468*** -15.16*** -16.88** -12.20***
(0.0261) (0.780) (2.630) (0.942) (3.125) (7.313) (4.300)
Year Dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Yes*** Yes*** No Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Country-Decade No No Yes*** No No No No
Observatons 530,205 530,205 333,932 530,205 530,205 273,521 186,549
R^2 (pseudo R^2) 0.165 (0.440) (0.421) - - - -
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Table E.7: Volume of Transferred Arms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS OLS FE RE OLS FE RE FE FE
1950-2007 1950-19891990-2007
1.014*** 1.185*** 0.937*** 0.902*** 1.071*** 0.412 0.334* 1.145 0.405
(0.132) (0.449) (0.163) (0.133) (0.135) (0.284) (0.178) (0.713) (0.508)
0.939*** 0.931*** 1.161*** 1.060*** 0.952*** 0.993*** 0.888*** 1.732*** 0.129
(0.102) (0.322) (0.0968) (0.0906) (0.103) (0.119) (0.0969) (0.328) (0.531)
-1.037*** -0.945* -0.984*** -0.984*** -1.142*** -0.648** -0.597*** -0.839 -0.540
(0.179) (0.509) (0.231) (0.184) (0.188) (0.285) (0.201) (0.894) (0.535)
-0.474*** -0.435 -0.588*** -0.538*** -0.473*** -0.759*** -0.737*** -0.937*** 0.519



































(0.603) (0.841) (0.648) (0.604) (0.647)
0.0119 -0.00006 0.00130 0.00538 0.0143* -0.0140 -0.00930 0.0284 -0.0836**
(0.00768) (0.0173) (0.00992) (0.00834) (0.00784) (0.0117) (0.00886) (0.0195) (0.0375)
-0.0242*** -0.0122* -0.0238***-0.0233***-0.0262*** -0.0119* -0.0121** -0.00786 -0.00112
(0.00469) (0.00738) (0.00548) (0.00471) (0.00490) (0.00703) (0.00526) (0.0107) (0.0146)
-0.0204***-0.0138***-0.0156***-0.0173***-0.0226*** -0.00537 -0.00728 0.00397 -0.0163
(0.00398) (0.00456) (0.00541) (0.00430) (0.00425) (0.00664) (0.00476) (0.0107) (0.0145)
0.0235** -0.0163 0.0205* 0.0255** 0.0231** 0.0134 0.00814 0.0125 -0.00351
(0.0109) (0.0166) (0.0107) (0.0102) (0.0109) (0.0123) (0.0107) (0.0174) (0.0387)
0.00603 0.0213 -0.0110 -0.00735 0.00527 0.00222 0.0104 -0.00213 0.0570
(0.00921) (0.0179) (0.00888) (0.00842) (0.00920) (0.0110) (0.00905) (0.0199) (0.0356)
0.450* 1.076** -0.0569 -0.00343 0.518** -0.422 -0.494* 0.196 -0.550
(0.252) (0.424) (0.270) (0.241) (0.254) (0.329) (0.261) (0.581) (0.963)
-0.598*** -0.992*** -0.212 -0.268 -0.681*** 0.257 0.297 0.0668 0.433
(0.227) (0.358) (0.236) (0.215) (0.236) (0.317) (0.243) (0.517) (0.874)
-1.614*** -1.928*** -0.848*** -1.038*** -1.778*** -0.0464 -0.0576 -0.414 -1.298
(0.187) (0.221) (0.228) (0.193) (0.216) (0.436) (0.275) (0.522) (0.852)
-1.042*** 0.443 -0.683** -0.868*** -0.911*** -1.118*** -1.222*** -1.026* 1.153
(0.298) (0.587) (0.290) (0.274) (0.310) (0.328) (0.286) (0.587) (1.443)
-0.250 0.400 0.544** 0.338 -0.266 0.747*** 0.539** 1.304*** -1.120
(0.280) (0.557) (0.269) (0.257) (0.280) (0.282) (0.260) (0.500) (0.953)
-3.511 -14.19 -3.293 -1.688 -4.286 1.149 4.512 -12.62 -24.92
(6.089) (10.83) (6.969) (6.121) (6.124) (7.290) (6.226) (13.13) (24.39)
14.86*** 1.721 15.09*** 13.69*** 15.05*** 14.37*** 12.56*** 13.88** 1.477
(3.278) (5.486) (3.251) (3.038) (3.278) (3.264) (3.040) (6.811) (11.41)
0.246*** 0.355*** 0.368*** 0.319*** 0.382*** -0.0302 -0.177 0.526*** 0.0665
(0.0486) (0.0572) (0.0699) (0.0568) (0.105) (0.200) (0.111) (0.164) (0.373)
0.0730* 0.0169 0.138*** 0.114*** 0.0924** -0.0216 -0.0781 0.179** 0.00911
(0.0441) (0.0617) (0.0431) (0.0407) (0.0462) (0.0845) (0.0551) (0.0753) (0.127)
-0.129 -0.0540 -0.165 -0.183
- - - -
-0.358
(0.311) (0.373) (0.314) (0.284) (0.318)









-18.68*** -22.28*** -18.19*** -19.52*** -18.39*** -9.008** -12.38*** -27.43*** -2.285
(2.159) (6.868) (2.083) (2.119) (2.177) (4.438) (2.592) (8.456) (8.576)
Year Dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes**
Country Dummies Yes*** No - Yes*** Yes*** - Yes*** - -
No Yes*** No No No No No No No
Observatons 12,700 12,700 12,700 12,700 12,699 12,699 12,699 7,639 5,061
R^2 0.400 0.470 0.169 0.382 0.400 0.171 0.386 0.068 0.021
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;



















































Table E.8: Probability to Trade - Arms vs. Goods (1962-2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit RE Probit RE Probit RE Probit RE
Arms Goods Arms Goods Arms Goods Arms Goods
0.981*** 0.331*** 1.525*** 0.150* 0.440*** 0.718*** 1.092*** 0.404***
(0.0828) (0.0325) (0.283) (0.0869) (0.0133) (0.0117) (0.0891) (0.0369)
-0.132*** 0.536*** -0.0486 0.131 0.130*** 0.626*** -0.161*** 0.799***
(0.0484) (0.0292) (0.163) (0.0831) (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0598) (0.0350)
-0.789*** 0.242*** -1.307*** 0.126 -0.252*** 0.252*** -0.874*** 0.407***
(0.0824) (0.0283) (0.271) (0.0786) (0.0228) (0.0142) (0.0909) (0.0318)
0.332*** -0.179*** 0.440*** -0.00122 0.0451** -0.113*** 0.412*** -0.298***
(0.0432) (0.0262) (0.152) (0.0774) (0.0187) (0.0149) (0.0527) (0.0315)
-0.195*** -0.654*** -0.205*** -0.689*** -0.231*** -0.924*** -0.296*** -1.039***
(0.0147) (0.00930) (0.0149) (0.00986) (0.0218) (0.0262) (0.0266) (0.0257)
0.0772** -0.0511 0.0849** -0.0951** -0.0253 -0.164 0.0150 -0.0722
(0.0380) (0.0439) (0.0385) (0.0449) (0.0856) (0.141) (0.0721) (0.0995)
0.122*** 0.302*** 0.119*** 0.309*** 0.201*** 0.870*** 0.155*** 0.578***
(0.0252) (0.0129) (0.0257) (0.0131) (0.0472) (0.0535) (0.0489) (0.0441)
0.447*** 0.452*** 0.486*** 0.533*** 0.645*** 1.384*** 0.489*** 0.531***
(0.0290) (0.0788) (0.0301) (0.0933) (0.0807) (0.229) (0.0681) (0.177)
-1.089*** -1.006*** 0.455 -2.450*** -0.0408 -0.256*** -1.215*** -0.817**
(0.315) (0.200) (0.351) (0.158) (0.0380) (0.0319) (0.409) (0.353)
0.0135*** 0.0074*** -0.00690 0.00740*** 0.0227*** 0.0203*** 0.0149*** 0.00751***
(0.00328) (0.000896) (0.00705) (0.00147) (0.00257) (0.00109) (0.00377) (0.00115)
-0.0159*** 0.0042*** -0.0184*** -0.00185 -0.0112***0.00924***-0.0131***0.00440***
(0.00248) (0.000919) (0.00362) (0.00163) (0.00247) (0.00112) (0.00281) (0.00117)
-0.0140***-0.0106***-0.0131*** -0.0129*** -0.0065*** -0.0027*** -0.0099***-0.0050***
(0.00189) (0.000590) (0.00201) (0.000665) (0.00234) (0.000912) (0.00237) (0.000907)
0.00456 0.000709 0.00943 -0.00518 0.0178*** 0.0148*** 0.00606 -0.00658**
(0.00584) (0.00231) (0.0107) (0.00488) (0.00506) (0.00285) (0.00669) (0.00315)
-0.0126** -0.00523** 0.00788 -0.0108** -0.0173*** 0.0107*** -0.0129** -0.00365
(0.00491) (0.00253) (0.00975) (0.00484) (0.00451) (0.00303) (0.00560) (0.00335)
0.602*** -0.186*** 0.526** 0.380*** 1.969*** 0.224*** 0.546*** -0.550***
(0.126) (0.0604) (0.220) (0.0946) (0.120) (0.0656) (0.147) (0.0699)
-0.109 0.303*** -0.630*** -0.00535 -0.215* 0.302*** -0.0748 0.270***
(0.133) (0.0517) (0.227) (0.0780) (0.112) (0.0583) (0.144) (0.0609)
-0.969*** -1.126*** -1.205*** -1.522*** -0.941*** -0.154*** -0.899*** -0.390***
(0.0946) (0.0414) (0.121) (0.0488) (0.106) (0.0522) (0.116) (0.0528)
0.653*** -0.0189 0.467 -0.516*** 1.245*** -0.645*** 0.703*** -0.530***
(0.162) (0.0833) (0.357) (0.166) (0.151) (0.102) (0.187) (0.107)
0.348** 0.0342 0.551* 0.199 -0.106 -0.316*** 0.467** -0.370***
(0.163) (0.0954) (0.324) (0.166) (0.166) (0.113) (0.189) (0.119)
-2.521 -27.13*** 0.246 -6.588*** 25.46*** -26.84*** -3.475 -29.00***
(3.185) (1.170) (6.031) (2.054) (2.086) (1.238) (3.349) (1.373)
-6.182*** -2.548*** -0.0703 1.233 -3.829** 1.716* -7.792*** 2.267**
(1.934) (0.988) (3.429) (1.628) (1.762) (1.024) (2.194) (1.099)
0.316*** 0.728*** 0.311*** 0.785*** 0.309*** 0.0432 0.312*** 0.410***
(0.0270) (0.0215) (0.0285) (0.0225) (0.0406) (0.0492) (0.0409) (0.0455)
0.168*** -0.0374*** 0.116*** -0.0278* 0.220*** -0.0925*** 0.166*** -0.0706***
(0.0231) (0.0114) (0.0316) (0.0153) (0.0238) (0.0134) (0.0258) (0.0137)
-0.568*** -0.518*** -0.204 -0.324*** -0.722*** -0.554*** -0.692*** -0.647***
(0.149) (0.0446) (0.189) (0.0746) (0.159) (0.0511) (0.160) (0.0517)
Constant
-10.03*** -0.573 -18.31*** 7.992*** -0.722*** -0.554*** (1.399) (0.792)
(1.215) (0.607) (3.939) (1.571) -9.128*** -4.247*** -10.35*** -0.181
Year Dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Country Dummies Yes*** Yes*** No No No No Yes*** Yes***
Country-Decade Dum. No No Yes*** Yes*** No No No No
Observatons 340,391 370,438 232,005 347,400 373,290 373,290 373,290 373,290
Pseudo R^2 0.415 0.512 0.398 0.529 - - - -
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Table E.9: Volume of Trade - Arms vs. Goods (1962-2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS FE FE RE RE
Arms Goods Arms Goods Arms Goods Arms Goods
-0.331 1.073*** -0.672 0.824*** -1.935** 1.060*** -1.242 1.036***
(0.248) (0.0341) (0.749) (0.107) (0.834) (0.0682) (0.761) (0.0683)
0.645*** 1.390*** 0.965** 0.752*** 0.915*** 1.020*** 0.910*** 0.996***
(0.126) (0.0273) (0.384) (0.0832) (0.326) (0.0606) (0.320) (0.0607)
0.138 0.656*** 0.544 0.0583 1.551* -0.125** 0.969 -0.107*
(0.286) (0.0357) (0.737) (0.104) (0.847) (0.0636) (0.763) (0.0636)
-0.206* -0.308*** -0.420 0.141* -0.247 0.0156 -0.338 0.0273
(0.113) (0.0249) (0.348) (0.0764) (0.295) (0.0558) (0.289) (0.0558)
0.0993*** -1.357*** 0.0835** -1.372***
- -
-0.00474 -1.434***
(0.0310) (0.00684) (0.0328) (0.00674) (0.0543) (0.0229)
0.659*** 0.487*** 0.617*** 0.471***
- -
0.338*** 0.525***
(0.0724) (0.0256) (0.0740) (0.0254) (0.130) (0.0845)
-0.315*** 0.631*** -0.325*** 0.636***
- -
-0.253*** 0.672***
(0.0566) (0.0132) (0.0601) (0.0129) (0.0961) (0.0452)
0.337*** 1.129*** 0.376*** 1.153***
- -
0.208* 1.200***
(0.0592) (0.0195) (0.0634) (0.0187) (0.110) (0.0998)
1.105 -0.00829 -0.346 -2.982***
- -
-0.644 -2.650***
(0.737) (0.165) (0.869) (0.160) (1.067) (0.241)
0.00972 0.0122*** 0.000451 0.00209 0.0301 0.00301** 0.0122 0.00288**
(0.00905) (0.00111) (0.0199) (0.00201) (0.0252) (0.00132) (0.0210) (0.00132)
-0.0202*** 0.00189* -0.0122 -0.0054*** 0.00154 -0.0049*** -0.00601 -0.0048***
(0.00593) (0.00110) (0.00847) (0.00188) (0.0102) (0.00133) (0.00827) (0.00133)
-0.0145*** -0.0071*** -0.0139** -0.0059*** 0.00236 -0.0029*** -0.00655 -0.0025***
(0.00511) (0.000692) (0.00582) (0.000690) (0.00954) (0.000679) (0.00661) (0.000661)
0.00441 0.0124*** -0.0134 -0.00125 -0.0237 0.00512 -0.0146 0.00451
(0.0137) (0.00261) (0.0230) (0.00512) (0.0202) (0.00370) (0.0198) (0.00371)
-0.00661 -0.00407 0.0208 -0.0101** 0.0163 -0.00625* 0.0164 -0.00667*
(0.0104) (0.00274) (0.0202) (0.00500) (0.0175) (0.00362) (0.0170) (0.00363)
0.927*** -0.564*** 1.817*** -0.0604 0.754 0.274*** 1.127** 0.249***
(0.335) (0.0597) (0.542) (0.101) (0.555) (0.0700) (0.502) (0.0701)
-0.181 0.0418 -1.008** 0.0607 -0.103 -0.170*** -0.519 -0.147**
(0.296) (0.0567) (0.435) (0.0889) (0.455) (0.0626) (0.403) (0.0627)
-1.323*** 0.0976*** -1.761*** 0.0394 -0.325 -1.218*** -0.941*** -1.120***
(0.224) (0.0342) (0.245) (0.0359) (0.388) (0.0387) (0.286) (0.0376)
-0.853** -0.432*** -0.0115 -0.433** 0.551 -0.517*** 0.255 -0.514***
(0.391) (0.0896) (0.761) (0.178) (0.678) (0.127) (0.663) (0.127)
-0.741** 0.692*** -0.0213 0.329** 0.271 0.287** 0.136 0.292**
(0.348) (0.0855) (0.649) (0.161) (0.571) (0.118) (0.565) (0.118)
-10.89 -20.70*** -5.412 0.392 -15.13 2.173 -7.117 2.054
(7.804) (1.658) (15.08) (2.719) (16.29) (1.748) (14.41) (1.752)
8.293** -6.301*** -0.0534 3.540* 4.053 4.034*** 1.788 3.959***
(4.089) (1.136) (6.847) (1.936) (6.207) (1.283) (6.031) (1.285)
0.244*** 0.166*** 0.286*** 0.163*** 0.226* 0.373*** 0.284*** 0.382***
(0.0575) (0.0152) (0.0646) (0.0152) (0.128) (0.0266) (0.0836) (0.0245)
-0.000576 -0.00338 -0.0243 0.00698 0.0106 0.000587 0.00423 0.000913
(0.0495) (0.0130) (0.0671) (0.0167) (0.0608) (0.0119) (0.0590) (0.0119)
0.131 -0.347*** -0.00512 -0.254*** -0.147 -0.202*** -0.106 -0.200***
(0.340) (0.0582) (0.410) (0.0749) (0.366) (0.0511) (0.346) (0.0512)
Constant
0.306 -1.931*** 0.149 10.97*** 10.38 -7.083 8.222 6.402***
(3.457) (0.602) (10.32) (1.758) (9.570) (1,711) (10.24) (1.211)
Year Dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Country Dummies Yes*** Yes*** No No - - No No
Country-Decade Dum. No No Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Observatons 10,282 285,374 10,282 285,374 10,282 285,374 10,282 285,374
R^2 0.343 0.728 0.407 0.748 0.001 0.400 0.381 0.742


















































Table E.10: Probability to Agree on a Transfer of Arms with Lagged Measures of Politcal 
Orientaton (1953-2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit Probit Probit Probit RE Probit RE Probit
0.456*** 0.761*** 0.545*** 0.641*** 0.475*** 0.786***
(0.00670) (0.0499) (0.0447) (0.167) (0.0128) (0.0557)
0.111*** -0.00329 -0.0200 0.183 0.124*** -0.0345
(0.00398) (0.0442) (0.0426) (0.173) (0.0108) (0.0528)
-0.0976*** -0.557*** -0.393*** -0.719*** -0.150*** -0.600***
(0.0185) (0.0580) (0.0538) (0.188) (0.0209) (0.0658)
0.0304*** 0.281*** 0.301*** 0.226 0.0697*** 0.379***
(0.00817) (0.0418) (0.0403) (0.158) (0.0183) (0.0502)
-0.131*** -0.155*** -0.151*** -0.160*** -0.265*** -0.274***
(0.00794) (0.0136) (0.0132) (0.0141) (0.0217) (0.0261)
0.0183 0.0967*** 0.0974*** 0.117*** -0.102 -0.000692
(0.0288) (0.0337) (0.0338) (0.0348) (0.0851) (0.0714)
0.0872*** 0.0729*** 0.0715*** 0.0699*** 0.202*** 0.114**
(0.0164) (0.0240) (0.0237) (0.0248) (0.0473) (0.0489)
0.479*** 0.469*** 0.446*** 0.498*** 0.675*** 0.521***
(0.0222) (0.0277) (0.0270) (0.0290) (0.0822) (0.0696)
-0.0819*** -0.284 0.255 0.375 -0.0457 -0.761**
(0.0183) (0.276) (0.264) (0.330) (0.0382) (0.368)
0.0090*** 0.0164*** 0.0156*** -0.00572 0.0213*** 0.0194***
(0.00141) (0.00280) (0.00266) (0.00633) (0.00230) (0.00321)
-0.0129*** -0.0156*** -0.00689*** -0.0177*** -0.0123*** -0.0127***












(0.00249) (0.00455) (0.00884) (0.00413) (0.00506)
1.419*** 0.698*** -0.00542 1.228*** 1.296*** 0.666***
(0.0683) (0.0974) (0.0790) (0.159) (0.0948) (0.108)
-0.579*** -0.747*** -0.167** -0.809*** -0.485*** -0.647***












(0.0997) (0.135) (0.257) (0.140) (0.154)
29.92*** -4.302* -1.901 -1.533 22.16*** -3.578
(0.702) (2.592) (2.439) (4.853) (1.630) (2.740)
2.979*** -3.235* -1.837 -4.466 -3.454** -4.625**
(0.707) (1.675) (1.646) (3.153) (1.560) (2.002)
0.359*** 0.471*** 0.659*** 0.515*** 0.386*** 0.408***
(0.0177) (0.0241) (0.0223) (0.0262) (0.0371) (0.0373)
0.205*** 0.170*** 0.165*** 0.121*** 0.211*** 0.179***
(0.0154) (0.0216) (0.0213) (0.0298) (0.0226) (0.0239)
-0.455*** -0.477*** -0.471*** -0.199 -0.730*** -0.589***
(0.135) (0.142) (0.149) (0.163) (0.158) (0.154)
Constant
-8.390*** -8.531*** -6.350*** -9.602*** -8.383*** -7.609***
(0.160) (0.867) (0.807) (2.903) (0.292) (1.046)
Year Dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Country Dummies No Yes*** Yes*** No No Yes***
Country-Decade Dum. No No No Yes*** No No
Observatons 470,169 466,039 466,039 291,724 470,169 470,169
R^2 0.347 0.439 0.429 0.417 - -
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Table E.11: Probability to Agree on a Transfer of Arms (without USA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit Probit Probit Probit RE Probit RE Probit
0.438*** 0.709*** 0.572*** 0.369** 0.437*** 0.715***
(0.00710) (0.0463) (0.0424) (0.165) (0.0128) (0.0520)
0.100*** 0.0498 0.00415 0.241 0.115*** 0.0356
(0.00398) (0.0418) (0.0405) (0.156) (0.0106) (0.0505)
-0.103*** -0.528*** -0.437*** -0.570*** -0.140*** -0.542***
(0.0172) (0.0545) (0.0510) (0.184) (0.0200) (0.0615)
0.0168** 0.185*** 0.229*** 0.115 0.0503*** 0.245***
(0.00811) (0.0396) (0.0383) (0.144) (0.0175) (0.0474)
-0.178*** -0.206*** -0.217*** -0.210*** -0.306*** -0.300***
(0.00795) (0.0143) (0.0138) (0.0151) (0.0209) (0.0255)
-0.0234 0.0492 0.0350 0.0734** -0.116 -0.00261
(0.0287) (0.0339) (0.0340) (0.0351) (0.0808) (0.0681)
0.0515*** 0.0799*** 0.0861*** 0.0695*** 0.140*** 0.126***
(0.0186) (0.0258) (0.0255) (0.0267) (0.0478) (0.0488)
0.544*** 0.491*** 0.450*** 0.517*** 0.786*** 0.572***
(0.0227) (0.0278) (0.0274) (0.0293) (0.0809) (0.0677)
-0.0550*** 0.663*** 0.573*** 0.202 -0.0351 0.334
(0.0167) (0.198) (0.186) (0.333) (0.0353) (0.308)
0.00710*** 0.0169*** 0.0129*** -0.00777 0.0196*** 0.0187***
(0.00144) (0.00276) (0.00254) (0.00608) (0.00235) (0.00319)
-0.00775*** -0.0126*** -0.0052*** -0.0190*** -0.0074*** -0.0099***












(0.00267) (0.00459) (0.00912) (0.00424) (0.00519)
1.542*** 0.876*** 0.155* 0.624*** 1.468*** 0.889***
(0.0782) (0.111) (0.0845) (0.185) (0.111) (0.123)
-1.095*** -1.421*** -0.675*** -0.963*** -1.265*** -1.392***












(0.110) (0.147) (0.301) (0.152) (0.167)
26.75*** -1.343 -1.225 0.479 19.90*** -1.570
(0.701) (2.426) (2.371) (4.558) (1.584) (2.601)
2.019*** -3.117* -2.503 -1.713 -2.989** -4.429**
(0.751) (1.623) (1.604) (2.845) (1.519) (1.916)
0.283*** 0.407*** 0.575*** 0.445*** 0.324*** 0.367***
(0.0195) (0.0255) (0.0237) (0.0277) (0.0374) (0.0375)
0.214*** 0.176*** 0.175*** 0.133*** 0.226*** 0.187***
(0.0154) (0.0215) (0.0212) (0.0299) (0.0227) (0.0241)
-0.437*** -0.504*** -0.530*** -0.137 -0.675*** -0.592***
(0.123) (0.133) (0.135) (0.167) (0.144) (0.141)
Constant
-7.315*** -8.387*** -6.464*** -6.202*** -6.908*** -7.613***
(0.176) (0.711) (0.644) (2.214) (0.303) (0.865)
Year Dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Country Dum. No Yes*** Yes*** No No Yes***
Country-Decade Dum. No No No Yes*** No No
Observatons 519,244 511,637 511,637 310,618 519,244 519,244
R^2 0.276 0.379 0.368 0.357 - -


















































Table E.12: Volume of Transferred Arms (without USA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS FE RE FE RE
0.363*** 1.021*** 1.228*** 1.058*** 0.926*** 0.916*** 0.835** 0.998***
(0.0161) (0.136) (0.439) (0.129) (0.171) (0.138) (0.386) (0.369)
0.277*** 0.470*** 0.559* 0.443*** 0.666*** 0.612*** 0.788** 0.692**
(0.0113) (0.115) (0.337) (0.112) (0.117) (0.106) (0.308) (0.300)
-0.112*** -1.049*** -0.952* -1.096*** -0.934*** -0.986*** -0.686 -0.854**
(0.0320) (0.182) (0.499) (0.180) (0.240) (0.189) (0.458) (0.434)
-0.0754*** -0.0340 -0.348 -0.00556 -0.181* -0.152 -0.351 -0.387
(0.0250) (0.104) (0.315) (0.103) (0.109) (0.0992) (0.285) (0.276)





(0.0202) (0.0329) (0.0354) (0.0324) (0.0512) (0.0573)





(0.0617) (0.0706) (0.0754) (0.0704) (0.115) (0.127)





(0.0488) (0.0640) (0.0709) (0.0638) (0.0966) (0.109)





(0.0554) (0.0638) (0.0726) (0.0636) (0.104) (0.115)





(0.0467) (0.477) (0.862) (0.454) (0.599) (1.057)
-0.0182*** 0.0110 0.00276 0.00409 -0.00439 0.00262 0.0167 0.00963
(0.00542) (0.00820) (0.0170) (0.00760) (0.0104) (0.00884) (0.0200) (0.0175)
-0.0139***-0.0257*** -0.0140* -0.0119*** -0.0259***-0.0254*** -0.00920 -0.0120*




(0.00415) (0.00413) (0.00478) (0.00550) (0.00438) (0.00666) (0.00510)
0.0357*** 0.0279* 0.00676
-
0.0173 0.0272* -0.0148 -0.00483
(0.00786) (0.0142) (0.0251) (0.0162) (0.0146) (0.0233) (0.0225)
-0.00806 -0.00522 0.00466
-
-0.0218** -0.0163 0.00734 0.00499
(0.00645) (0.0106) (0.0198) (0.0109) (0.0100) (0.0188) (0.0181)
-0.327 0.376 0.627 -0.172 0.439 0.338 0.286 0.426
(0.238) (0.309) (0.465) (0.259) (0.329) (0.293) (0.436) (0.413)
-1.466*** -0.469* -0.385 -0.260 -0.721** -0.541** -0.329 -0.400
(0.233) (0.277) (0.408) (0.223) (0.286) (0.259) (0.396) (0.372)
-0.271 -0.703*** -0.733**
-
-0.679** -0.717*** -0.358 -0.549**
(0.222) (0.238) (0.292) (0.273) (0.232) (0.331) (0.275)
-1.468*** -1.279** 0.364
-
-0.446 -1.008* 0.945 0.743
(0.290) (0.510) (0.900) (0.575) (0.519) (0.905) (0.871)
1.090*** -0.0990 0.216
-
0.603* 0.362 0.417 0.467
(0.259) (0.344) (0.648) (0.346) (0.321) (0.597) (0.587)
29.39*** 2.644 -5.227 1.730 3.242 4.232 -1.679 -3.506
(2.976) (6.528) (12.16) (6.404) (8.092) (6.808) (12.72) (11.58)
31.97*** 9.010** 1.896 9.470*** 12.07*** 9.608*** 5.172 2.930
(2.235) (3.535) (5.834) (3.552) (3.623) (3.326) (5.315) (5.199)
0.255*** 0.228*** 0.317*** 0.262*** 0.374*** 0.298*** 0.596*** 0.408***
(0.0434) (0.0556) (0.0680) (0.0552) (0.0778) (0.0629) (0.107) (0.0798)
0.0649 0.0450 0.00191 0.0600 0.130*** 0.0986** 0.0476 0.0307
(0.0409) (0.0492) (0.0686) (0.0494) (0.0499) (0.0462) (0.0628) (0.0605)
-0.399 -0.225 -0.112 -0.241 -0.200 -0.217 -0.457 -0.221
(0.425) (0.306) (0.366) (0.309) (0.308) (0.278) (0.335) (0.316)
Constant
-2.383*** -11.03*** -15.74*** -12.08*** -13.07*** -12.13*** -16.00*** -15.51***
(0.521) (1.994) (5.615) (1.756) (2.269) (2.010) (5.502) (4.836)
Year Dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Country Dummies No Yes*** No Yes*** - Yes*** - No
Country-Decade Dum. No No Yes*** No No No Yes*** Yes***
Observatons 9,803 9,803 9,803 9,803 9,803 9,803 9,803 9,803
R^2 0.243 0.389 0.472 0.385 0.169 0.374 0.0606 0.445


















































"Ich versichere an Eides Stat, dass ich die eingereichte Dissertaton „Trade and Uncertainty”
selbstständig verfasst habe. Anderer als der von mir angegebenen Hilfsmitel und Schrifen habe
ich mich nicht bedient. Alle wörtlich oder sinngemäß den Schrifen anderer Autorinnen und/oder
Autoren entnommenen Stellen habe ich kenntlich gemacht." 
__________________________
Florian Johannsen
Lübeck, den 28. Februar 2014
